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A Reconstruction, Using Anthropological Methods, 
of the Second Economy of Soviet Georgia 
Yochanan A] tman 
ABSTRACT 
This study aims to explore the second economy of Soviet Georgia by 
reconstructing aspects of its social organisation and the workings 
of selected examples of second economy activity. 
Since its principal research mode is participant observation, this 
involved living for over a year within a community of recent 
migrants from Soviet Georgia to Israel. This experience offered 
opportunities: 
a) to gain access to everday behaviour in order to establish 
that culture's basic values, and 
b) to build up detailed and cross-checkable case studies. In 
so doing, it aimed to exploit the resources of a living 
community by treating it as a data-base. 
Its further aim, however, is not merely to obtain details of cases 
and to understand these by placing them in their cultural setting. 
These cases, when considered against the background of a people's 
mores and values, provide the building blocks which allow us to 
understand the wider formation of which they are a part. 
The study then aims to engage in the secondary analysis of these 
cases in order to construct a model of Soviet Georgia's system of 
second economy production and distribution. 
While traditional explanations focus on Georgia's natural resources 
as the major reason for its flourishing Second Economy, this study 
looks at primary cultural patterns and daily behaviour conduct which 
underlie the social expressions of a people. It then identifies the 
Social Support Network as a focus of personalised relationships in 
Soviet Georgia. The Social Support Network is also the power base 
of Second Economy activity. The way the network operates and the 
shape it takes determines the scope of its operations and the ability 
of members to functioias agents in that economy. 
After setting up the core values of Soviet Georgia's society and 
their manifestations in the Second Economy, two detailed case studies 
examine the structure and operation of the production and distribution 
of goods. These are supplemented by six accounts of crisis events 
which allow us a close look into the way the informal system copes 
with emergencies. 
All of this enables a reassessment of Soviet Georgia's Second Economy, 
the sources of its rapid expansion and unrivalled success in the Soviet 
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involved living for over a year within a community of recent 
migrants from Soviet Georgia to Israel. This experience offered 
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These cases, when considered against the background of a people's 
mores and values, provide the building blocks which allow us to 
understand the wider formation of which they are a part. 
The study then aims to engage in the secondary analysis of these 
cases in order to construct a model of Soviet Georgia's system of 
second economy production and distribution. 
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as the major reason for its flourishing Second Economy, this study 
looks at primary cultural patterns and daily behaviour conduct which 
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of Second Economy activity. The way the network operates and the 
shape it takes determines the scope of its operations and the ability 
of members to functicnas agents in that economy. 
After setting up the core values of Soviet Georgia's society and 
their manifestations in the Second Economy, two detailed case studies 
examine the structure and operation of the production and distribution 
of goods. These are supplemented by six accounts of crisis events 
which allow us a close look into the way the informal system copes 
with emergencies. 
All of this enables a reassessment of Soviet Georgia's Second Economy, 
the sources of its rapid expansion and unrivalled success in the Soviet 
system as well as possible future developments. 
PART I 
THE RESEARCH QUESTION 
AND THE 
METHOD OF INVESTIGATION 
CHAPTER 1 
INTRODUCTION'TO THE RESEARCH 
Page 
SOVIET GEORGIA AND THE SECOND ECONOW 1-1 
THE RESEARCH QUESTION 
1.1 Some Observations 1-1 
1.2 Some Explanations 1-3 
1.3 Another Dimension - the Philosophy behind this Study 1-4 
2. SOVIET GEORGIA -A GENERAL OVERVIEW 1-6 
2.1 History -A Brief Outline 1-6 
2.2 The People 1-7 
2.3 The Economy 1-8 
2.4 Georgia under Soviet Rule 1-10 
2.5 The Last Twenty Years: 1-11 
The Sixties and Seventies in Georgia 
3. THE SECOND ECONOMY AS AN EMERGING FIELD OF STUDY 1-14 
3.1 A Note on Names and Terminology 1-14 
3.2 A Working Definition of the Second Economy 1-15 
3.3 The Scope of the Field 1-16 
(NOTES) 1-LCJ 
1. SOVIET GEORGIA AND THE SECOND ECONOMY: THE RESEARCH QUESTION 
1.1 Soine Observations 
"Georgians are known throughout the Soviet Union as a high-living 
breed ... Socialism seems never to have taken firm root in 
Georgia, where money talks too loudly to suit proper Communists. " 
(Kaiser, 19? 6, p. 110) 
"Among other Soviets, Georgians have a reputation for paying the 
biggest bribes to store clerks for DUMMY goods, bidding the 
highest prices for used cars., renting private rooms at the old 
Sandunovsky baths in Moscow and banqueting Like grandee8 on 
special succulent lamb 8ha8hlik flown in, with servants., on an 
illicitly chartered plane from Tbi8ili. " 
(Smith, 1980, P. 125-6) 
"of all the places we visited, Moscow's heavy hand seemed to fall 
lightest on Georgia. " 
(Stewart, 1969, p. 105) 
"ALL my information points to the fact that there was a going 
rate in those years (the sixties and early seventies in Georgia) 
for ministerial posts, ranging from 100,000 Rubles for the not 
very important post of Minister for Social Security, up to 
250,000 to 300,000 Rubles for such bottomless feeding troughs as 
the Ministries of Trade and Light Industry. At the time, there 
were more people ready and able to pay several hundred thousand 
Rubles for a ministerial post than there were vacancies, so when 
a post did come up, a competition began - something very like an 
auction would take place behind the scenes, although the victor 
was not always the highest bidder. That is because the competi- 
tion was not merely among the aspirants to the vacant post but 
also a competition among the recipients of their bribes .. . 11 
(Simis, 1982, p. 35-36) 
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"The whole of Georgia knew that the only way to get into the 
Tbilisi Medical Institute in the sixties was either to have 
considerable patronage or pay 15,000 Rubteej and all were equal 
before this law. " 
(Simia, 1982, p. 169) 
These impressions have been argued about consistently over a long 
period, and shared by leading experts on Soviet economics: 
"The literature on Soviet Anti-Syetemic Economic Behaviour (which 
is roughly congruent with the term Second Economy here) is full 
to bursting with references to Georgians ... It is obvious to 
the eye of any traveller that Georgians are considerably richer 
than the population of RSFSR, except perhaps in Moscow and 
Leningrad, where there is concentration of welt-paid people and 
the official figures much exceed the Russian average ... the 
Georgian propensity to ASEB is notorious, and a few (literary) 
references are enough. This rather firm conctusion - and I make 
bold to call it no less - has the most severe consequences for 
many estimates of the Soviet economy. " 
(WiZee, 1980) 
"In form this (private activity in industry and trade) may not 
differ greatly from what takes place in other regions, but in 
Georgia it -seems to have been carried out on an unparalleled 
scale and with unrivalled scope and daring ... illegal private 
activity and corruption seems especially highly developed in the 
southern regions of the country: In Transcaucasia, and in 
Central Asia ... however, Georgia has a reputation second to 
none in this respect. " 
(Grossman, 1977) 
Along with the numerous anecdotal impressions of travellers, journal- 
ists and scholars, let us consider some official figures. It is said 
that Georgia had in 1972 more private cars per capita than any other 
of the Soviet republics (Kipnis, 1978), had the highest percentage of 
the population in institutions of higher education in 1970, going by 
break-down of nationality (with Jews being the only exception) 
(Hirszowicz, 1982); and an enormous number of specialists avoided 
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their designated job assignments, while still managing a good standard 
of living (Suny, 1979). Wiles (1980), estimates that 25% of Georgian 
GNP is black. 
We cannot avoid concluding that there is remarkable unanimity of 
opinion among Sovietologists and Western observers, that Georgia is 
unrivalled in the USSR both in the level and in the sophistication of 
its second economy. 
1.2 Some Explanations 
Following that, the questions that arise are: how is it that Georgia 
has become the epitome of corruption in the Soviet system? or, what is 
it that makes Georgia a fertile ground for a flourishing second 
economy? and how and why does it work so successfully? 
A traditional explanation highlights the natural resources of Georgia 
and its high output in growing quality and scarce products: in par- 
ticular its winter vegetables, tobacco, flowers, fruits, honey, silk 
(Davi taya, 1972). And the f act that Georgi a has vi rtual ly a monopoly 
in teas (96% of all Soviet production); citrus fruits (98% of all 
union produce); and wines (nicknamed 'the wine-mine'). This goes 
along with the popular image of the Georgian, who makes money by 
filling a suitcase with tangarines or carnations, and sells them on a 
freezing winter day in a Moscow market (Smith, 1980; Kaiser, 1976; 
Parsons, 1982; Wiles, 1980). 
However, as Grossman notes (1977), the agricultural scene is rather 
distinct from the enormous private activity in industry and trade; and 
one cannot limit the overall boom simply to one sector of the economy. 
In addition, the question, of how does the unofficial system operate 
in a strictly controlled regime, with numerous bureaucratic procedures 
and official barriers, still remains. 
Other factors mentioned are the huge tourist movement centred on the 
shores of the Black Sea and the mountain health resorts: some three 
million tourists annually (Davidashvili, 1971). As well as the rela- 
tively warm weather, which considerably reduces living costs in winter 
(Wiles, 1980). 
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Yet another factor sometimes used to explain the economic state of 
affairs is the traditionally strong nationalistic tendencies, which 
work in both directions: Georgians attempt to reject directives from 
Moscow2 (the official, state-owned economy is, of course, associated 
with the Gosplan); whilst Moscow is somewhat reluctant to impose its 
'Russification' policy and allows the Republic considerable latitude 
in the running of its internal affairs (Kazemzadeh, 1979; Kipnis, 
1978; Suny, 1979; Wiles, '1980). 
1.3 Another Dimension - the Philosophy behind this Study 
While traditionally, Soviet Georgia's flourishing second economy has 
been the preoccupation of economists or political scientists, I agree 
with Wiles (1980) that in order to understand the issue in question, 
one should look into the fundamentals of the culture: to the indi- 
viduals concerned themselves, employing person-centred methods of 
research through personal involvement. It is only by closely observ- 
ing a community's daily routine, by assessing the beliefs and values 
of a people, by looking at actual behaviour in particular situations, 
that a working model of a society and its economic way of life can be 
established. This is a process which anthropologists have termed 
participant observation. There is really nothing revolutionary in the 
idea - possibly any traveller to Georgia grasps the fundamental dif- 
ferences in the atmosphere and daily conduct, as compared with other 
parts of the Soviet Union3; yet it is a novelty: the concept and its 
methodology have never previously been employed in the context of the 
workings of a second economy. 
There are then a number of questions that arise when we come to 
consider the role of Soviet Georgia within the overall setting of the 
Soviet Union. Firstly, if Soviet Georgia is indeed different from 
other Soviet republics, on what bases do these differences spring 
f rom? If, as observers appear to insist, there is to be found in 
Georgia a distinctive culture that "is much closer to the Mediter- 
ranean world than to Moscow" (Smith, 1980), then how does this culture 
'work' in its dealings with a Moscow-based and controlled bureaucracy? 
And if, as we believe, there is a flourishing second economy in 
Georgia, how does the operation of this economy relate both to the 
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culture in which it is set, and to the rigidities of the formal system 
- the first economy? 
In short, what I am primarily concerned with in this thesis is to 
provide an understanding of the nature, and some indication of the 
extent of the second economy in Soviet Georgia, the processes by which 
it operates and the cultural bases on which it depends. In doing so, 
I follow a truism of anthropology - that an understanding of economic 
phenomena cannot be achieved if these are separated from their cult- 
ural milieu (eg. Douglas and Isherwood, 1980). 
In this thesis I will concentrate on the period of the 1960's and 
1970's, roughly till about the fall of Mzhavanadze - the deposed first 
secretary in 1972: a move that had political repercussions which 
extended right throughout the Republic, and which provides a suitable 
demarcation point. 
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2. SOVIET GEORGIA -A GENERAL OVERVIEW 
Georgia4 is one of the fifteen republics comprising the Soviet Union. 
It occupies an area of about 70,000 sq. km. (26,757 sq. miles) and 
lies in the Central and Western Transcaucasia. To the West, it bor- 
ders the shores of the Black Sea, and to the North rise the Greater 
Caucasus mountains. The South is also mountainous (more than 80% of 
its territory is covered by mountains and hills). To the East lies 
the Azerbaijani plain. 
Georgia's bordering neighbours are the RSFSR, Armenian SSR, Azerbaijan 
SSR, and Turkey. It contains two autonomous Soviet Socialist 
Republics: the Abkhaz (capital: Sukhumi) and the Adjarian (capital: 
Batumi). There is also one Autonomous Region: the South Ossetian 
(capital: Tskhinvali). The Republic's capital is Tbilisi, which has 
enjoyed this role for over 1500 years. 
2.1 History -A Brief Outline 
While tradition relates the Georgians back to the biblical Japhet, it 
is generally accepted that the early inhabitants of the Caucasus were 
connected with the Central Asian Hittites and that there were strong 
Semitic influences. At the time of Alexander the Great the first 
Georgian dynasty was set up (4th Century BC), to which period the 
written Georgian language can be first traced. 5 
The first century AD saw the whole area come under Roman influence 
through which Christianity was introduced - the Georgians were amongst 
the first in the region to accept it (4th and 5th Centuries). 
It was not until the 11th Century, however, that Georgia became a 
unified kingdom and an important regional power. A century of a 
strong Georgian empire began, with borders on both the Black and 
Caspian Seas. It was a period of cultural expansion, too, in which 
Rustavel i's i mmortal saga 'The Kni ght in the Ti ger's Ski n' was wri t- 
ten. It is a period on which the nation's historical memory is 
strongly centred, and is continually referred to. 
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In the following centuries the Georgian kingdom was torn to pieces as 
much by inner rivalry and local interests as by invading forces: 
Persians, Mongols, Ottomans, Arabs, Russians. These were to blend the 
Georgian people of the region into a unique race with a distinctive 
culture. Gradually the Caucasus came under increasing Turkish and 
Russian influences. Finally, King George XII submitted his Kingdom to 
Russian rule, at the turn of the 19th Century. This was followed by a 
process of gradual incorporation into the Greater Russian Empire. In 
1921 Georgia was forced into the Soviet Union after a brief period of 
independence (1918-1921), first as part of the Transcaucasian federa- 
tion, and later as an independent republic. 
2.2 The People 
According to the last Census, in 1979, Georgia houses just over 
5,000,000 people, splitting evenly between urban and rural popu- 
lations. The native Georgians make up a clear majority (some 70%), 
with Armenians, Russians and Azeris the largest minorities (9%, 7.5% 
and 5% respectively). The Jewish minority, once some 1.5% of the 
population (up to the beginning of the 1970's), has practically halved 
as a result of the mass emigration of the last decade. 
There are tensions between the different ethnic groups, especially as 
the Georgian majority tries to impose its hegemony and mores on the 
Republic's minorities. Armenians are traditionally the most hated 
element (Elyashvili, 1975; Kazemzadeh, 1979); and recently (1978) the 
Abkhaz minority issued a formal request asking to be detached from the 
Georgian Republic and Joined up in the neighbouring RSFSR. Georgia is 
possibly the only Republic where Russians do not occupy the dominant 
positions in the political structure, the education system, or the 
economy (Parsons, 1982; Freidgut, 1974; Simis, 1982). Ethnic mixing 
(by inter-marriage) between the Georgians and others is almost nil 
(Peters, 1981). All these factors serve to foster the Georgian na- 
tional identity, stressing local patriotism and rejecting alien cult- 
ures. 
Georgians are forced to live in close-knit communities, as nearly 80% 
of the land is mountainous and only 40% of the land area is suitable 
for cultivation. The land under tillage is four times more densely 
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inhabited than the USSR average (Davitaya, 1972) and the majority of 
the population is concentrated in the valleys, which occupy only 13% 
of the territory (Gegeshidze, 1974). 
Towns are growing fast, attracting not only rural dwellers, but also 
non-Georgians. Tbilisi in particular has a long standing tradition of 
a cosmopolitan centre. Georgians, however, stick to Georgia. Only 
90,000 of them (in 1970) were estimated to live in other parts of the 
USSR; possibly the lowest incidence of ethnic dispersion in the Soviet 
Union (Parsons, 1982). 
The standard of living, relative to other Soviet republics, is high, 
and is probably the highest in the whole of the USSR, aggregating 
primary and second economy incomes together (Wiles, 1980). There are 
important pointers to this such as Georgia having the highest number 
of cars and physicians per capita; a saving account average twice the 
national average (though the 'official' GNP showed a very low growth 
rate). Yet the most recent reports indicate that today even in 
Georgia certain items (in particular meats, butter, grains) are ra- 
tioned and Georgians are finding it increasingly difficult to afford 
the soaring black market prices. 
2.3 The Economy 
Georgia is the land of 'the Golden Fleece', blessed with numerous 
natural resources. In the words of St. George (1973): "It is hard to 
imagine a piece of land more richly endowed by nature" (p. 204). 
Resources include marble, peat, zinc, coal, iron, oil and particularly 
manganese. But Georgia's reputation is highest in respect of food 
production, which is nearly 45% of the total output and is the main 
source of employment (Schroeder-Greenslade, 1980; Peters, 1981). 
Recreational facilities for tourists and holiday-makers in the Black 
Sea and mountain areas provide a further major money earner. Georgia 
enjoys a monopoly in citrus fruits: 98% of the total production of 
the USSR (Davidashvili, 1971); in teas (96%) and in table wines, which 
were praised by Homer over 2,000 years ago (Peters, 1981). But it is 
also a major source of high quality tobacco, vegetables (especially 
winter vegetables), fruits, flowers, silk. 
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While this study does not deal with the second economy of the agricul- 
tural sector, it is a well established fact that this is a major 
contributor to the flourishing informal economy. The Georgian who 
packs his suitcases with tangerines, or the season's flowers, to sell 
them in frozen Moscow or Leningrad, is not just a popular stereotype. 
The reality is sustained by the dense air traffic between Georgia's 
major towns and other republics6, which has resulted in a waiting list 
of two weeks on average -a fact disclosed not only by my informants, 
but also by the London office of Aeroflot. 
Georgian recreation resorts are famous throughout the Soviet Union and 
beyond. There were more than 3,000,000 tourists in 1969 (David- 
ashvili, 1971). Among the Black Sea visitors are many of the Soviet 
leaders (Maclean, 1980) (Krushchev was arrested there, whilst on 
vacation), and the health spas of Borzom17 and Zkhaltubo are renowned. 
This massive traffic should be another contributor to the highly 
successful second economy. 8 
Georgia is also well industrialized. It produces steel, pig iron and 
rolled metal - it stood in third place in the Union in metallurgical 
production in 1970 (Davitaya, 1972). Its hydro-electric power poten- 
tial is far beyond its current needs. In Batumi there are oil refin- 
eries whilst Georgia produces agricultural machinery and as much as 
one-third of the all-Union production of locomotives (Davidashvili, 
1971). It has a developed chemical and pharmaceutical industry. 
About one-eight of the total workforce was employed in the heavy 
industry in 1975 (Schroeder-Greenslade, 1980). 
In light industry one should mention, in particular, footwear9 
(Davidashvili, 1971) food preservations and fabrics (Davitaya, 1972). 
Light industry accounted for about a quarter of all employees in 1975 
(Sch roe der-Greensl ade, 1980). 
One of the strong characteristics of Georgian economy is that a high 
proportion of it (mainly in the agricultural sector) is conducted in 
private. That is to say, it is conducted privately with official 
sanction - to distinguish it from unofficial, second economy activity. 
In 1975 this sector accounted for about two-fifths of agricultural 
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employment and was responsible for almost half of agricultural pro- 
duce; it accounted for one-eighth of farmed land and for over half the 
livestock herds. The private sector produced 64% of the meat, 54% of 
the mi I k, 43% of the eggs and 46% of the wool .It al so suppl i ed 64% 
of the fruits and 51% of the vegetables in Georgian production. In 
1978,41% of urban housing was privately owned in Georgia. All these 
figures are high and above the average for the USSR - the highest 
private profile for any republic (Schroeder-Greenslade, 1980). 
This large and successful private sector necessarily makes the seepage 
of resources f rom the publ ic sector i nto pri vate hands much easi er. 
After all, as Wiles (1980) indicates, "it is difficult to distinguish 
a private pig from a non-private pig and the pig itself can't care 
less about where it comes from. " 
2.4 Georgia under Soviet Rule 
In 1921, after enjoying -a short period of independence (1918-1921) as 
a Social Democratic Republic, Georgia was 'freed' by the 11th Red 
Army, and since then has been part of the USSR, 10 one of fifteen 
republics in the Union. 
The first Soviet years in Georgia saw a rapid economic development 
accompanied by the retention of much of the country's cultural autono- 
my. Yet an underground resistance movement existed, and an attempt to 
overthrow the regime was made in 1924. The church was i traditional 
opponent of communism and its leadership was arrested after making an 
international appeal for help against religious persecution. 
The 1930's and 1940's saw two Georgi ans standi ng at the hi ghest pi n- 
nacles of power within the Soviet system - Stalin and Beria. Both 
leaned heavily on Georgia in a reign of terror. During their time, 
forced collectivization changed the foundations of the domestic econo- 
my dramatically and many of the leading figures in Georgian Bolshevism 
and the intellectual elite were liquidated, some experiencing show 
trials, some not. Yet it is symptomatic that once Stalin was denounc- 
ed by Khrushchev at the 20th Party Congress (1956), he at once became 
a national symbol and still is to this day. 11 
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In the Great Patriotic War - the Soviet term for World War II - 
Georgia, though under threat of invasion from the Germans, stayed 
intact. And, as with other regions, Georgians were enlisted in the 
Forces en masse and f ought bravely. 12 It was a Georgian who flew the 
Red Flag over the Reichstag: a symbol of Soviet victory. 
The early 1950's were characterized by a bitter power struggle over 
supremacy in the Caucasus and Georgia, with Beria Cthe butcher of 
Georgia') fighting fiercely to retain his position. He fell in June 
1953, and was replaced by one of Khrushchev's men, Mzhavanadze, who 
was to rule for nineteen years. 
2.5 The Last Twenty Years: the Sixties and Seventies in Georgia 
The 1960's and early 1970's are the chosen period of this research 
project, as this covers the span of time my informants were active 
economically and otherwise; and most of the information generated 
relates to this period. 
The 1960's and early 1970's were characterized by rapid economic 
growth, most of it being unofficial, however, and therefore not re- 
corded. Official figures ostensibly point to a poor economic perfor- 
mance and a less than average standard of living (Peters, 1981; 
Shroeder-Greenslade, 1980; Suny, 1979) - both claims are the reverse 
of the truth if the whole economic picture is considered. Under 
Mzhavanadze, the second economy thrived. Stories spread about under- 
ground millionaires, of which the most famous was Otari Lazishvili who 
- according to the legend - had his bath taps made of pure gold. Even 
the church hierarchy was corrupt. 
However, one way or another, the 1960's were a period of marked pros- 
peri ty: many rural areas were introduced to electricity, running 
water and sewerage; transportation was improved, and, at the start of 
the 1970's, Georgia had more cars and better housing per capita than 
any other Soviet republic. It also had the highest density of doctors 
and academic professionals in general. 
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In 1972, the tide turned for many: Mzhavanadze was dismissed and 
replaced by Shevardnadze, who had a reputation for being an honest and 
tough person. Apparently he decided to bring an end to the prevalent 
state of affairs, and mass purges began: hundreds of people were 
sacked from top-level positions and some 25, OPO were arrested. It 
took some time for the new regime to stabilize, with both sides of the 
dispute recognizing reality. Shevardnadze at last understood that 
there was no way of uprooting the second economy (there had been some 
bombs, and a fire had almost destroyed the Tbilisi Opera House, which 
could have been an attempt on his life -a warning not to take things 
too far). On the other hand, much of the most extravagant forms of 
corruption are no longer to be found these days in Georgia. Thus, 
higher education and the Tbilisi Medical School, in particular, are no 
longer a short path to fortune through 'admission fees' and false 
diplomas. The same is true with the Church, which was known to be a 
special interest of Tamara Mzhavanadze, the First Secretary's wife 
(nicknamed Tsarina Tamara, after the legendary queen of the 12th 
Century Georgian EmpireL And it is probable that ministerial posts 
cannot be bought for money today, and that underground millionaires do 
not indulge in conspicuous consumption as flagrantly as before. 
The 1960's and 1970's also saw a steady increase in national revival: 
a 're-nationalization' process (Suny, 1979). This tendency to 
'Georgianization' of the country expressed itself in various ways. 
For instance, there was discrimination against minority ethnic groups 
in higher education, from which not only the Armenians (a tradition- 
ally hated element in Georgia) particularly suffered but also the 
Abkhazians and - the Russians! Georgia is the only Republic where 
Russians are not automatically the better educated (Parsons, 1982). 
Above all, there was the campaign against the Moscow initiative to 
introduce Russian at the expense of Georgian, which came to a climax 
in 1978, when some 30,000 demonstrated in Tbilisi. 
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In the 1960's and 1970's some 99% of all Georgians regarded Georgian 
as their native tongue, and recently only 25% claimed fluency in 
Russian; but this is an improvement over past decades (Parsons, 1982). 
Georgians rarely inter-marry. In 1969, it was estimated that 93.5% of 
Georgians married other Georgians (Peters, 1981). 
In 1972 a society for the protection of Georgian historic monuments 
was founded, the first of its kind in the USSR. And in 1976/1977 a 
small group of nationalists, headed by Zviad Gamasakhurdia, the son of 
a famous Georgian novelist, made a statement "welcoming military 
intervention by the United States to aid Georgia's secession from the 
n Soviet Union. (David Shipler, The New York Times, 24th July, 1978). 
Earlier in the 1960's the fifteen hundredth anniversary of Tbilisi and 
the eight hundredth anniversary of Shota Rustaveli's birth were given 
much attention and celebrated with exaggerated grandeur. 
Present intelligence from Georgia talks of a decline in economic 
prosperity. Some consumer goods are rationed, including meat, eggs 
and butter. Black market prices have soared and fewer can afford to 
buy. Regarding nationalistic tendencies, they are still strong. In 
March 1981, two mass demonstrations were staged in Tbilisi against 
Russification attempts; and last November, the same Zviad 
Gamasakhurdia protested to Andropov about cultural suppression of 
Georgians in Azerbaijan (Tavisuplebi's Tribune (40), May 1983). 
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3. THE SECOND ECONOMY AS AN EMERGING FIELD OF STUDY 
3.1 A Note on Names and Terminology 
The emerging area of research, which I refer to in this study as 'the 
second economy', is known under various names -a reflection on its 
diverse origins and immature state of development. Other common names 
include: the irregular economy, the hidden economy, the shadow econo- 
my, the black economy, the underground economy, the subterranean 
economy, the informal economy. While there were several attempts to 
classify them in some meaningful pattern (eg: Gershuny and Pahl, 
1980; Ditton, 1979; South, 1982; Henry, 1981; Gaudin and Schiray, 
1982; Mars, 1982), these have tended to be somewhat personal and 
specific13 (South, 1982). So it is left to the investigator concerned 
to evolve a suitable terminology and framework of meanings. 
When considering an appropriate name, I ruled out the hidden, under- 
ground, subterranean and shadow economies - because they do not corre- 
spond well to the Georgian reality. There is nothing really hidden 
about that part of Georgian economy, it certainly is neither under- 
ground nor subterranean; and there is some doubt as to who actually 
shadows who - is the 'first' economy shadowing the 'second', or is it 
the other way round? - as some of this research evidence suggests. 
The black economy seems to be a somewhat-misleading title, especially 
after a whole spectrum of 'colours' were introduced for the analysis 
of the Soviet market (Katsenelinboigen, 1977,1978). And there is 
nothing peculiarly esoteric or occult about that economy. To the 
contrary, all evidence points towards its being a well-organized 
system, with wide social approval. 
So I was left with two concepts that fitted the case better- the 
informal economy and the second economy. I did incline to favour the 
former, because it captures one essential difference: the variant of 
formality versus informality. But I declined it for the latter, 
mainly because the second economy is the more established term used in 
reference to the Soviet economy, 14 and eliminates certain ethical 
qualms - is value neutral as far as is humanly possible. 
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3.2 A Working Definition of the 'Second Economy' 
Throughout this study the standard term used will be THE SECOND 
ECONOMY. In defining it I follow Grossman (1977) and Mars (1982) with 
some amendments. 
The second economy comprises all movements of resources that fulfil 
both following tests: 
(a) are directly or indirectly for private gain; and 
(b) are in some significant respects in knowing contravention of 
either the letter or the spirit of the law. 
While Grossman suggests that the fulfilment of either of these condi- 
tions is sufficient for an activity to be designated as part of the 
second economy, here we are concerned only with the illicit activ- 
ities, and therefore exclude the private legal sector, which falls 
within Grossman's original statement. To this degree, my definition 
is more restrictive. On the other hand, this definition is more 
inclusive, by accommodating any transaction which serves the said 
ends. It is the totality of transactions (unrecorded or recorded 
under misleading headings) that comprise a parallel economic order, 
which can rightfully be described as a system, running alongside the 
'first', official economy. 
The definition also allows for indirect as well as direct private 
gain. This is important, for in the Georgian reality it is part of 
social mores to solicit for nepotistic advantage, and one's commitment 
reaches far beyond the nuclear family. This is in accordance with the 
philosophy of this study, which stresses the significance of broad 
cultural factors in shaping an informal economy, or, indeed, any 
economy. 
Finally, to avoid any unforeseen omissions, the definition of 'law' 
was enlarged to include violations against the spirit of the law - to 
accommodate such well-known phenomena as, for example, the 'Tolkach' - 
the fixer who uses informal means to reach legitimate ends. While he 
may not intentionally be breaking the law, he nevertheless knowingly 
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uses ways which are in clear breach of formal regulations. 
15 As such, 
these acts fall within what is defined here as 'the second economy'. 
3.3 The Scope of the Field: Studies on the Second Economy 
A recent bibliography on materials pertinent to the second economy 
lists over thirty books published in the last decade with direct 
reference to this subject; and more than a hundred other publi- 
cations (The Canadian Network on the Informal Economy, 1982). And 
South's (1982) bibliography is even more comprehensive. 
Studies of the second economy are now accepted as providing not only 
knowledge in their own right, but also useful insights into a whole 
range of practical activities - from the informal workings of 
industrial relations systems (Mars and Mitchell, 1976) and studies 
of workers self-control (Henry, 1978), through psychological impli- 
cations of pilferage (Zeitlin, 1971) to its real influence on 
political perceptions and government welfare policies (Cornford, 1980; 
OCPU, 1978). There is, in addition, a growing body of comparative 
material now surfacing from different countries, some of which are 
macro-estimates and calculations of extent (Gutmann, 1976; Feige, 1979); 
some are attempts at micro studies of particular aspects or locations 
(Ferman et al, 1978), and some attempts at articulating both levels 
(Henry, 1978; Gershuny, 1978; Gershuny & Pahl, 1980). 
Illicit informal economic activity is as old as economic activity 
itself. Wherever there have been social organisations and legitimate, 
formalised economic relations, there were also to be found the bending 
of rules. One of the most fascinating accounts (and a most detailed 
one) of earlier times, is the 'Merchant of Prato' (Origo, 1963) who 
lived in this Italian town and fiddled the tax authorities in the 14th 
century. 
More systematic sociological studies started to tackle this issue 
only in the last two decades, and itwas not until very recently 
that the idea of a 'second' parallel economic system, running 
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alongside the formal 'first' economy and with the characteristics 
of complex relations matrices has clearly emerged. (First 
formulated at the Outer Circle Policy Unit paper, 1978). 
Henry (1981) put it well when suggesting: 
How can we look at marriage and the family, for 
example, and ignore extra-marital affairs which 
may maintain the very existence of many families? 
How can we estimate the real economic activity of 
a country when as much as one fifth of its work 
force may have unregistered second jobs or be 
involved in informal trading networks? How can 
we judge the effectiveness of our health care 
services when the bulk of health care takes place 
in the family and local community? We need to 
know how these informal institutions operate, 
and also how they relate to their formal counterparts. 
(Henry, 1981, p. l. Also quoted in Mars, 1982) 
Mars (1982) identifies three types of economies which correspond 
to a typology of development: the industrialised societies versus 
the developing countires; and to the nature of market-government 
relations: western 'market' economies (eg Western Europe and 
North America) versus centrally controlled 'Soviet-type' economies, 
in particular those of the Soviet Union and the Eastern Block. 
Each of these economies has, it can be argued, its own peculiar 
second economy and these are not easily comparable. Firstly, 
because of different standings on some key economic questions, 
like: employment Unemployment in the Socialist democracies 
is ruled out on the basis of ideological reasons while in 
Capitalist economies it was always thought to be a necessary 
pitfall to balance industrial relations. Or Prices - in the 
Western tradition these should be largely left to the 'market forces'. 
In the communist countries these are firmly fixed and centrally 
controlled as 'profits' bear a totally different meaning than 
in the West. 
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Secondly, because the nature of the work organisation, the pay 
structure, the law (many economic crimes in the Soviet Union 
would be prized for entrepreneuriality in the United States) are 
so vastly different. Last (but not least) because the social 
organisation of a society, the beliefs and values of a people 
and the do's and dont's of a culture, are a major contributor - 
as will be argued in this thesis - to the shape a second economy 
will take. 
It has been suggested that the Soviet Union - the epitome of a 
centrally controlled, command economy - is characterised by an 
extensive second economy and that this represents a dispropor- 
tionate percentage of its total economic activity (eg OCPU, 1978). 
We have, however, no empirically based micro studies for the 
Soviet Union, so far, and the present study is therefore a 
pioneering venture on the Soviet scene. And while there were 
previous attempts to utilize similar sources - notably the 
Harvard project in the 1950s and, more recently, Gur Ofer and 
his team (1979,1980), none, however, have used the concepts and 
methods of social anthropology, nor related such findings to the 
nucleus of culture and social organisation, which are at heart of 




1. Defitsitny = Deficit ie. goods in shortage. 
2. As manifested in the 'language battles' between the Georgian and 
the Russian Languages in the 1970's and the beginning of the 
1980's (Peters, 1981). 
3. "Georgi a: I was on my way to Georgia that morning. And when we 
landed in Tbilisi, the Capital, one hour later, I knew I'd defi- 
nitely left Russia behind. My guide was already out on the 
tarmac with a car to meet me, the bar was miraculously open in 
the arrival lounge, and the first thing she did was to offer me a 
glass of Georgian champagne before we set off for the city" 
(Hone, 1982). 
"Life in Tbilisi, the Georgian Capital has a Latin flavour all 
its own. In its people, its mood and mores, it is much closer to 
the Mediterranean than to Moscow" (Smith, 1980, p. 125). 
"Immediately the fact that we were now in Georgia was brought 
home by the appearance of a party of young Georgians who had come 
out for the day from Tbilisi" (Maclean, 1980, p. 38, part II). 
"It is this psychological element - the desire to ensure the 
survival of their cultures, and a certain Middle-Eastern style of 
art, food, manners and attitudes, that characterizes the 
Armenians, the Georgians and the Azerbaijanis, setting them apart 
from the Russians" (Kazemzadeh, 1979, p. 1). 
4. So called in the West, possibly deriving from the Persian word 
'Gurgistan', and not, as is often thought, from St. George, the 
patron saint of Georgia. (Lang, 1962) 
5. The Georgian language, one of the oldest spoken, being very 
different from the neighbouring languages, is a source of tradi- 
tional national pride. 
6. For instance, there are two flights a day of the largest size 
Soviet jets between Tbilisi and Tashkent (the Capital of 
Uzbekistan and the fourth largest Soviet City), whereas there is 
usually only one daily and sometimes no flight, from Tashkent to 
other republics. 
7. My informants used to particularly praise the Borzomi mineral 
waters which are used as a medicine for stomach upsets and head- 
aches, and as a remedy for hangovers. 
8. My main informant in the Biscuit Factory Case (Chapter 6) made 
close contacts with highly ranked KGB officials, who used to come 
on vacation to Georgia. Luckily for him, he never had to use 
these connections. 
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9. This, however, does not exclude the exceeding demand for foreign 
produced shoes and boots - one of the second economy's most 
flourishing activities. (See Rules of Informal Trade in Chapter 
7). 
10. Technically, under Article 72 of the (1977) Soviet Constitution, 
"each Union Republic retains the right to freely secede from the 
USSR. " 
11. It is a bitter irony that more than a hundred lives were lost and 
several hundreds were wounded and exiled in pro-Stalin demonstra- 
tions in Tbilisi in March 1956. 
12. It is interesting that the Germans, trusting anti-Russian feel- 
ings, attempted to form a Georgian legion. 
13. As in different places and at different times the definition of 
legality is sometimes in considerable variance, necessarily the 
illegal acts would be defined and termed differently. 
14. The most recent international conference about the topic was 
labelled 'The Second Economy of the USSR' - in the Kennan 
Institute, Washington, 1980. 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
The method used in this study is innovative. Firstly it involved 
detailed participant observation within a living community, carried 
out to reconstruct aspects of its recent past. In this respect there 
have been several well accepted precedents. It is, however, in the 
adaptation of this method to reconstructed aspects of second economy 
activity that this study can claim to break new ground. 
1.1 Two Pioneering Projects 
Two projects deserve particular mention as pioneering in this field. 
These are the Harvard Project on the Soviet Social System, carried out 
during the early fifties, and the Columbia University Research in 
Contemporary Cultures, which preceded it by a few years (1947-53). 
Both were massive in the utilization of resources and the scope of 
their concerns. 
The Harvard Project, over four years, interviewed 329 individuals for 
two to four days each, and administered 2,718 general questionnaires 
plus a further 9,748 questionnaires on special topics. They also 
conducted some 60 detailed psychological tests and issued 48 manu- 
scripts on specific topics (Bauer et al, 1964). To this day, these 
comprise the major source of systematic social data on the Soviet 
system, drawn from the actual experiences of living individuals opera- 
ting within the system. The Columbia Research Project employed 120 
persons over f our years to do an i ntensi ve study of seven cul tures. 
Though it depended heavily on exploitation of key informants (in the 
anthropological tradition), it also used a variety of documented data, 
ranging from written and oral literature to film reviews, children's 
diaries and dream analysis (Mead, 1953). Both projects sprang out of 
the post World War II period - when cultures became inaccessible for 
direct observation and study or, worse than that, simply ceased to 
exist (eg. the East European Jewish Shtetl). Yet is was considered a 
high priority to study these cultures, either with a view to gaining 
or increasing information on a hostile country, or, attempting to 
preserve the memory of almost extinct cultures for future generations. 
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Similar to the Columbia Project, but with a heavy linguistic bias, was 
the Language and Culture Atlas of Ashkenazi Jewry compiled at Columbia 
University in the early sixties (Weinreich, 1962). 
Reconstructive research is also fundamental to Oral History (eg. the 
Oxford History Workshops Series: Samuel, 1975) and indeed, as 
Goldberg (1981) comments, is an indivisible part of the traditional 
ethnographer's fieldwork routine, though to a lesser degree. 
1.2 The Choice of Methodology 
This research, however, seeks to add a fresh aspect to contemporary 
studies on cultures at a distance. It focuses on the 'second economy' 
of a section of Soviet society, which is a novelty in itself. But, 
more importantly, it stresses the importance of a cultural focus in 
studying the phenomenon of the 'second economy'. 
The view of this study, firmly underlined in its methodology, is that 
a central aspect of life - such as the role the second economy plays 
in Soviet Georgian society - should be studied and understood as 
integral to other aspects of life in contemporary Georgia. But by 
exploring the entirety of Georgian culture, and its way of life, we 
expect to produce a comprehensive insight into the origins, process 
and meaning of that second economy. 
While such an enquiry mounts some considerable difficulties (which 
will be shortly discussed), especially since it is based on emigrant 
experience, nevertheless it offers a unique opportunity to gain an 
unconventional insight into important dimensions of Soviet affairs, 
hardly ever exposed in normal circumstances. Not only is this line of 
inquiry a unique opportunity for a comprehensive insight into people 
who actually live and operate in the Soviet system, but, arguably, it 
is probably also the best approach. Only by being removed from the 
actual scene without the threat of exposure and victimization, can a 
person honestly contribute a frank and revealing account of his deeds. 
This does not merely reinforce the credibility of information provided 
by informants, but has an equally important ethical advantage for the 
researcher. The researcher is not inhibited by fears of potential 
repercussions for informants as a result of his study. For additional 
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reasons relating specifically to the study of Soviet Georgia - see 
later in this chapter. 
Furthermore, to follow a point made by Weinreich (1962) in another 
context, it is not good enough to learn from directed and censored 
Soviet publications about second economy activities. These merely 
indicate events which have occurred. One cannot establish where 
events do not happen - what Weinreich calls 'negative data' - and why. 
This crucial information can be established only by investigating 
living sources: informants who operate in the system. This, then, is 
a unique contribution which "allows the Sovietologist to transform 
himself from an archaeologist into an ethnographer. His study becomes 
alive. Through investigations ... he can collect directly data 
which is not available otherwise" (Douchene, 1980, p. 51). 
Furthermore, to do social research on people's behaviour, particularly 
when it comes to sensitive and controversial issues, requires a cer- 
tain public atmosphere -"a certain regime. This study could not have 
taken place in the Soviet Union because there was no chance nor reason 
to expect even minimal co-operation. Indeed, it takes some time for 
immigrants to the free world to be considered 'ripe' for social inves- 
tigation in the Western tradition. 
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2. PREPARING FOR THE FIELD 
2.1 General Preparations 
After the research application had been accepted there were three 
intensive months of preparations prior to my departure to Israel. 
These included reading about Soviet Georgia and the Soviet economy, 
and in particular on anthropological field methods and participant 
observati on. While I was acquainted with the concept of a community 
and the role of a social investigator within the community from my 
previous experience as youth worker and organisational psychologist, I 
had not formally trained as an ethnographer, and that seemed a gap to 
be filled. I also took several lessons in Georgian, acquiring the 
very basics of the language and some key words and phrases. In the 
event, most of my conversations were carried out in Ivrit - Modern 
Hebrew. 
2.2 Choosing the Fieldwork Site 
At a very early stage, I had enough data available to decide upon my 
fieldwork site. Ashkelon seemed to be most suitable on three ac- 
counts: 
(a) Ashkelon had an established and large Georgian community, second 
in size only toAshdod. The first immigrants were directed to 
Ashkelon and it was the first major area of Georgian settlement. 
(b) Elam had studied this community before - the only one studied in 
Israel. I had therefore some idea of what I would find there, 
which seemed to be an asset. Elam was of course interested in 
very different directions. He was funded by the Ministry of 
Absorption with the aim of focusing on resettlement and adjust- 
ment patterns (Elam, 1974,1975,1976,1980). His publications 
refer to this and to some traditional ethnographic aspects: 
family relations (1979) and marriages (1975). From his writings, 
Ashkelon appeared to be a cohesive community, which tended to 
revive the original groupings in Georgia. This became possible 
through a mass-emigration of whole communities during a short 
period of time (some 25,500 emigrated in Just four years: 1971- 
74). Kulashi, for instance, renowned as the 'Jerusalem of 
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Georgia', was almost emptied of its 9,000 Jewish inhabitants, 
many of which regrouped in Ashkelon. This particular aspect, was 
considered paramount as it suggested that one could trace conti- 
nuity patterns of common behaviour and social institutions back 
to Georgia, as well as to validate actual factual occurrences by 
several witnesses. 
I also hoped to revive some of Elam's old contacts, perhaps 
through an assistant whom I knew was living locally. Elam him- 
self, unfortunately, had died several years before. 
(c) I knew Ashkelon beforehand. I had spent considerable time there 
during my early university days and I still had a few friends, 
whom I hoped could introduce me to the right people and give me 
some. good advice. 
2.3 The Fieldwork within the Research Framework 
From the very start it was thought necessary to spend a whole yearly 
cycle in the field, to allow for all seasonal occurrences to take 
place and be documented. 
While in the field, I kept in contact with Dr Mars in London through 
weekly telephone calls which averaged half an hour, and in which we 
discussed my tape-recorded reports -a contact which became a 'life 
line' and was invaluable in tackling the difficulties as they arose, 
as well as overcoming the common disease known as 'fieldworker isola- 
tion' and the low morale that it often involves. Dr Mars also paid me 
two visits to the field, giving me the benefit of five weeks of 
intensive discussions and the opportunity to test out preliminary 
ideas as well as sharing feelings and experiences: a facility which 
few fieldworkers can claim to have had (eg. Agar, 1980; Boissevain, 
1978). 
In February 1982, twelve months after my start, I ended my fieldwork 
with a celebratory feast -a joint venture I organized with close 
friends, to which all informants and associates were asked to come and 
participate. 
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Then I went to London and started preliminary writing up. The getting 
away from the field was considered important to allow for a perspec- 
ti ve of ti me and space as agai nst the cl ose i nti mate i nvol vement of 
being in the community. As had been anticipated, in certain areas 
some more information was required to 'round off' what had been gath- 
ered, and so, in the summer of 1982,1 returned for two months for a 
'hole plugging' period. On my return to London, I finalized my 
report. 
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3. STARTING THE FIELDWORK: PERSONAL ADJUSTMENT TO THE FIELD 
3.1 The First Two Weeks 
I landed in Israel in December 1980, coming to a refreshing Mediter- 
ranean winter after an eighteen months stay in chilly London. The 
first days back gave me strange and unpleasant feelings of being a 
stranger in my own home. A 'culture shock' after only eighteen months 
away, in other words! 
I soon set off to Ashkelon. In the first two weeks I made several 
excursions, meeting people and starting to look for a flat. Although 
I encountered numerous persons, including the top hierarchy of the 
local municipality, it was apparent how little they actually knew 
about a substantial group of local inhabitants. Most disappointing 
proved to be Elam's assistant, who turned out to be merely a trans- 
lator from Georgian to Hebrew. She could not point out anyone to 
approach for a start, and there seemed no way of taking advantage of 
her past experience. 
Another reason for my confusion was the generally hostile opinion 
about the Georgians. Already back in London we had got messages that 
they were not the most pleasant folk on earth. A short time before we 
left, The Observer newspaper published some revolting photographs of 
fat and ugly Georgian women packing watermelons for export in an 
Ashdod warehouse (October, 1980). In Ashkelon the people I knew were 
unanimous that these people were aggressive, noisy, dirty, smelly - 
and, of course, awful liars. The light relieving the gloom came from 
a young soldier who was travelling with me on the Ashkelon bus. She 
was the first person I had met who actually had Georgian neighbours, 
and she seemed to think that they were rather nice people, generous 
and very good neighbours to have. I noted in my diary that either she 
had developed a positive bias for Georgians to explain the fact that 
she and her family had not moved to a better neighbourhood for resi- 
dence, or that all the rest were so ignorant - like those Austrian 
mountain villagers who had a clear idea that all Jews had tails and 
Ii ttl e horns. In only such a way coul d so wel 1 def i ned, a cl ear cut 
prejudice have formed. I was relieved very soon to find out that the 
soldier was right and the others were wrong. Thereafter, one of my 
roles in the community became that of 'the outsider who thinks that we 
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are nice people and passes the gospel to the outside world. ' 
3.2 The Problem of Residence 
An urgent task to complete was finding a flat. This proved to be 
difficult. Firstly, there were almost no estate agents dealing with 
that part of Ashkelon. I still remember their faces when I insisted 
on a flat in the area. It did not seem to fit the image I projected. 
Secondly, vacant flats were in much demand as Ashkelon served at the 
time as the hinterland town for the police and army forces in the Gaza 
Strip and Yamit district. And of course the Georgian population 
needed flats for newly weds or recently arrived relatives. Thi rdly, 
the social expectations of my wife and myself were somewhat above the 
local average. For instance, a telephone was considered paramount, 
and that proved to be a probl em. 1 And then we needed aI arger than 
usual residence by Israeli standards to accommodate a study room. 
As things did not seem to move with the estate agents, I tried a 
different approach. With the help of a local friend, who had a car, 
we set off carefully to tour the neighbourhood and located a few 
potential spots. I left notices at the local groceries and started to 
knock on doors. This turned out to be the right way as personal 
contact is always preferred by Georgians. Before too long we located 
a flat which answered all requirements: spacious, with a telephone, 
long lease, and in a perfect location: it was just on the border of 
the community. Thus I was very close to local affairs, 
without being too exposed. This was thought to be rather important - 
as proved the case later. In February 1981 we moved in. 
3.3 Entering the Field 
(a) The 'Spy' Complex 
I started my work with extreme caution, which meant that for the first 
two or three weeks I did not initiate any contacts. I imagined that a 
1 ot of eyes were f ol 1 owi ng my movements as I was a stranger to the 
place. And like Boissevain (1978) 1 assumed that as it was a highly 
'densed' community, I had better take care not to slip. There were 
several reasons for this approach. From Elam I knew that Ashkelon was 
a very cohesive community, therefore any grave mistake would mean an 
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early break with many of the people. Then, I had to assume - which 
proved to be correct - that the massive anti-Georgian prejudice could 
have resulted in equally strong anti-stranger feeling. As a stranger, 
therefore, I was bound to be suspect. 
I also knew that Georgians are renowned for their suspicion. Gur 
Of er, to whom I had tal ked by then, conf i rmed that he was unabl e to 
approach them in his study on the private sector in the USSR (1980) 
and Gershon Ben-Oren, a Georgian migrant philologist and historian, 
who would become a good colleague later on, further confirmed this at 
our first meeting in Jerusalem, where he seemed to be over suspicious 
about me and my work. 2 Another reason was that I had not trained as 
an ethnographer, and whil st I bel ieved I had other rel evant experi - 
ence, this was definitely a novel and testing task. 
There was also a practical reason. From the little definite informa- 
ti on I had got so f ar, there appeared to be two pol i ti cal bodi es 
representing the Georgian community: The Association of USSR Olim3 in 
Ashkelon and The Association of Georgian Olim3 in Ashkelon. This 
further suggested to me that I should adopt a cautious approach so as 
not to end up captive with one fraction of the community, and hence be 
outcast by another -a common trap for anthropologists to fall into 
(eg. Mars, 1972;. Pelto and Pelto, 1973). And there was another reason 
f or my cauti on. Al I the way back f rom London I carried with me the 
uneasy feeling that I was on a mission looking for material that was 
concealed, secret - almost 'forbidden fruit' and I am the sort of 
person to break in and crack the seal for the mere sake of knowledge. 
This is, I am afraid, as much a reflection on the state of the art as 
it is an expression of my anxieties. Thus, Simis's recent book (1982) 
is headed: nUSSR. Secrets of a Corrupt Society". Gerald Mars coined 
the term 'hidden economy' (OCPU, 1978), and Stuart Henry applied it to 
his book (1978). And Jason Ditton scribbled his field notes on Bronco 
toilet paper in a bakery lavatory while configurating as a bread 
salesman (1977). 
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So there I was: a spy in the service of the Social Sciences 
Internazional. And this feeling only deepened in Israel. Eli Leshem 
of the Ministry of Absorption, whom I approached for background data 
on the Georgians in Israel, refused any help. He claimed that aid 
could only be extended to Israeli institutions; "and who knows if you 
are not a CIA agent? " he commented Jokingly. A few days later, Mussa 
Shelhav, a good friend and colleague, telephoned to inform me about an 
American investigating Georgians in Ashkelon. In Israel, news travels 
fast. 
My fears were also founded on what I already knew about that society: 
a tight community with very rigid boundaries to the outside, and 
internally competitive. A kind of sociey which, according to Douglas 
(1978), will have a cosmology of witchcraft accusations and xeno- 
phobia. Structurally I was therefore set up to become an ideal scape- 
goat. 
(b) The Issue of Exchange 
About this point in time I became somewhat obsessed with the issue of 
'exchange', ie: what could I offer my potential informants in ex- 
change for their co-operation. That is, for what return would they be 
willing to help me out - what Hatfield (1973) senselessly calls 
'mutual exploitation'. This became connected with my spy complex, as 
I reasoned as follows: 
i)I was af orei gner in what seemed to be a homogenous and f ai rly 
tight-knit community. I did not belong there, either by choice 
or by kin, and I was far different from my subjects as regards 
personal background, formal education, interests, occupation, 
social and economic status ... 
ii) My role was very ambiguously defined and even harder to explain. 
iii) There seemed to be nothing practical or useful that I could offer 
my target group. 
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Hence, I figured, anyone would conclude that a person who comes from 
abroad, does not make his living from ordinary, decent work, and 
anyway cannot explain clearly what he is doing, must have something 
fishy about him. Besides which, he does not seem to be contributing 
anything and why is someone of his status living here in the first 
place? 
From this I Jumped to the conclusion that I had to do something about 
the situation, in line with theories of impression formation (Asch, 
1946; Tagiuri and Petrullo, 1958) and attribution (Kelley, 1967; Jones 
and Davis, 1965). 
As it turned out, I was much better at analyzing the situation than in 
providing the solution -a charge often levied at my profession. 
Indeed, I encountered suspicion all the way along. Probably, even two 
out of my four closest key informants did not fully trust me. When, 
towards the end of my fieldwork period, I allowed myself to inspect 
some of the less pleasant aspects of my immediate inquiry (ie, the 
criminality survey), one of my key informants said bitterly to my 
closest ally: "You see, I always said we should not trust him. " 
Apparently there was a meeting held shortly after my miraculous ap- 
pearance in the community, in which - in the best tradition of the 
Bruderbund - my fate was determined, but in my favour, fortunately. 
It was decided to co-operate fully with me. Probably, in spite of 
serious errors, I appeared to be OK. 
Some of the mistakes, which apparently were not grave enough, included 
a burial of a neighbour where I offered my help which, of course, was 
not needed; but why should I have offered it in the first place? Then 
I made myself too quickly and too enthusiastically a patron of the 
1 ocal Georgian Dance Group, trying to hel p them to set up a tour to 
England. The Dance Group Leader was I ater to comment to a mutual 
friend: "I knew from the beginning he was a good person. He has such 
a naive face ... "- hardly a compliment in a culture that empha- 
sizes competitive shrewdness. Then there was an evening when I in- 
si sted on carryi ng the shoppi ng bags of aI ady who was ol d enough to 
be my mother - and yet she was a married woman and I was a total 
stranger. As they say in Israel: I had more luck than brains. 
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4. COLLECTING DATA: THE RESEARCH PARADIGM 
The research strategy will be discussed in three sections. Fi rstly, 
the utilization of the four central tools of social anthropology; 
secondly, the development of three conceptually different fieldwork 
phases; thirdly, the use of additional material and information. 
4.1 Four Anthropological Tools 
(a) Participant Observation 
Since Malinowski, participant observation, through continous residence 
among the subjects of study, has become the central tool of cultural 
anthropology. Participant observation as used here does not mean 
quite what it says - the involvement of an ethnographer to record 
current events and chart up relationships as they become manifest 
through action and involvement. Rather, participant observation here 
means the use of a continual presence gradually to develop good rap- 
port and trust in orderto gain data about the past. This was con- 
sidered vital as former attempts to study illicit economic activities 
using traditional sociological techniques of questi onnai re- surveys 
failed to obtain the co-operation of the Georgian population (Gur 
Ofer, personal communication; Israeli Institute for the Study of 
Contemporary Society, 1979). 
Participant observation, unlike any other research modes, does not 
require a pre-arranged scheme: it develops its own momentum, and 
leads the researcher to unknown territories. This was considered an 
important virtue for a study which was looking into a largely unex- 
pl ored domai n. Thus, I had no pri or knowl edge on the central i ty of 
networks to the second economy and their manifestation through the 
Institution of the feast, nor the crucial impact of transportation on 
production and distribution, nor the fact that a successful shop 
manager spends most of his time not behind the counter but chasing 
goods. 
But participant observation has here also a more traditional usage, ie 
recording events while they occur, since significant patterns of 
relationships do persist V(%Georgia to the new setting. 
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(b) The Use of Key Infomants 
The selection and exploitation of key informants is an important 
feature of this research. Firstly, because reconstrcutive research 
needs the data it obtains to be most rigourously cross-checked for 
detail, reliability (credibility) and the obtaining of different per- 
ceptions of the same event. The role of key informants in this re- 
spect, then, is to direct the researcher to the potential sources of 
information, to help establish an informant's credibility and assess 
the validity of obtained information. Secondly, key informants should 
facilitate the obtaining of data by helping to contact potential 
informants and serving as guarantors of the integrity and trustworthi- 
ness of the researcher. 
In addition to their crucial role in the direct aims of the research, 
key informants should facilitate the process of being accepted into 
the community and in the build-up of rapport and trust, by functioning 
as Isensors' to public opinion and guides for the researcher about the 
do's and don'ts. 
Al I these make key i nf ormants a mai n channel of communi cati on; and 
thei r choi ce p-( a maj or task in the early stages of f iel dwork. 
(c) Collection of Life Histories 
At a more advanced stage of the fieldwork, structured interviews were 
conducted, with the aim of obtaining the life history of Ego and 
family, in particular what concerned professional careers. Their 
importance was in helping to realize the matrix of relations in the 
community, which clarified Phase I events (see following) by putting 
them in a kinship context. It also helped me to find my way in the 
complex paths of familial ties of the community in general and of my 
close associates in particular. It was through the life histories 
that the important connections between family structure and career 
choice and development (discussed in Chapter 9) were revealed. The 
questionnaire was built around the 'family tree', investigating as- 
pects of marriage, geographical location and mobility, occupations and 
education, wealth and social relations. In addition, some twenty 
questions were asked referring to close friends, to relations with 
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gentiles, religious feeling and social standing. (The full question- 
nai re is gi ven in the Appendi x). Al 1 data requi red was f actual , to 
minimize errors. 
The Life History Questionnaire was pre-tested on two informants for 
clarity of meaning, and translated into Hebrew (by the researcher) and 
into Georgian (by two independent persons: to match wording). I 
alone applied the questionnaire, which proved to be quite a lengthy 
process. It required a pre-arranged invitation, normally to the 
interviewee's place, and often (in 65% of the cases) I had to be 
accompanied by a third person who introduced me. The interview would 
take not 1 ess than two and a hal f hours, but it normal ly took more - 
usually a whole evening. This was because it involved, in accordance 
with custom, a mini-feast in my honour (especially if it was my first 
cal I to the place). 
Thirty-five interviews were conducted over a period of four months. 
(d) Questionnaires 
On two occasions during the fieldwork, questionnaires were employed 
for different ends. 
i) Life in Georgia Questionnafre 
A third of my way through the fieldwork, when I was still in the 
process of establishing myself in the community, I initiated a 
prize winning essay competition at the local school, with two 
aims in mind: 
gaining recognition in the community by sponsoring the 
competi ti on; 
gathering preliminary information with the help of school 
pupils. 
A few topics were given, contrasting aspects of life in Georgia 
with life in Israel (see list of topics in Appendix), and pupils 
(the two upper grades only, aged 13-14) were given instructions: 
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the very basics of how to collect data - to enable them to ques- 
tion parents, relatives and neighbours, and then report back. 
Both aims had success above expectations. Reports were of high 
standard, extremely detailed and from various sources. Some 
contained up to thirty pages. Twenty-four reports were submit- 
ted, of which twelve were considered excellent, and four won 
prizes, presented on a festive gathering of pupils, parents and 
celebrities (including the Mayor). The prize winning essay com- 
petition 'legitimized' my position as a scholar 'who writes a 
book about Georgians. ' My association with the school, a tradi- 
tional authority and respectable institution, benefited me con- 
siderably in the longer run. It also set a precedent of inquiry 
through pupils (for both the school authorities and the parents) 
which I was to use again. 
ii) Personal Details Questionnaire 
Towards the end of the fieldwork period, a questionnaire was 
administered in two local schools in order to obtain basic data 
on the community. 
Sixty-five questionnaires were filled in which related to forty- 
eight families4 (out of approximately 1,300 families: that i s, 
about 4%). Questions included ages of members of family, occupa- 
tions in Georgia and Israel for both father and mother, educa- 
tion, place of origin, dates of marriage and emigration. (For 
exact details see Appendix). 
As before, pupils were carefully instructed on how to question 
their parents. Only the three upper grades were asked to co- 
operate (ages 12-14). 
4.2 Three Phases of Fieldwork 
As this research developed, I came to recognize three fieldwork phases 
that were conceptually, though not necessarily chronologically, sepa- 
rate. 
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(a) Phase I 
This involved traditional anthropological fieldwork: the focus was on 
collecting data on Georgian migrants in Israel; to chart their social 
relations and to identify their principal social institutions. As 
well as providing useful data on settlement in Israel, this phase 
allowed for two things to happen: 
the growth of trust, by inquiring into relatively undisturbing 
aspects of social life as it unfolded in the present: eg: "How 
are marriages arranged here? n; "How are economic relationships 
organised here? " 
the accumulation of data about social institutions and behaviour 
patterns, whose significance came to light when comparing and 
5 contrasting (in Phase II) with how things were in Georgia. Thus 
first-hand experience was gained by looking into areas like 
marriages, deaths,. friendship, feasts, the concept of work and 
leisure. 
(b) Phase II 
At that stage, which corresponds to what Mead (1953) labelled the 
'informant technique', I attempted to translate the understanding of 
observed social process back into the Soviet Georgia context. Ques- 
tions asked were: "How were marriages arranged over there? "; "How 
were economic relationships organized over there? "; "How did personal 
support networks operate in Georgia? "; "How did Jews and non-Jews 
differ? " This made it possible to identify continuities as well as 
discontinuities between 'here' and 'there'. 
The degree to which social bases of behaviour applied to both Jews and 
non-Jews was of central interest in this phase. 
(c) Phase III 
This was directly concerned with second economy relationships in 
Georgia, best understood on the background of prior apprehension of 
the working of social institutions - particularly of networks - which 
were derived from Phases I and II. The questions here dealt with were 
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how people participated in, or had experience of, second economy 
activity in Georgia. 
It was at this stage that the use of key informants became crucial in 
the building up of extensive and cross-checkable case studies, and in 
determining the typicality of Jewish involvement with ethnic 
Georgians. In all phases, but particularly in Phase III, the typical- 
ity of obtained information was a major and constant pre-occupation of 
this research. 
4.3 Additional Material 
In addition to empiric research, some other sources of information 
were sought. These related to both Georgia and the migrants in 
Israel. 
(a) Additional Sources on Georgia 
i) Newspaper Survey 
Over three years, the leading Georgian daily Komunisti was moni- 
tored for reports on second economy activity and corruption. The 
period covered was from January 1979 to December 1982. In addi- 
tion, the Radio Free Europe bulletins were monitored for current 
news on Georgia. The monthly Georgian compatriot paper Samshoblo 
(distributed free in the West) was monitored over a period of 
eighteen months (April 1981 to October 1982) for general informa- 
ti on. 
ii) Literature Survey 
Six persons who left Georgia in their early twenties, after 
completing their formal education in Georgian schools, were asked 
to screen the literary textbooks from sixth grade (age 11) to 
tenth grade (age 15)6 and choose the twenty most loved pieces of 
literature. Those selected unanimously (see Appendix) were ana- 
lysed for ideas and values. 
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iii) Personal Communications 
In order to gain information about Georgia from non-Jewish 
Georgians, the very small ex-Georgian community in the UK was 
asked about different aspects of life in Georgia, and, in par- 
ti cul ar, about the di ff erences between J ews and genti 1 es. Two 
British couples who spent time in Georgia on teaching and study 
missions were asked for their impressions. All informants had 
the additional advantage of living in the capital city. Thus, 
aspects derived from the Israeli scene were put to test of rel- 
evance and typicality as regards -their experience among non-Jews 
and city dwellers. 
In the Spring of 1982, Dr Mars spent two weeks in Tbilisi on a 
senior scholar exchange programme, and because of his close 
association with this research, was able to look at different 
issues of interest. He visited two factories, spent considerable 
time on social events (ie: feasts), and tried to establish the 
nature of differences between Jews and non-Jews in Georgia. 
(b) Additional Sources on Georgians in Israel 
i) Newspaper Survey 
Over fourteen months (December 1981 to February 1982) the Hebrew 
leading daily Yedi'oth Akh'ronoth was monitored for reports on 
Georgians in Israel. 
ii) Anthropological Archive 
The archive of the late Dr Itzhak Elam, an ethnographer who had 
studied the Ashkelon Georgian community upon their arrival in 
Israel, was put at my disposal. The archive which contained 
numerous field notes, was studied carefully. 
iii) Criminality Survey 
In order to ascertain the substance of the common view in Israeli 
public opinion concerning the criminal tendency of Georgians, and 
in order to look for possible continuities of extra-legal activ- 
ities in Israel, a comprehensive survey was conducted at the 
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local magistrates court. I counted the number of official com- 
pl ai nts and requests f or detenti on ina gi ven year W anuary to 
December 1980) for Georgians as against the general population. 
iv) Community Survey 
During my stay in Ashkelon, different information about life in 
the community was compiled from numerous sources to establish 
relevant background data, eg: number of inhabitants, occupations, 
types of resi dence, edutati on of the younger generati on (rel i- 
gious vs secular, secondary and higher education), marriage pat- 
terns (ages, statuses), political affiliations. This was part of 
Phase I, discussed earlier. 
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5. COLLECTING DATA: THE PROGRESSION OF FIELDWORK 
5.1 Getting Going 
(a) Key Informants 
The first to approach me, or to return my approaches, were, as is 
often the case (Agar, 1980), marginal people. marginality character- 
ized also my closer informants, whom I labelled before as 'key inform- 
ants'. There were f our of them. Two, typi cal ly, Ii ved Ii teral ly on 
the border of the community. Another almost bought a flat in the more 
affluent parts of Ashkelon, and only his father's disapproval stopped 
the deal. Yet when I last contacted him he was still determined to 
move. The f ourth, who Ii ved in the heart of 'Gruzl and', was, though, 
marginal in another sense: he was the embodiment of failure, at least 
by Georgian standards, and as such helped me to gain some invaluable 
insights on the culture. 
Of the four, one in particular was a close friend and ally. He was my 
'Doc'. Like Whyte's legendary aid, he was inclined to action and 
wanted to change things concerning the unsatisfactory standing of 
Georgians in Israel. He certainly found a sympathetic listener in me. 
He became not only an important source of data, a most wise guide and 
observant assessor of peoples and events, but, most important, he took 
the risk of being my guarantor. In a society where everyone should 
'belong' or at least 'affiliate' to somebody, I would have been doomed 
without someone accounting for me. Even in a sense of warning me not 
to dri nk too heavi ly ("You are not a Georgi an af ter al I ") and tak i ng 
my-place, when some smart guy tried to out-drink me. I was most 
fortunate to have met him. 
The four key informants, with a wider circle of their friends, formed 
my social base in the community. I was helped by the fact that this 
was a peer group culture - of which I was not too aware at the begin- 
ni ng. It was yet another piece of luck that my natural preference to 
relate to my age group benefited me so directly. As a matter of fact 
I needed them very much because of my poor Georgian. I learned the 
very basics but I gave it up after a while, realizing it would need 
too much effort whilst there were few facilities around (no textbooks, 
no teachers). There were, of course, teachers in Jerusalem and the 
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Tel-Aviv area, but not in Ashkelon. And while quite a few of the 
women who stayed at home could easily have taught me, and benefited 
financially as well, this - alas - was considered a taboo. As a close 
friend, to whom I came with this offer, put it: "I know, and you 
know, that nothing will happen if you and my wife stay alone. But the 
others don't. " So my Georgian suffered, and I depended heavily on the 
better Hebrew speakers who, inevitably, were the younger generation. 
This was all right, because I was expected to relate to them in the 
first instance, and through them to the others: the middle-aged, the 
elderly and the women. 
(b) Maintaining my Independence 
In these circumstances: a cohesive community, rigidly structured by 
age on one hand, and my lack of the language on the other, it appeared 
vital to maintain an independent standing regarding my sources of 
information and my affiliation to individuals and cliques. This, 
however, was not an easy, task. . 
As has been observed with pariah groups, whether ethnically organized 
(Zborowski and Herzog, 1952) or occupationally (Mars, 1972; 1982) - 
they typically respond to their perceived homogeneous lack of status 
by developing what to an outsider seems-minute and non-functional 
divisions of prestige. I was a rare exemplar, and therefore an obvi- 
ous target to capture and thus to exercise social power and prestige. 
I had to apply much attention and energy to escaping these traps of 
honour (typically endless invitations to feasts or honorary seats in 
the synagogue). Of course, not only honour is involved. This is the 
way important people are captured (see Chapter 5 on Networks and 
Feasts) and a network is woven; and while captivity might be most 
enjoyable, the time comes when you have to pay the price. In my case 
the bill came as a request, which turned out to be a demand, to 
my professional powers for someone's private benefit. While I would 
welcome such a request on a more general level (eg: writing a letter, 
finding out information), using my professional standing might have 
damaged my i ntegri ty in the 1 onger run. It was not easy to say 1 no' . 
and the fact I was associated with several groups helped me to say it 
- knowing that if it came to the worst I would not lose all my connec- 
tions. 
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(c) Establishing an Image and Roles 
My early concern about possible 'exchanges' with the community was 
soon resolved. I came to be known as 'Doctori' and 'Englishi', much 
to my surprise. Surprise, because I considered as one of my assets 
the fact that I was an Israeli, a 'good' Israeli as opposed to the bad 
ones who did not like Georgians. Another virtue I thought to be 
helpful was my very informal look and approach. The community, how- 
ever, preferred a different image because they wanted to honour me and 
by doing so honour themselves. That is to say: 'we are al 1 the more 
important because a distinguished person (as far as they were con- 
cerned I was already a doctor) comes all the way from England (the 
West is traditionally prestigious in Soviet as well as Israeli eyes) 
to write a book about us. ' 
This modified image committed me, of course. Thus I had to abandon my 
shorts in the summer and bring generous gifts when I came back for a 
second field period - a. s would be expected from a 'big man'. I had 
also not to be seen conversing too frequently with youngsters or 
children, 7 or indeed women - whether married or not, young or old. 
The fact that I was married saved me -I am certain -a lot of trou- 
ble. Firstly, because baychelors were not considered full members of 
the community and secondly because, as a married man, I was considered 
safe enough to be allowed at least some contact with women. 
The glamorous foreign halo did not completely rule out my local iden- 
ti ty. As with Shoked (1977), the fact that both my subjects and 
myself belonged to the same society indicated a long range commitment. 
We often discussed the kind of things to do in the future regarding 
the place of the Georgians in Israeli society, and I proved my commit- 
ment by launching a photo- documentation project about life in the 
Georgian quarter of Ashkelon -a project that would start upon my 
return to Israel, andwhich was mostwelcome by my social circle in 
Ashkelon. Like Shoked, I found myself in the annoying situation of 
being unable to attend the High Holidays in the community - hence 
missing important events - simply because I was expected to join my 
family on such occasions. I feared that failing to do so would not 
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only be interpreted as not respecting my parents (which was Shoked's 
concern), but that I might be considered a man without roots, hence a 
man without honour. 
Apart from serving the function of an interesting addition to the 
community's routine, I was known as a superb letter writer. As I also 
typed the I etters mysel f on my el ectric typewri ter, I had -f requent 
requests, which were normally channelled through my closer friends, 
providing them with a real 'exchange' for their help to me. I would 
usually have a letter or two a week, and sometimes it involved some 
further work, like finding out particulars at a governmental bureau. 
1 11 ked to do that servi ce as it demanded 11 ttl e of me and seemed to 
yield high returns. It also gave me another source of information on 
personal matters, to which I would otherwise have had no access. 
I was also a dedicated campaigner on behalf of the Georgian cause, and 
I did it with all my heart. I twice initiated a reportage with 
photographs in the local press. I once appeared on Israeli radio, 
advocating the Georgian cause and just missed an opportunity to appear 
on Israeli television. I initiated the photo-documentation project 
and fought vigorously - without much success - to bring the Georgian 
Dance Group on an European tour. 
5.2 Inquiring about the Second Economy 
(a) 'Coming Out' 
Si nce the second economy is so thoroughly bl ended wi th the everyday 
Iife of Georgi a (see Chapter 9), 1 soon stumbl ed on pi enty of casual 
information. Even Elam, who was not particularly interested in that 
aspect, could not help but mention it several times, as he rightfully 
recognized it to be a most important variant in assessing the back- 
ground of Georgian immigrants. The difficulty - which turned out to 
be a psychological one more than anything else - was to 'come out' 
with a declared aim and study it more systematically. I preferred a 
straight-forward statement, not only because this would make things 
easier in acquiring data, but because I thought it only fair to ad- 
vise, at least my principal informants, about my intentions. 
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About half way through the first period of my fieldwork, I felt confi- 
dent enough to make that statement. (I was also aware that time was 
advancing, and this put some pressure on me). I first discussed it 
with 'Doc', who immediately understood the originality from a research 
point of view, and who said that as a good friend he was committed to 
help me succeed in whatever I chose. The next thing 'Doc' suggested 
was to summon a meeting with his close circle and try to get their 
commitment. We did it the day after, and again, rather surprisingly, 
there were no difficulties. All involved agreed to help out in find- 
ing informants and suggesting lines of inquiry. 
The difficulties came only later, when actually sitting with people 
and asking them for precise data. This made informants aware of the 
nature of the inquiry and what it demanded of them. It was then that 
even some of my closer circle started to doubt me, which meant ap- 
poi ntments that were not kept, i ntervi ewees who avoi ded comment on 
illicit earnings and, most agonizingly, informants who started to co- 
operate and then withdrew, making it impossible to establish a case. 
But in essence studying the second economy did not differ from study- 
ing any other aspect of life. As a matter of fact, I can think of 
quite a few Phase I matters that would cause me greater hardship to 
obtain satisfying results. Even with the technicalities, while I 
started with indirect conversations, I soon found out that straight- 
forward questions and open note-taking normally led to no objections, 
because, as 'Doc' put it: "What matters is not what you do but who 
you are. " However, with some informants I was able to reach only 
Phase I or II. With others I successfully entered Phase III without 
any delay. 
(b) Differentiating the Past from the Present 
When I ooki ng i nto second economy af f ai rs, I drew a cl ear Ii ne that 
differentiated between the past and the present. Although there were 
a few interesting occurrences during my stay in Ashkelon - the most 
striking of which was an all-Georgian enterprise: the forging of US 
Dol I ars. Thi s was the bi ggest ever f orgery of f orei gn currency de- 
tected in Israel, and was called the 'Crime of the Year' (Grinberg, 
1981). It had some interesting patterns - according to the Press - 
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resembling the operation of networks in second economy activities in 
Georgia (the continuity was expressed, among other things, in the name 
of the pri nti ng house: 'Tbi 1i si'; Ronen, 1981), and there were even 
some Ashkelon connections. 
However, I made a point of not looking into that or other affairs to 
the extent that I preferred not to listen, passively, to passing 
gossip. There were two good reasons for this. Firstly, it seemed to 
be dangerous to look too closely into criminal business, and secondly, 
it might have made me an object of suspicion to the extent that even 
the good will of my closest friends would not have saved me. Tempting 
as it was, I dropped this line of inquiry without much regret. 8 
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6. SOME PROBLEMS OF RECONSTRUCTIVE RESEARCH AND HOW THEY WERE DEALT 
WITH IN THIS STUDY 
6.1 The Issue of Sampling 
(a) The Problem of Representativeness and Relevance 
When dealing with an emigre population, the question of its repre- 
sentativeness and relevance, being a unique self-selective sample, is 
of major concern. An additional concern, however, in this case, is 
the fact that the immigrants were an ethnic minority - Jews - in a 
largely Christian population. The questions of representativeness and 
relevance are therefore even more acute. I would like to examine 
these concerns in two parts. Firstly, how and in what aspects is the 
studied sample similar or dissimilar to the general population it 
stems from, and secondly, how important are the various similarities 
(or dissimilarities) to the questions under investigation. 
To start with the second point, the main interest of the present 
research is to look into the operations of Soviet Georgia's informal 
economic institutions. Therefore, the leading query would be how much 
do the selected informants know about the issue concerned. Have they 
operated within the economic system? Were their operations typical of 
the sector in which they functioned? Were their activities segregated 
by any particular attribute? (eg: Did they come into contact with 
only Jews? ) 
If one could establish that there existed no specialized 'Jewish 
economy' as such, then what is true of Jewish agents would basically 
apply to non-Jewish protagonists as well. Even more so - to go back 
to the first question - if it can be established that Jews are very 
similar by various criteria to their gentile compatriots. 
Both questions will be discussed at length in the next chapter. 
There still remains the issue of the self-selection Of immigrants. 
There is a wide spread assumption that people who emigrate differ 
substantially from those who do not. The Harvard Project researchers 
in the 1950's confronted the same problem and this was their answer: 
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"Any sample of former Soviet citizens will be fundamentaLty 
different from the Soviet population from which it was drawn, and 
therefore unrepresentative of it in some sense. On the other 
hand any sample, no matter how drawn, shares certain features 
with the parent population. We should Like, therefore, to affirm 
here a principle that underlies all of our use of this data. The 
question of the importance of sample bias can be answered only in 
the context of the specific type of analysis which is made, and 
the specific inferences which are drawn. " 
(Inkeles and Bauer, 1959, p. 26) 
The Columbia Project, the other notable predecessor of this research, 
gave a similar reply: 
"Each informant is a representative of hie culture when his sex, 
family, history, inteUigence, type of experience in and outside 
his culture and his relation-ship to the anthropologist are taken 
fully and property into account. " 
(Mead, 1952, p. 44) 
It is the intention here, likewise, to taken into account the possible 
bias of my sample, particularly when generalizations will be attempted 
to be drawn. 
Since this research focused on the illegal economy, unavoidably its 
sources had a further limitation. It drew its information from indi- 
viduals who were directly involved in it. But also - given the info- 
rmal and sensitive nature of inquiry - it had to be limited to indi- 
viduals who could be trusted to give credible information and whose 
information I could satisfactorily check out. And since the mode of 
research was anthropological and largely informal, it further required 




All this leads to the fact that this research is largely based on 
anecdotal evidence. Anecdotalism, though not systematic, can serve as 
a good base of data. An economist recently commented that: 
"every fact begins as an anecdote; for instance every historical 
action taken by every citizen that contributes to the national 
income is an anecdote, and is only Later grouped with others to 
become a statistic. This grouping does not enhance its validity! 
So what we have here is only a more arbitrary more partial aeLec- 
tion of anecdotal information than is usual. Indeed, we can be 
more precise: it is quite common to accept 'anecdotal' evidence 
on prices, since a price, even in an imperfectly competitive 
market has rather broad applicability, and an unofficial observer 
is quite Likely superior to an officiaL one. " 
(Wiles, 1980, p. 2) 
(c) Regional Representation 
A last point concerning the data presented here is its geographical 
spread. As will be discused in the next chapter, Ashkelon has repre- 
sentatives from all Georgia, including the big cities. However, most 
informants, and hence the bulk of data, stem from rural Georgia, and 
one should bear it in mindL 
What concerns rural Georgia, however, is that information is not 
limited to any particular region. Where possible - as for instance in 
the case study on shops (Chapter 7) - information was deliberately 
drawn from different areas to test regional variance and typicality. 
6.2 Perceptual Errors 
(a) Forgetting 
In reconstructive research, one deals with materials of the past. 
Therefore the limitations of human memory are an inbuilt restriction 
(Baddeley, 1979). These, however can be minimized. 
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Forgetting may take the form of lack of memory, that is - some infor- 
mation is not recalled and in that sense is lost. Or it may be 
manifested in inaccuracies, that is, a piece of evidence may not be 
congruent - at different times or on different occasions, reported 
information would differ. 
Informants in this research were reporting on occurrences that hap- 
pened at least five to ten years before. Their information was there- 
fore expected to be subject to the above limitations. To minimize 
these effects, two methods were used. 
Refreshing the Memory 
In order to confirm information established elsewhere, one can 
put forward concrete questions of various degrees of directness 
(openness). For instance: 
Who received bribes from the enterprise? Copen' question) 
Who, at the local government level, received bribes? 
Did the Mayor receive bribes? (directive question) 
This was found to be a good way of refreshing an informant's 
memory. In other contexts, it is often referred to as the 
'recall method', which normally yields best results in memorizing 
data, as any basic book on the psychology of memory would confirm 
(eg: Baddeley, 1976; Egan, 1958). Yet another way of refreshing 
the memory is the 'puzzle method' (see following). 
ii) Intra-Person Reliability 
To check on a person's recall of details, this is an essential 
ingredient of reconstructive research. Especially if directive 
questions are put forward, there is a danger of a tendecy to 
confirm them - the so-called 'demand' phenomenon, to be discussed 
later. For instance, if a person confirms that the Mayor receiv- 
ed regular bribes, the obvious questions would then be: how 
much, how often, where and when? These questions should then be 
repeated at least once, at an appropriate interval of time. 
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It was a regular practice in this research to confirm details in 
such a way. For mi nor detai 1 s, one repeat in an i nterval of a 
month or two was considered sufficient. Major information, how- 
ever, was subjected to more demanding tests. My main informant 
on The Factory was rechecked four times on particular details in 
a peri od of two years, and three (out of the f our) mai ni nf orm- 
ants on The Store were rechecked four times (one) and three times 
(two) over a period of fourteen months. 
In questionnaires this method is regularly used, known as 'detec- 
ting questions' or 'verification items', but necessarily they 
lack the time dimension, which is a major element in establishing 
information credibility. 
Forgetting can be a major source of error in reconstructive research. 
One should, however, differentiate between residual and accidental 
information (much of which comprises the bulk of research findings in 
studies of memory and forgetting, such as Ebbinghaus's nonsense sylla- 
bles) and regular meaningful events. Take for example the payment of 
bribes. Apparently they were paid monthly, as a matter of routine. 
It woul d theref ore not be unreasonabl e to expect a person to recal 1 
the exact sums i nvol ved, even a decade 1 ater. Or what are 1 abel 1 ed 
here as Crisis Events. These were unique, highly significant events 
in a person's life - when his personal safety and the welfare of his 
close family were at stake. One should not be surprised, then, that 
these occurrences are described in vivid clarity, with minute details, 
even though they happened long ago. 
(b) Unconscious Deception 
This is not a very common case, yet existing and Justifying considera- 
ti on. A cl assi c exampl eis Al f red Adl er's chi I dhood cemetery. For 
years he recalled passing a cemetery on his daily route to and from 
school. Only after he paid a visit to his home town in adulthood did 
he realize that there was not, nor had there ever been a cemetery. It 
was a figment of his imagination (Sperber, 1970). 1 had one such 
bizarre report during this research venture. As a reservist in the 
Israeli army, I found myself one day waiting with another reservist 
for a lift to a remote spot in northern Israel. There is rarely a 
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better opportunity for sharing intimate personal information than an 
accidental meeting of two uniformed men unknown to each other and 
stuck on a deserted road in the Galilee for an unspecified period of 
time. The accent of my 45-year old companion disclosed his Russian 
origin. He came from Chernovich, Galicia, and had been a bus driver 
for 22 years. I did not reveal to him my particular interest in the 
Soviet Union's second economy, but in the circumstances it appeared 
only natural that I should question him in detail about his past. 
What he told me, especially concerning his earnings, was absolutely 
out of line with any other information I possessed. He claimed to 
have been paid 4,500 Rubles a month officially. "But surely you mean 
your total annual income, " I laughed at him. "No, no. " He was cer- 
tain about the figures. "You are speaking in old Rubles, then? " I 
tried to make some sense from the impossibly high figure. He insisted 
that these were new Rubles and that this was the official rate, and he 
even remembered that his starting salary was about 3,000 Rubles. We 
spent a few hours together. The person seemed absolutely normal to 
me. His reporting about- his present life seemed most reasonable. He 
conversed fluently in Hebrew, and besides I knew his mother tongue - 
Yiddish. And certainly he had no motivation whatsoever to lie to me 
or to deceive me. Yet the figures he suggested were at least twenty 
times higher than those I got from very reliable sources. They did 
not make any sense, and yet he seemed so certain. He even described 
the office where he was paid, and other routine aspects of his life. 
I still cannot explain it except on the grounds of Adler's childhood 
cemetery experience. 
Unconscious deception is an extreme case, but it does not differ in 
priciple from any reported information which is essentially a personal 
account, and as such should be subject to inter-personal validation. 
When reconstructing the Soviet second economy, one has to rely heavily 
on personal accounts. The censored press and the unreliable statis- 
tics (a constant problem for Sovietologists) are of little help. 
Vigorous cross-checking is therefore a must, and it was a routine part 
of this research to cross-check information - indeed, the very reason 
for living in a community of immigrants, which serves as a massive 
data base. Cross-checking aimed to encompass any detail, but particu- 
larly what concerned the second economy. It meant that any occupation 
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should have at least two accounts, hopefully more. In some instances, 
as with a factory and a shop, it was possible to obtain independent 
information from persons who worked at the same work place or witnes- 
sed the same events. Cross-checking was most helpful in filling out a 
whole picture in a puzzle-like manner. While informant A might not 
have all the necessary details to complete an account, he nevertheless 
could give a lead which could then be picked up by informant B. Going 
back later to informant A with a more complete account to test out his 
experience, he might then add another piece of data which would clari- 
fy yet another poi nt or rai se a new questi on, and so on. In that way 
the case studies on The Factory and The Store were built. Indeed, 
this way maximum advantage is taken of this particular methodology: 
the use of patient participant observation and an existing community 
as a data base, to reconstruct life experience puzzles. 
6.3 False Reporting 
There are three errors -resulting from false reporting which are a 
danger to social research in general, but to reconstructive research 
in particular, because of the over-dependence on personal reports. 
(a) Social Desirability 
Social desirability (Edwards, 1957), or demand, are common effects 
produced in self-report inventories, but are also present in open- 
ended informal interviews - the essence of anthropological method. 
These could take the form of 'putting up a good front' - an attempt to 
portray oneself with a positive bias rather than realistically. I 
found this frequently when approaching people for my Life History 
Questi onnai re. Since I had to make appointments in advance, and was 
sometimes accompanied by a friend or a school-teacher who had formally 
to introduce me (Informally I was fairly well known in the community), 
people tended to feel very committed to answer my questions (which I 
val ued) yet, at the same ti me, were not al ways wi 111 ng to di scl ose 
perhaps embarrassing personal details. Either because of the formal- 
ity of the interview, or because I was a stranger, interviewees per- 
ceived themselves to be representatives - 'chosen' to testify - of 
their families and even larger communities. However, while not deny- 
ing a prison history ("To be jailed for 'combination' is not a 
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shame"), they would perhaps not wish to focus on it; or the rare 
occasions of outmarriages and divorce which would have to be pinned 
down by a polite insistence ostensibly to obtain the complete family 
tree. 
Another common form of social desirability is the wish to please the 
researcher, that is, to match what the informant perceives to be the 
researcher's expectations. In Ashkelon this tendency was expressed in 
a frequent inquiry about the progress of my research and a stated wish 
to help me out. As one informant put it: "If a person like you comes 
all the way from England9 to write a book about us, then the least 
that I can do is to see in what way I could be helpful. " Certainly it 
is better to be in that position rather than in Evans-Pritchard's, who 
was told: "You are a foreigner, why should we tell you the right 
way? " (in Hatfield, 1973). But sometimes, when trying too hard, that 
could become an embarrassment. On one occasion a close informant 
dragged a man off the street, forcing him to tell me about his Job as 
a ticket collector on a train - because I had asked his help to locate 
such a professional. The poor man struggl ed to tel I me as 11 ttl e as 
he could. He was apparently alarmed and did not understand what it 
was all about. Clearly, not only was his testimony of little use but 
I also lost a potential source of information and had 'gained' a 
suspecting acquaintance. 
Purposeful Misleading 
Purposeful misleading, that is, intentional lying in order to lead the 
researcher off the track, could be either a cultural way of handling 
strangers (eg: Evans-Pritchard with the Nuer), or a wish to conceal 
sensitive information. I experienced some of the latter in the more 
advanced stages of the fieldwork, when I allowed myself to dig into 
the messier affairs of the present - as opposed to my regular dealings 
with the past. 
I was curious to check the criminal record of the Georgian community, 
both in order to examine the carry-over effect from Georgia and to 
test popular prejudice about the allegedly bad record of Georgians as 
regards law-breaking. This impression is widely given by the Israeli 
public and Press. After some effort, I obtained permission to go 
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through the local magistrates court files. What I found was surpris- 
ing in two ways. Firstly, the overall crime rate (measured by offi- 
cial charges and detention requests) was lower for the Geogian commu- 
nity than for the rest of the population. Secondly, the Georgians 
were outstanding in one peculiar offence: stealing electricity from 
the national electricity company. This was a specific Georgian phe- 
nomenon and rather widespread. However, not only was I not told about 
this before, but when inquiring - having already obtained official 
figures -I was assured (wrongly) that it was a rare occurrence. 
Of course, intentional misleading would not be surprising if it served 
a purpose. I came across this in one of' my residual roles as the 
town's expert on Georgians. A colleague working with girls in dis- 
tress in the local social service department approached me about a 
reported case of elopement. Naturally I was very interested to become 
involved. While Elam, my late predecessor in Ashkelon, evidenced 
several cases in the early and mid-70's, I had not come across any. 
Immediately I made myself available, and shortly afterwards we met 
with the girl and her parents. They were opposed to her marriage, 
while she gave the impression that she would rather consent. 10 My 
next step was to try to get some more background information about the 
families involved. To my astonishment, I quickly found out, through 
my sources, that not only was there no elopement, but that the girl 
had actually already been engaged. The true problem turned out to be 
the girl's age. She was under the legal marriage age and it was 
thought that by fabricating an elopement, the authorities would be put 
under pressure to give their approval to the wedding. " 
(c) Exaggeration 
Exaggeration is a form of conspictus display. For many it is the 
renowned Georgian attribute, evident to any traveller (eg Hone, 1982; 
Maclean, 1980; Papashvily, 1973). 11 For observers, this is rather 
appealing - say as guests at lavish feasts. But to social observers 
it possesses some problems when trying to establish information as 
accurately as possible. Social gatherings like feasts are an excel- 
lent occasion to collect information: the wine loosens the tongue and 
time stops still. And as a guestyou become the focus of attention 
and your wishes (including questions) get answered. However, if I 
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believed all accounts, then Mzhevanadze, the deposed ruler of Georgia, 
was supposed to be on the paying list of some traders who - as the 
Georgian saying goes - 'did not know where Tbilisi was on the map'. 
Furthermore, the present first secretary, Shavardnadze, who appears by 
the stories to be rather a hermit, is supposed to have been a personal 
friend of several of Ashkelon's present inhabitants. 
As could be expected in a large community, one finds a wide range of 
behaviours. Thus, there was one informant who, being aware of the 
inbuilt cultural tendency to exaggerate, would actually underestimate. 
He would typically say: "I think our income was so and so, but you 
must not take it down. It could now seem to me higher than it actual- 
ly was. " On the other hand, there was a pathological liar who was 
supposed to be so powerful that he was only short of becoming the 
mayor of aI arge town. 
Remedies for false reporting are simple, but labour expensive. 
Meticulous cross-check-ing of information is the key, along with a 
careful and continuous effort to establish an informant's credibility. 
This was done through key informants, who were expected to be in a 
position'to assess a person's standing, at least in the community, 
and, if possible, back in Georgia. Of course, over time I was able to 
establish independently my impressions of a person's standing in the 
community. It so happened that two informants who were among the 
first with whom I developed a good rapport and with whom I spent 
considerable time and effort, had to be discounted as they were found 
to be lacking in credibility. Sometimes, when the problem seemed to 
be more a lack of accuracy (that is, exaggeration) than incredibility, 
I arranged - mainly through key informants - to pass the message that 
it was paramount for me, "in order to write a reliable book, " to be 
given accurate accounts. It seemed to help. In a particular instance 
I used to pass all information to the attention of an informant's son, 
who would then filter it according to the best of his ability. 
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Both perceptual errors and false reporting are a potentially greater 
danger to reliable research in studying culture from a distance, 
mainly because of the necessary overdependence on a particularly 
narrow channel of data: selective informants. To minimize these 
sources of error, three main methods were employed: 
establishing an informant's credibility: both in his present 
life in the community and, before that, in Georgia; 
establishing an informant's reliability: by rechecking his re- 
ports over time; 
establishing a report's validity (typicality): by cross-checking 
it with similar accounts. 
6.4 Researcher-Subjects Relations 
(a) Working with an Emigre Society 
The ever-present problem of acquiring the frank cooperation of sub- 
jects becomes a major concern in reconstructive research when dealing 
with an inaccessible culture. All data is necessarily dependent on 
the successful (or unsuccessful) rapport with informants who are in 
the difficult position of both exiles and newcomers: they left their 
fatherland but are not yet integrated in their new home. Their stand- 
ing as immigrants in a different society is bound to have an impact on 
the way they cope and adapt to the new situation. Inevitably it 
shades the relations with a researcher in a certain way. In our 
particular case, dealing with people who come from an environment 
where free research is non-existent, and a person with a pen and a 
notebook has to be an official of some kind, can only make things 
complicated for both sides. 
The Harvard Project researchers, for instance, were concerned about 
how the Soviet emigres' responses would be affected in the light of 
the fact that they were waiting for visas to the United States (Bauer 
et al, 1964; Inkeles and Bauer, 1959). The Georgian way of responding 
to the Israeli reality was to 'hedgehog: wrap inwardly and minimize 
the contact with, and influence of, the outside environment. 12 Con- 
sequently, former attempts to obtain information on economic activity 
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in Georgia using 'closed' structured questionnaires failed to obtain 
adequate co-operation (Ofer et al, 1979). Another survey at the same 
period, though reporting some data, admits that "many of the inter- 
viewees were ashamed M to go into details about illicit income in 
the USSR" (Israeli Institute for the Study of Contemporary Society, 
1979, p. 15). 
The strong boundary the Georgians have built around themselves (Elam, 
1980) and their mutual rejection of Israelis (only 3% of Israelis ever 
met Georgians si Ily: Astman and Rosenbaum, 1979)13 suggested that 
the gradual buiolcdif trust with specific individuals, and within a 
community framework was imperative. That called for a research method 
which would involve a close association with Georgians over a consid- 
erable period of time, and careful consideration in asking (or re- 
fraining from asking) particular questions. 
(b) Ethical Considerations 
Working with immigrants from a totalitarian police state, and recon- 
structing aspects of their life there, raises some ethical concerns 
peculiar to this type of inquiry. 
Since people who left the Soviet Union have still got relatives there, 
this issue naturally was present all the way through my fieldwork, 
though it was not often openly put forward, perhaps because informants 
did not want to offend me. 14 More than anything, this puts a heavy 
burden of responsiblity on the researcher. After all, it is he who 
makes the decisions as to what to present and how. Needless to say, 
the information is concealed in such a way that any detection of the 
source of reference is practically impossible. There is no mention of 
names of people or places, and any specific data (eg: the sort of 
produce in the factory described) were given adequate fictitious 
cover. 
More than once I found myself in the uneasy situation of trying to 
convince a person that he could tr ust me with his secret affairs in 
the recent past. I tried to keep the balance between my desire to 
know and succeed i n this venture on the one hand, while recognizing a 
person's very real difficulties in cooperating on the other. I tried 
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to remember that my momentary loss is far less crucial than his poten- 
tial risk. 
6.5 A Final Note 
As has been presented here, there are no doubt numerous limitations to 
be dealt with when undertaking research on an inaccessible culture, 
requiring a reconstruction of events from the past and tackling a 
sensitive issue such as illicit economic activity. 
However, if these problems are identified and faced during the data 
collection phase, in carefully planned strategy, and if taken into 
consideration when applying the findings, this methodology is possibly 
the best one available today to study our particular issue: the 





Elam makes a point in his field notes: "A telephone in a neigh- 
bour's flat reminds us that we never came across one in a 
Georgian flat - with one notable exception. Is it because a 
telephone acknowledges distance between relatives, a substitute 
for face to face contact . *.? 1' (8.8.1977, unpublished field 
notes). Elam was right. Fouryears later telephones were still 
low on the Georgian priority list. Evidently, these were con- 
sidered unnecessary for inter-community communications. 
Telephones might also suggest an asocial attitude: to shorten or 
hasten communication would be considered an insult. One should 
never be short of 'social time'. 
This suspicion was existent also in Georgia. Plisezki, who 
studied Georgian Jews in the late twenties notes it, and so does 
Krikheli, who directed the Historical and Ethnographical Museum 
of Georgian Jews in the thirties and forties (in Ben-Zvi, 1963). 
However, one cannot separate this suspicion from the general 
problem of practising social sciences in the Soviet Union in 
those times. 
3.01 im: migrants to Israel. 
4. Some of the questionnaires which related to the same family were 
filled in in different classes. 
5. Goldberg (1967) has looked at continuity patterns among migrants 
by using participant observation to examine their principal 
social institutions in the present and recent past. 
6. Textbooks were available in Israel. The sampled persons had left 
Georgia at different times during the last decade. As far as I 
was able to establish, these texts had hardly changed in the last 
twenty years. One of the respondents was a Christian and was 
educated in the capital city. The other five were Jewish and 
came from east, south and west rural Georgia. 
7. Consider the following vignette: on a summer day I strol I al ong 
the main street. "Shalom professor" I was greeted by two young 
brothers. The youngest (aged 9) wanted to try on my sunglasses. 
Without thinking I hand them over, while his elder brother (aged 
12) slaps him in the face: "How dare you make such a request! " 
8.1 did, however, look into the ordinary offences at the local 
magistrates court, which of course did not come to the attention 
of the press. But this was done in order to learn about my 
sample, not to gain information about the second economy, and, as 
already mentioned, that immediately raised some eyebrows in my 
vicinity. 
9.1 was known in the community as 'Doktori' and 'Englishi', both 
suggesting a high standing. 
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10. Usually elopement is worked out with the girl's prior consent. 
11. For further elaboration, see Chapter on Core Values. 
12. This is one possible reaction among few others. North African 
emigres' reaction in the fifties and sixties apparently was 
largely one of disintegration and overdependence on the receiving 
society (Marx, 1976; Elam, 1980). 
13. This should explain why people preferred to relate to me as 
'Englishi' (Englishman) and not as Israeli, which I am. The 
general rejection of Israelis, and what appeared to be Israeli, 
made it difficult to see me in the same category while responding 
to me favourably. 
14. Which does not imply that my standing was taken for granted; my 
integrity and credibility were constantly in question. 
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Two Questions 
The overall question this chapter aims to answer is the following: 
Is the sample used in this study adequate - ie. can one learn about 
Soviet Georgia's second economy by studying a community of Georgian 
Jewish emigr6s in Israel? 
The question should be treated I believe at two conceptually different 
levels. One derives from the economic sphere, the other from the 
cultural milieu. 
(a) The Question of Economic Representation 
Since this study focuses on economic activity, the central issue to be 
examined is whether the people of the selected sample can give evi- 
dence about the second economy. Two expectations can be offered: 
That, as a minimal requirement, the people in our sample have 
observed Georgia's second economy in action, they can - and do 
give evidence about their observations. 
Better than this: if as participants in the second economy of 
Georgia, they give evidence particularly of their participation 
with and alongside non Jewish Georgians. 
(b) The Question of Cultural Representation 
As this study aims to understand economic behaviour on the basis of a 
people's culture, three further expectations can be put forward: 
That, as natives of Georgia, the studied people should reflect in 
their behaviours and attitudes some aspects of their host 
culture. 1 
Better than this, if as a minority group living along with the 
majority, the selected sample can give evidence about the general 
population. 
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Better still, if it can be established that the selected sample 
not only lived among their gentile neighbours, but in practical 
terms lived with them and shared similar beliefs and customs, 
then their contributions can be regarded as disproportionately 
val uabl e. 
I will start by examining the issue of cultural representation first. 
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1. THE PLACE OF JEWS IN GEORGIAN SOCIETY AND CULTURE 
An established Jewish presence in Georgia traditionally goes back to 
the legendary Kusar Empire in the 8th Century and some would argue to 
before that - to dispersal after the destruction of the first temple. 
There is firm evidence both of settlements at least as far back as the 
11th Century and of an uninterrupted presence since then. This pres- 
ence has been relatively uneventful. In Georgia there were no expul- 
sions and restricted pales of settlement as in Czarist Russia. When 
Russia annexed Georgia in 1801 it had to recognize the established 
position of its Jews who then enjoyed a much freer status than else- 
where in the Russian Empire. Since the Red Army takeover of Georgia 
in 1921 there has been a similar differential in control. 
The decades between the start of Soviet rule and the beginning of mass 
emigration to Israel are of crucial importance to this research. It 
is in those years that the subjects who provided the data were born, 
grew up and were socially active. In examining the place of Jews in 
Georgia at that period, the following questions are of main interest: 
How close was their life to that of gentile Georgians? How integrated 
were they in Georgian society? What differentiated them from the non- 
Jewish population? 
I would like to focus on three central areas: the cultural arena, 




Language is the core of culture and as such is a prime indicator of 
the exclusiveness of a people. Georgian Jews have neither a separate 
language, nor a special Jewish dialect in Georgian. Consequently they 
are a rare exception among Jewish ethnic groups. Ben-Zvi (1963) 
notes: "What is most surprising is that even the script they use 
amongst themselves is Georgian, going from left to right, and is very 
different from all other Jewish groups in the East and West, who used 
Hebrew script for communicating the local spoken language amongst 
themselves. " (p. 91) 
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Nevertheless there were in use certain Hebrew words and expressions, 
especially among pedlars and merchants -a kind of secret argot or 
canting language (similar to that of fairground workers in Britain) 
intended to take advantage of Georgian gentile listeners. The vocabu- 
lary was rather limiting and probably derived from chatter and chant- 
ings of religious ceremonies. Recent research indicates that the 
vocabulary of specific Judeo-Georgian speech is probably richer than 
originally suspected (Moskovich and Ben-Oren, undated). Yet it is 
doubtful whether it ever came into general use; and the researchers 
themselves stated that: "according to the established view, a sepa- 
rate Judeo-Georgian language does not exist. The Georgian Jews them- 
selves claim that they speak the Georgian language common to them and 
to the Georgian gentiles. " (p. 1) I 
Names 
Georgian Jews bear the same names as the Georgian gentiles: both 
first and surnames. In that sense, they are practically indistin- 
gui shabl e. What is more, first names are Georgian proper - not an 
adaptation of Jewish names and they do not use separate Hebrew names 
either as is the case elsewhere. It has been suggested that the use 
of the traditional Georgian surname endings 'adze' and 'ili, were 
adopted by Georgian Jews in the second half of the 19th Century. This 
suggests that at this time there were more opportunities for integra- 
tion which would indicate Jews could 'pass' as Georgian in certain 
situations. 
(C) customs 
Georgian Jews followed local custom to the extent that even the major 
religious ceremonies - for example, weddings - differed only "in a few 
Hebrew songs, of a religious or semi-religious nature" (Plisezki, 
p. 36). 
Plisezki noted that the Jews in the mountain areas of Georgia (Racha 
region) performed the Bussloba ceremony, which is a fertility rite 
associated with farm animals, although in his day Jews were not shep- 
herds, and he doubts whether they ever were. 
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Elyashvili (1975) suggested that any respectable girl - Jewish or 
gentile - would play the Deira (a kind of drum) and the Garmoshka (a 
mouth organ), traditional Georgian instruments. These days, the pro- 
per musical instrument is the piano, which is almost a must in any 
Georgian Jewish home in Ashkelon - as, it appears it is in Georgia 
itself. 
When I enquired about customary ways of celebrating holidays in 
Georgia, to my surprise all respondents2 mentioned the celebration of 
the Georgian New Yea-r and even Christmas. 
"Jews used to celebrate Christmas together with the gentiles and 
in the same way: decorating trees, buying presents, putting on 
fancy dress. " 
nChristmas was full of Joy. We would decorate a fir tree, pre- 
pare a huge meal, and wait for midnight, when we would start 
da nc i ng. " 
"We used to celebrate Christmas thus: we would take a fir tree 
and put it in the middle of the house and decorate it with toys, 
and small lights; and fruits and sweets as well. Around the tree 
we would put tables with lots of food and drink, and we would 
give blessings for a good and sweet year (like we bless in the 
Jewish New Year); and we would celebrate right into early morn- 
ing. In the mi ddl e of any town or vi 11 age there woul d be the 
tallest fir tree, all decorated. And the children would put on 
various fancy dress ... I remember (Santa Claus) giving me a 
kind of 'birthday bag', with sweets and small toys inside. " 
Another informant explained this puzzling phenomenon: 
"It was a special event celebrated by Jews and gentiles alike. 
Christmas is a Christian festival, but we would celebrate it 
because Jews and Christians were neighbours. " 
Likewise, one informant recalled that, Christians would be honorary 
guests at Purim. 3 And according to another, they would take part in 
Simkhas Torah. 4 Both are traditional festive occasions. 
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Another cultural feature of Georgian Jews, very much a deviation from 
diaspora Jewish tradition, is excessive alcoholic consumption, espe- 
cially of wines, which is in accordance with the Georgian gentile way 
of life. While the non-drinking of wines and spirits was a key dif- 
ference between Jews and Christians in Europe; Georgian Jews, like 
their gentile neighbours, even grew their own grapes and made their 
own wine. 
There were no special Jewish dishes, as is common in other Jewish 
diasporic communities - Georgian cuisine prevailed, but of course the 
consumption of pork was prohibited, and all KashruthS laws were ob- 
served. 
1.2 Gentile-Jewish Relations 
(a) Formal and Informal Bonds 
The strongest bond, that of marriage, was almost out of the question. 
Jews did not intermarry. Of course, there have. been exceptions to 
this rule - more so in the cities, and from the 1960's onwards, but 
almost none in the rural areas. 
There are a number of reasons for this. Firstly, the religion rules 
it out. Secondly, the social organization of the Jewish family and 
the Jewish community in Georgia was very close-knit. The fact that 
the majority of the Jewish population was rura, 6 ensured that there 
were only a few dissenters. Both Elyashvili (1975) and Plisezki 
(1931), reporting on Georgian Jewish life in the 1920's and 1930's 
respectively, commented on their strong communal boundaries. Elam, 
who studied the migrants upon their arrival to Israel in the early 
1970's, was fascinated by their strong ingroup cohesion and outgroup 
rej ec ti on. 
A third factor militating against intermarriage was that traditionally 
couples married young to spouses chosen by their elders. Girls would 
not usually be more than sixteen years old, whilst men would marry in 
their late teens or early twenties. Thus the family's authority 
prevailed and the ability, or wish, to deviate was limited. 7 
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Nonetheless, there are alternative bonds to those of wedlock which can 
unite Jewish and gentile individuals, and through them families. This 
is the traditional blood brotherhood bond, which still holds in rural 
Georgia, though the urban population consider it passe. Blood 
brotherhood signifies the ultimate link between two individuals and 
their respective families. It is the epitome of a long established 
relationship, and the ritual is performed as a symbol of that special 
bond, or in order to publicly demonstrate it. 
The ritual is dramatic, and involves cutting a finger (usually the 
small or middle finger - sometimes both) to let the blood run for a 
while. Then the appropriate fingers are held against each other thus 
permitting one's family blood to mix with another's. Symbolically it 
is interpreted as 'becoming as a brother' (the literal meaning of the 
Georgian term: Dzenobili), or 'as a sister' CDOM' in the case of 
females). The ritual can be either private or public, according to 
circumstances and intentions. However, it is always considered a 
serious commitment. 8 The commitment affects both families, and 
therefore the formal binding would be the outcome of a long period of 
maturation in their relationships sometimes requiring the formal con- 
sent of the heads of both families. Despite the fact that I came 
across several cases of blood-brother/sisterhood the impression shared 
by my informants was that this was not a common event - in fact rather 
a rare event. Nevertheless, most cases I heard about involved a Jew 
and a gentile, 9 and was an expression of the concern to cement a 
special relationship that extended beyond the individuals directly 
involved. 
A second bond which cut across the Jewish/gentile divide, was provided 
by milk brotherhood and milk sisterhood which mystically linked off- 
spring of different mothers if they were suckled from the same breast. 
There were no religious barriers to seeking such attachments from 
either side of the divide if a mother proved unable to feed her own 
child. As with blood brotherhood, the milk bond extended at least for 
the life of the individuals involved and forged links beyond them to 
members of their wider families. One of my informants had a blood 
brotherhood link with a gentile family that had extended over three 
generations. This was not considered vastly extraordinary in such 
cases. 
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Besides these mystically backed quasi kinship links based on ties of 
blood and milk there were other less committing bonds. The Georgian 
language provides for three types of friendship. Next to Dzemobili 
(Dobili) - which can be secured without the aforementioned blood- 
spilling ritual - stands Megobari, a committed friend indeed. The 
Life History Questionnaire survey indicates that 30 out of 35 inter- 
viewees (86%) had in Georgia at least one gentile Megobari, irrespec- 
tive of their occupation or place of residence (Kulashi, for instance, 
was 90% Jewish). Naturally, both elements influence the total number 
of significant gentile relations. 
(b) Anti-Semitism and Gentile-Jewish Relations in General 
It has long been an uncontested truism among scholars that anti- 
semitism in Georgia was practically non-existent. A notable dissident 
in this respect is Aaron Krikheli, Director of the Historical and 
Ethnographical Museum of Georgian Jews in Tbilisi, who emphasizes a 
traditional Georgian anti-semitism (1976) going back to the feudal 
serf system under which yoke Jews were badly exploited. But he is an 
exception, and relying on Elam and my own experience I can ascertain 
that the people concerned - the Jews emigrating from Georgia - did 
not, on the whole, experience anti-semitism. On the contrary they 
stressed the good relations they had with gentiles. Sometimes these 
observations colour the background of their present day situation in 
Israel: "I felt more at home among the Georgians than here among my 
supposed brothers" is a common remark. 
Yet occasionally one was told of anti-Jewish incidents. A woman 
recal I ed that as a chi 1d at school pork was f orced i nto her mouth by 
other pupils. A man said that even his close friends would sometimes 
remark: nYou are a hell of a lad - it's a pity though that you are 
Jewish. " And one should remember the Khrushchev drive against econom- 
ic crimes in the early 1960's - the only ones to be executed in 
Georgia were Jews. Most puzzling are two blood libel incidents which 
occurred as recently as 1965 and 1969. Most of my informants also 
admitted that a Jew would be discriminated against in the second 
economy. Jews would pay higher 'fees' than gentiles for entrance into 
higher educationlo and probably higher bribes to secure the running of 
illicit enterprises. 
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Nevertheless, compared with other parts of the Soviet Union, anti- 
semitism was at a relatively low level. 11 It should be borne in mind 
that the Armenians (for whom there is little love in Georgia) are the 
proverbial 'scape-goats' -a traditionally hated element and as such 
are persecuted (Wiles, 1980). Elyashvili (1975) indicates that in 
Georgian literature it is the Armenian who is picked up as the 
'Shylock Type' - not the Jew. The Jews were never, therefore, quite 
the underdogs of Georgian society, which could explain their relative 
feelings of ease. Or to take a Marxist view, following Elyashvili and 
Plisezki, Jews in rural Georgia were never in direct competition with 
the native population: they were small traders ie. pedlars and go- 
betweens, while gentile Georgians were on the whole farmers. Admit- 
tedly in recent times, particularly in the 1960's, occupational struc- 
tures have been changing, but so far as is known this had no effect on 
anti-semitism. 12 
The Georgian people exhibited weaker anti-semitic attitudes on the 
whole compared to other regions of the USSR, and on the positive side, 
showed much sympathy under Soviet Rule for the Jewish cause, whether 
for the active practice of religion during the years, or for emigra- 
tion to Israel in the 1970's. In the 1960's, before the Zionist 
revival, Georgia had almost half of all active synagogues in the 
Soviet Union (while Georgian Jews numbered only a fraction - some 3% - 
of the total Jewish population). Ben-Ami (1965) recalls how surprised 
he was to see, in the early 1960's, children praying in the synagogues 
on the Sabbath, instead of attending school. He tells of an agreement 
between a particular Jewish community and the Georgian official who 
was in charge of places of worship. He 'failed' to notice any chil- 
dren (who by an early warning would disappear into the courtyard) on 
his 'surprise' visits - and probably there was a similar arrangement 
with the school authorities. 
The freedom of Georgian Jews to observe their religious customs indi- 
cates a sharp contrast with the consistent oppression of Jews in other 
parts of the Soviet Union, which was referred to as a 'planned cul- 
turocide' (Feuer, 1967). 
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2. JEWS IN THE GEORGIAN ECONOMY 
2.1 A General Overview 
The traditional Jewish occupations were in small trade. That is, 
either wandering from village to village (Nelochnik), or selling from 
a stall in the market place, or on the main street (Korobeinik). The 
Jews were often sub-contractors to wealthier Jewish merchants, who 
were positioned in the central villages and towns. One of my inform- 
ants, now over 80 years old, still has vivid memories of her father, 
who was a small trader at the turn of the century and was subject to a 
wealthy contractor. The relationship between them reflected the not 
too distant days of serfdom, including the obligatory submissive bow 
when approaching the patron. 
Plisezki (1931) gives a picturesque account of the life of a small 
tradesman. "He would take on account some stock for about 20-25 
Rubles, and on Sunday, early in the morning, he would leave the town- 
ship to reach a remote corner of the district. Usually he would walk 
with the goods on his back, in addition to the Talith13 and Tefilin14 
... He would wander from village to village and return home on 
Thursday evening or Friday to have the Sabbath with his family. By 
Friday, he would settle the accounts with his employer and take a new 
load for the coming weekly cycle. " (p. 138) Some of the payments would 
be made by barter rather than in cash - they were mostly dairy produce 
and crops which, through his family, he would attempt to sell locally. 
With Georgia coming under the Red flag in 1921 considerable economic 
changes soon took place, which affected the Jews as part of the native 
population. The country was regimented into an intense plan of indus- 
trialization -(-f+ty- k. j-ýWL"r gýwE nomic Policy' of the early 1920' E S) 
- which soon turned into 
Ve 'horrors of the 'Collectivization' of the 
I ate 1920's and 1930's, during which period several Jewish Kolkhoz 
were established (there were eight by 1930), but which ended in eco- 
nomic collapse. 
After World War II Jews became occupationally more and more integrat- 
ed, wi th the spread of technical and hi ger educati on, f ol 1 owi ng the 
speedy industrialization in the 1950's and 1960's. Neishtat states 
that "While in the 1920's and even the 1930's many refrained from 
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sendi ng thei r chi 1 dren to school; in the 1 ate 1940's there were very 
few who did not attend State schools. In the 1960's there were al- 
ready a few thousand Jewish students, hundreds of qualified academics, 
scores of whom exercised the liberal professions, or were artists and 
scientists" (Neishtat, 1976, p. 139). 
Neishtat's impression receives support from the Soviet census, which 
indicates that eighteen out of 1,000 Jews were registered in insti- 
tutes of hi gher educati on in the 1961-2 academi c year. And I srael i 
figures on Georgian migrants indicate that Jews were represented in 
all economic sectors (Litvak et al, 1981) - though their occupational 
structure apparently had some specific bias. 
2.2 The Georgian Jewish Occupational Structure 
In estimating the occupational structure of Jews in Georgia, in com- 
parison with the general occupational structure of the Georgian popu- 
lation, I rely on Israeli figures concerning arrivals to Israel and on 
official Soviet statistics, as well as on my own data. 
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Table 1: Occupational Declarations of Georgian Immigrants to Israel 
(January, 1970 - September, 1979) Aged 15 and Above: Per- 
centage from Total (Adapted from Litvak et al. 1981). 
Men Women Total 
With Declared Occupation 76.2 37.6 56.5 
Without Declared Occupation 23.8 62.5 43.5 
Total 100.0 100.0 100.0 
Physicians (including Dentists) 1.2 1.7 1.3 
Paramedical Professions (Nurses etc) 0.2 20.8 7.1 
Engineers & Architects 6.6 1.6 4.9 
Academics (Social Sciences & Humanities) 4.2 2.4 3.6 
Academics (Natural & Life Sciences) 0.6 1.1 0.8 
Teachers 0.6 9.4 3.6 
Artists (including Writers, Composers) 4.9 2.8 4.2 
Trade (including Retailers) 10.0 3.5 7.8 
Craftsmen, Industrial & Construction Workers 57.4 27.0 47.2 
Administrative Posts (including Managerial) 3.5 11.1 6.1 
Agriculture 0.2 0.1 0.1 
Public Services 3.4 8.2 5.0 
o fAeýý) 7.2 io. 3 V'3 
Table 2: Sectoral Distribution of the Georgian Working Population in 
1970 and 1975: Percentages from Total. (Source: Georgian 
SSR in 1975 (1976). 
1970 1975 
Industry & Construction 27 26 
Agriculture & Wood Industry 38 35 
Transport & Communication 78 
Trade 67 
Public Service (including Health & Education 16 18 
Administrative Posts (including Managerial) 22 
Others 44 
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To start with, we face a large percentage of immigrants with 
undeclared occupations, of which we can find no reference in Soviet 
figures. This is due partly to the impossibility of admitting to such 
a lack in the Soviet Union. But it could also be that Soviet figures 
do not include the non-working population (the table refers to the 
'working population' - yet I could not find any other figures on non- 
working populations). Lastly, I can not rule out, that for whatever 
reasons, people arriving in Israel may not have wanted to declare 
their true occupations. 
Three sectors in particular show a large bias of Jewish stratification 
against the trend of the general population: agriculture, trade and 
handi craf ts. In agriculture (which includes in the Soviet figures 
also the wood industry) Jews comprised only a fraction of the work- 
force (0.2% as against 35%). In trade, though the stated proportion 
of Jews approximates to the overall Georgian level (7.8% and 7%) the 
real proportion in trade was probably higher because it included a 
large proportion of those with undeclared occupations. I have to rely 
in this respect on the overall impression given by my informants (both 
Jewish and gentile) that trade was a very 'Jewish' occupation. My 
Life History and Personal Details questionnaire show that 36% of those 
interviewed were traders. 
Handicrafts are another major 'Jewish' occupation. In Soviet figures 
it appears to be incorporated in the 'Industry and Construction' 
category (26%), while the Israeli survey has 47.2% of Jewish workers 
(57.4% of the men) in this category. It is my impression - backed by 
my questionnaires - that a large proportion of this number were 
craftsmen (41% in my surveys). 
It should be noted that figures concerning the Jewish population 
relate, of course, to migrants to Israel. They do not therefore 
automatically reflect that proportion of the Jewish population who 
stayed in Georgia. In fact since most arrivals were from rural 
Georgia and those who stayed behind lived mainly in the bigger cities, 
it would be only fair to assume (having no inverse data) that their 
occupational structure may be more in accord with the general trend. 
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2.3 Jews in the Second Economy 
The second economy accounts for not only a substantial portion of 
Soviet Georgia's national economy (25% is a cautious estimate - Wiles, 
1980), but it penetrates practically every corner of daily life as 
will become evident in the following chapters. The paramount question 
that concerns us here is whether Jews occupied any particular posi- 
tions in the second economy distinct from their gentile countrymen, or 
whether in certain spheres their role was so dominant that we might 
fruitfully speak of a distinctive 'Jewish second economy'. 
Broadly speaking, the answer to this is no. Jews do not play any 
special role as compared with gentiles. Indeed, we can quite certain- 
ly ascertain that they do not hold prominent, or central positions - 
neither in the second economy, nor, indeed, in the formal economy as a 
whole. For instance, Jewish mayors are unheard of - with the excep- 
tion of Kulashi, a townlet of which 90% of its inhabitants were 
Jewish. Jews were generally excluded from the police, both the eco- 
nomic police, or the KGB and the most prominent ministerial post 
occupied by a Jew was probably at the time of the Menshevik govern- 
ment. 15 These are the important power bases from which Jews were 
excluded. Traditionally they were pawns and middlemen, rather than 
decision-takers. 16 The fact that Jews were the only people in Georgia 
to be executed in the 1960's for economic crimes should not be mis- 
interpreted. These acts were in part a consequence of Khrushchev's 
anti-Jewish campaign. 17 
It would however be correct to say that Jews maintained a high profile 
in the second economy up to the 1970's. simply because their tradi- 
tional involvement in trade and crafts was greater than their relative 
representation in the country's population, as outlined previously. 
That is to say, they tended to concentrate on consumer goods, which is 
a natural focus for second economy activity, particularly in a society 
like Georgia, where there is great emphasis on extravagance and con- 
spicuous consumption (see Chapter 7, Section 6, The Rules of Informal 
Trade). And also according to my informants, Jews were preferred 
associates in second economy activities because "We kept our mouths 
shut. " This argument was consistently given for the common phenomenon 
of Jewish-gentile cooperation in the second economy. To my mind, 
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there can be no other explanation for this perception of Jews, except 
for the recognition that they were traditionally vulnerable; a toler- 
ated minority, who were close to native Georgians and yet were not 
totally assimilated. They could therefore be more easily threatened 
and hushed-up, and would hesitate to betray associates. When neces- 
sary, of course, they might serve as scapegoats. 18 
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3. THE PARADOX OF THE MASS MIGRATION IN THE SEVENTIES 
I have demonstarted that Jews were integrated into gentile society 
both culturally and economically to an extent rarely found elsewhere 
in the Jewish diaspora. Yet the migration to Israel of 30,000- 
35,00019 Jews within a decade which, even at a cautious estimate, 
represents more than one half of the total Jewish population of 
Georgia'20 requires explanation. 
The obvious question is: why should so well integrated a people - as 
is the claim - migrate en masse? Why indeed should a higher propor- 
tion of Jews have come from Georgia than from any other Soviet repub- 
lic. 
The usual explanations for Jewish migratory movements - that they 
arise in reaction to anti-semitism or as an attempt to escape from 
poverty - do not apply in this instance. Firstly, Georgia has tradi- 
tionally had a particularly low level of anti semitism, lower indeed 
than elsewhere in the Soviet Union (eg. Elyashvili, 1975; Neishtat, 
1970; Elam 1980; Ben-Ami, 1965). Neither was there any significant 
upsurge in anti semitic activity at this time. And second, the Jews 
did not leave to escape from poverty. Soviet Georgia has the highest 
standard of living in the Soviet Union and furthermore this standard 
is one in which the majority of Jews have shared. 
So we are faced with something of a paradox. Why should Georgian Jews 
have left a hospitable home that had been so far many hundreds of 
years, one in which they were exceptionally well integrated, to which 
they were deeply attached (Ben Zvi, 1963 and Elam, 1980; Gershoni; 
1979) and in which they were relatively economically secure? As we 
shall see, our paradox has a number of strands. It was, however, this 
very involvement of Jews in, and their acceptance by Georgian society 
and culture that had a major influence on their migration. This 
together with the impact of religious Zionism and certain specific 
events of the early 1970's, resulted in the impressive exodus of whole 
communities from their motherland (Deda Mitza2l) to their father- 
land. 22 
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3.1 The Personification of Nationhood 
The fusion between the personal /individual and the national/public; 
the close association between an individual, his land and his country- 
men; and his affiliation to his nation's past and future, are well 
expressed in the first, famous letter of the eighteen families addres- 
sed to world public opinion: the first attempt by Jews in the USSR to 
publicly challenge the authorities on their right to emigrate. 
"Their blood is in our veins, and our tears are their tears-23 
The Prophecy has come true. Israel has risen from the ashes: we 
have not forgotten Jerusalem and it needs our hands. 
"There are eighteen of us who signed this letter. But he errs 
who thinks that there are only eighteen of us. There could have 
been many more aignatures. 
"They say there is a total of twelve million Jews in the world. 
But he errs who believes there is a total of twelve million of 
us. For with those who pray for Israel are hundreds of millions 
who did not live to this day, who were tortured to death, who are 
no Longer here. They march shoulder to shoulder with us, uncon- 
quered and immortal, those who handed down to us the tradition of 
etruggle and faith. 
"That is why we want to go to Israel 11 
And another public expression: a letter from an ex-Georgian living in 
Israel, published in the Georgian compatriot monthly, addressed greet- 
ings for the 1982 New Year: 
"I woutd Like to wish, in the name of the Georgian community a 
happy New Year to this paper. I wouLd aLso Like to wish a happy 
1982 to my Land of birth, to my magnificent Vani region., to aLL 
inhabitants of wonderfut Georgia and of Vani, my birthplace. I 
hope the New Year wiLl see you in joy and happiness, my dears. 
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We, in Israel, as compatriots, join you on the eve of the New 
Year, around the Little fir, with tears of joy. New Year greet- 
ings, our mother - who gave us life - Tbilisi. From all 
Georgians in Israel - we toast with you, brothers, to your life. " 
(Samahobto, No. 57, January 1982) 
The fact that an individual is not accountable to himself alone, but 
is also a representative of his extended family, the institution he 
works for, as well as his nation, becomes manifest during the feast - 
a central Georgian institution, to be discussed in Chapter 5. 
, 24 While in Ashkelon, I was often referred to as 'Englishi , although 
it was wel 1 -known that I was I srael i, but because my i nsti tuti onal 
affiliation was to England this was considered to be an integral part 
of my identity. Likewise, an English visitor to Tbilisi was honoured 
with toasts to England and recitations from Shakespeare. 25 Yet an- 
other informant recalls a feast in Georgia after the 'six days war', 
where - as a single Jew amongst gentiles - he was honoured by a toast 
"to the Jewish people, the State of Israel and the Israeli Defence 
Force for its glorious victory. " 
3.2 Georgian National Aspirations 
Georgia has always been known in the Soviet Union as a hotbed of 
nationalism (Kipnis, 1978; Suny, 1979; Peters, 1981; Parsons, 1982). 26 
The 1960's and 1970's saw an upsurge of national feeling as seldom 
before. This might be an outcome, as Kipnis (1978) suggests, of the 
aftermath of Stalin's death and the de-Stalinization period, which 
stimulated fears that Georgia might be further Russified and pushed 
people to intensify their national identity. This was reflected in a 
trend towards Georgian rather than Russian schools, a decline in 
intermarriage and a re-kindling of orthodoxy among the younger genera- 
tion. The very high proportion of Georgians who consider Georgian as 
their native language remained stable over a decade (99.4% in 1970 and 
99.5% in 1979), while those claiming fluency in Russian dropped from 
42.6% (in 1970) to 39.8% (1979)27 (Parsons, 1982). 
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In addition, however, one should not underestimate the relative re- 
laxation of the Khrushchev and Brezhnev era as compared with the reign 
of terror in the time of Stalin and Beria, which probably loosened 
inhibitions in expressing criticism of the official line. 
It is against this background, as well as on the basis of the funda- 
mental configuration of Georgia as a multi-national society, that it 
was perceived as only natural for Jews to want to return to Zion where 
their national identity could find fulfilment. It was not only the 
Jews who defined their identity in the general upsurge of Georgian 
national spirit - but Georgian nationalism itself was encouraged by 
the Zionistic wave which swept through whole communities, and which 
gave it further momentum. This accounts, to a degree, for the rela- 
tive ease with which Georgian Jewry secured official permission to 
emigrate in comparison with other regions of the USSR: a point con- 
firmed by Elam (1980), who studied Georgian Jews upon their arrival. 28 
3.3 Religion and Zionism 
Like Jews everywhere, the two features of religious observance that 
precluded assimilation were the observance of distinctive dietary laws 
and the operation of the Rule of endogamy - insistence on marriage 
only with Jews. Jews in Georgia, however, ate the same foods as 
Georgians (except for pork) and mostly prepared them in the same way 
so that their dietary laws were not as divisive as elsewhere. The 
principal barrier to assimilation arose from endogamy. I have no firm 
figures on the rate of intermarriage between Jews and non Jews but my 
informants are all agreed on its rarity. There are indications, 
however, that the intermarriage rate, though low, was increasing 
throughout the 1960's (Neishtat, 1976). 
One of the principal reasons for this widespread acceptance of an 
endogamous norm conforming to the ideal, lay in the tight social 
organization of relatively small scale, face-to-face, communities 
which were able to be sustained by a relative ease in religious obser- 
vance. The Georgian authorities did not make worship as difficult as 
in other Republics and it is recorded that in the 1960's about a half 
of all synagogues in the Soviet Union were in Georgia - though that 
Repubic contained only 3% of the Union's Jews (Schreider, 1979). 
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Linked to this active religious life lay the central role of the 
Khachamim - the religious, spiritual andcommunal leaders of their 
communities. Among their functions was the administration and control 
of an informal system of internal taxation and redistribution as well 
as their acting as Judges in the solution of disputes - both secular 
and religious. 
For such leaders the observance of the Zionistic ideal of migration to 
Israel was backed by a religious fervour to return to Zion. When the 
doors to migration had been partly opened prior to the outbreak of the 
first World War, there had been an exodus of 500 people. A second 
group of twenty families had followed in 1926 when the Georgian regime 
had actually encouraged the move with financial aid (Elyashvili, 
1975). For the rest, their involvement in Georgia was too integral, 
the difficulties in moving too great or the lack of Zionist leadership 
and organization too considerable. Neither 'push out' nor 'pull in' 
factors were strong enough to resolve their relative inertia. And for 
most of the period from 1926 the doors had remained closed. 
3.4 The Catalyzing Events of the Seventies 
The doors to migration were finally opened only through the occurrence 
of two events operating together that were to act as the catalyst 
which initially allowed the Khakhamim and then over 30,000 of their 
f ol 1 owers to mi grate inf our years. These events were the Mi ddl e 
East's Six Day War of 1967 and the fall of Georgia's First Secretary, 
Vasily Mzhavanadze in 1972. The first was to link Georgian Jewish 
consciousness to an identification with the State of Israel. It 
directly led Georgian Jews to become the first of any 'Soyiet republic 
to pressurize the authorities to permit migration. The second was to 
plunge Georgia into turmoil because it disrupted the basis of its 
personal support networks: indeed reverberations from the Mzhavanadze 
scandal were to extend throughout the Republic. 
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(a) The Six Day War of 1967 
Israel's astonishing victory over its neighbouring enemies had a 
significant impact on Georgian Jewry. Almost everyone to whom I spoke 
mentioned this event as a milestone in Jewish identity. For the 
younger generation it was of particular importance. It was the first 
major event in which they could identify with the Jewish State. 
There was another side effect of the Six Day War. Soviet propaganda 
di rected at i ts own nati onal s started to be appl ied agai nst I srael , 
with which the USSR had broken relations at the start of the conflict. 
The aim was to mobilize Soviet opinion against the Jewish State. In 
Georgia, however, this had the reverse effect of that intended. In 
accordance with the Georgian rejection of things Russian, this nega- 
tive propaganda was reinterpreted and Israel's attraction grew. As 
one informant put it: 
"We were certain that Israel was only short of being a little 
America, exactly because it was blackened in the Soviet media. 
We thought: 'If the Russians put so much effort into this cam- 
paign, it is because they are trying to disassociate us from a 
very good idea. '" 
Much of the prevai Ii ng perceptions of I srael deri ved of course f rom 
the Soviet blocking of information and with misinformation. "Unti I 
the 'Six Day War' I knew there is a place on the globe named Israel 
but I didn't know it was a Jewish state" an informant said. "All I 
knew about Israel that there is a Jerusalem, and that it is the focal 
point of Jewish life. But I really had no idea what Jerusalem was 
like or anything else, " said another. Undoubtedly, however, a part of 
this naivite , has to do with ethnocentricity, especially of rural 
Georgia. Elam tells about the Georgian Jew who was actually surprised 
to find out that Israelis did not speak Georgian. 
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We should not forget the implications that the image of a victorious 
Israel had on a predominantly Macho society. At that time I was told, 
"people would greet each other in the street by covering one of their 
eyes with the palm: a sort of 'Dayan salute'" - in imitation of 
Israel's one-eyed war hero. There is little doubt, that this admira- 
tion extended to the non Jewish population of Georgia. 29 
(b) The Fall of Mzhavanadze 
On 29th September, 1972, Mzhavanadze, the First Secretary of the 
Central Committee of the Georgian Communist Party, was ousted by 
Shevardnadze, until then Minister of Internal Affairs, in the after- 
math of what Kaiser (1976) has labelled "perhaps the biggest political 
scandal of modern times. n Mzhavanadze had ruled Georgia for 19 years 
and under him corruption had thrived to unparalleled levels. 
When Shevardnadze came to power, the tide turned. He had the reputa- 
tion for being honest, tough and determined to end the state of af- 
fairs he had inherited. Mass purges followed and prospects looked 
gloomy for many in Georgia. Uncertainty and insecurity mounted as 
peoples' personal support networks collapsed under this centralized 
onslaught. According to various sources, a power struggle persisted 
for months which still further increased insecurity: there were even 
attempts on the life of the new ruler. 
Jews had particularly good reasons to fear these developments. In 
Khrushchev's time, Jews were the only ones in Georgia to have been 
executed for economic crimes (Schreider, 1979) and given the tradi- 
tional Georgian Jewish occupations of small merchant, pedlar and 
craftsman (see t&r4,. z-2- ), their stake in the second economy was 
probably higher and their vulnerability greater than that of the 
average Georgian. In this sense, the change of government functioned 
as a 'push out' factor. 
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We can see the Joint impact of these two short-term catalizing events 
through emigration figures. In 1969,400 Georgian Jews left for 
Israel and in the following year all migration was stopped. In 1971, 
with the opening of the gates, however, 4,300 Georgian Jews emigrated 
(making a third of all SovietJewish emigration). In 1972, theyear 
of the change of government, this figure had grown two and a half 
times to 10,900 and in 1973 it was still high at 7,450. However, from 
1974 onwards there was a marked decrease in emigration to 2,670 and 
throughout the rest of the 1970's the numbers per year rarely exceeded 
a thousand - and were usually much less (Litvak et al, 1981; official 
Israeli figures). 
Apparently, by the time of the Yom Kippur War in October 1973, the 
halo effect of the Six Day War had faded and by 1974 the Shevardnadze 
regime had stabilized. The euphoria on one hand and panic on the 
other had both decreased. But the pull effect of the one and the push 
effect of the other had worked together to produce in proportionate 
terms, the highest rate of migration in the shortest time from any 
Soviet republic - and an excellent data base to draw from for the 
present study. 
Questions Answered 
I started this chapter by raising two issues which referred to the 
overall question of whether the sample used in this study would be 
adequate for research purposes. 
Concerning the general issue of cultural representation three expecta- 
tions were put forward: 
That, as natives of Georgia, the studied people should reflect in 
their behaviours and attitudes some aspects of their host 
culture. 
Better than this, if as a minority group living along with the 
majority, the selected sample can give evidence about the general 
population. 
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Better still, if it can be established that the selected sample 
not only lived among their gentile neighbours, but in practical 
terms 11 ved wi th them and shared si mi I ar bel ief s and customs, 
then their contributions can be regarded as disproportionately 
val uabl e. 
I believe the selected sample satisfies all three expectations. Not 
only di d the peopl e concerned ref 1 ect thei r nati ve cul ture and 11 ve 
alongside the Georgian majority, but in practice they were closely 
associated and integrated into Georgian society and culture. Indeed, 
rules of endogamy and dietary laws were observed and these precluded 
full commensality - nevertheless some Jews did, on occasion, inter- 
marry. They also participated with gentiles in drinking sessions -a 
vital dimension of Georgian social life (see Chapter 5) and the over- 
whelming majority of my informants had at least one close gentile 
friend. 
The second issue, that of economic representation raised two expecta- 
tions: 
That, as a minimal requirement, the people in our sample have 
observed Georgia's second economy in action, they can - and do 
give evidence about their observations. 
Better than this: if as participants in the second economy of 
Georgia, they give evidence particularly of their participation 
with and alongside non Jewish Georgians. 
Here again I have demonstrated that not only were my informants ob- 
servers of second economy processes and not only were they partici- 
pants in second economy activity - but indeed they were substantially 
integrated in Soviet Georgia's second economy. 
While in some sectors of the economy - notably agriculture and the 
higher economic levels - they were largely under represented, in 
others - particularly in trade and handicrafts they were deeply 
involved, thus allowing for a massive concentration of knowledge. As 
I shall show, it was their relative over representation in trade that 
allows a disproportionate access to data about much of Soviet 




Mead (1953) states: "Each informant is a representative of his 
culture when his sex, family, history, intelligence, type of 
experience in and outside his culture, and his relationship to 
the anthropologist are taken fully and properly into account" 
(p. 44). 
2. In the Life in Georgia Questionnaire (See Chapter 2 on Methodol- 
ogy). 
3. Purim -A Jewish holiday. A festive occasion with a carnival- 
like atmosphere. 
4. Simkhas Torah - The Celebration of the Law. Another jubilant 
occasion with dancing and singing. 
5. Kashruth - the Jewish dietary laws. 
6. Georgian Jews lived in twenty-three settlements, of which eight 
had less than 10,000 inhabitants, eight had between 10,000 to 
30,000 people, five had between 30,000 to 100,000 inhabitants and 
only two had more than 100,000. (Based on the 1959 census, 
excluding the Ashkenazi community, largely concentrated in the 
capital, Tbilisi) (Altshuler, 1980). 
7. There were (and still are) sanctioned deviations. A couple may 
elope if parents have refused permission for them to marry. This 
is a way of pressurizing for consent, but within known limits. 
Outmarriage would not, however, be tolerated. 
8.1 heard of several cases of teenagers experimenting with blood- 
mixing (the socialization of becoming a Georgian? ) without neces- 
sarily attaching the proper significance to the ritual. 
9. For second economy activities, such a bond has particular sig- 
nificance as it clearly shows a deep Jewish integration in the 
general (second) economy. 
10. Simis (1982) notes the 'entrance fee' to the Tbilisi Medical 
School was 15,000 Rubles, but according to my information Jews 
were charged up to 50,000 Rubles. 
11. Gitelman (1977) who interviewed Russian Jews in Israel in the 
1970's found that "over three-quarters claim to have experienced 
anti-semitism 'often' or 'sometimes'. " (p. 551) 
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12. And yet it would be wrong to dismiss the outbursts of blood-libel 
in the 1960's as minor affairs. The authorities, for obvious 
reasons, played them down and incidents hardly received any 
publicity. It could well be a populist shaping of an official 
anti-semitic stand of the time. In any case it requires further 
investigation, which is beyond the scope of this research. (My 
thanks to Ron Heisler for drawing my attention to this point). 
13. Talith -A prayer shawl (religious symbol of dress). 
14. Tefilin - 'Phylacteries' (Small black leather boxes containing 
religious scrolls and worn during prayer). 
15. Joseph Eligulashvili, Finance Minister. 
16. Feuer (1967) who visited Georgia in the late 1960's noted that "I 
never heard of any Jew among the 48 members of the Institute of 
Philosophy and my synagogue acquaintances (in Tbilisi) knew the 
name of no Jew on the faculty of Tbilisi State University" 
(P. 100). 
17.55-60% of all those shot for bribery, embezzlement and specula- 
tion under the 1961 Soviet legislation were Jews, even though 
they constituted only 1% of the total Soviet population (Leibler 
quoted in Staats, 1972). 
18. Another common reason given is that 'Jews are good in business': 
meaning they had a special talent for trade. This was a common 
bel i ef among my i nf ormants and, as f ar as I was abl e to check, 
was also held by Georgian gentiles. 
19. According to official Israel figures (Litvak et al, 1981) there 
were 29,933 Olim (migrants into Israel) from 1969 till March 
1980. However, I estimate the figure is closer to 35,000 to 
include arrivals from other republics: according to Altshuler 
(1980), 10-15% of Georgian Jews lived outside Georgia. 
20. That is, if we accept Altschuler's (1980) estimate that there 
were some 50,000 Georgian non-Ashkenazi Jews prior to the begin- 
ning of emigration. The overwhelming majority of Olim were non- 
Ashkenazi. 
21. Literally meaning 'motherland': the most common expression for 
Georgi a. 
22. Fatherl and (or ancestors 1 and) is the common term f or Zi on. 
23. This refers to Jews of past generations, who lived in the diaspo- 
ra and longed for Zion. 
24. Meaning, 'Englishman'. 
25. Mars (1982) personal communications. 
26. This point has already been discussed in the first chapter. 
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27. Though this drop might not be statistically significant: being 
relatively small, the collection of data might account for the 
differences. 
28. An article in the London Times at that period reveals the 
Georgian authorities have permitted a unique experiment: the 
creation of a Jewish 'public committee' to decide the order of 
priority in granting exit visas for families wishing to go to 
Israel. (D. Bonavia, 28.9.71) 
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"Although the people of the Caucasus speak many Languages and 
profess a variety of different religions, the region possesses a 
characteristic atmosphere and way of living which permeates every 
racial group and walk of life. " 
(Lang, 1962, p. 3) 
1. INTRODUCTION 
It is a central argument of this thesis that economic activity - 
whether open or hidden, primary or secondary, cannot be fully under- 
stood except in the context of its cultural setting. Accordingly 
therefore, it is necessary to identify and itemize those aspects of 
Georgian culture that play a leading role not only in Justifying but 
also in facilitating the behaviours with which we are concerned. 
1.1 Town and Country 
Since my analysis is derived from investigating people who came large- 
ly from small towns in rural Georgia - though this is supplemen ted by 
other sources of information - it should be born in mind that things 
might be somewhat different in the larger urban centres, which house 
about a half of the. country' s population. However, there are close 
links between town and country (Dragadze, 1976), and: 
"It is apparent that Georgians consider rural Georgia as the 
repository of the nation's cultural heritage, a fact evident not 
just in the fine arts, in poetry and prose writing, but also in 
the considerable body of research into Georgian folklore, dance 
and music, as welt as in films. " I 
(Parsons, 1982, p. 555) 
1.2 The Main Features 
It has often been noted that Georgians resemble Mediterraneans in 
their looks, manners and emphasis on competitive assertion (eq. Smith, 
1980; Maclean, 1980), and indeed their competitive way of life has 
many features similar to those found along the shores of the Mediter- 
ranean (Peristiany, 1966; 1968; Davis, 1977). This is not surprising 
considering its geography and climate, and the foreign influences that 
have shaped Georgia for centuries. 
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The values outlined here comprise the main features of Georgian cul- 
ture and as we would expect, these are reflected in its second economy 
activity. They include first and foremost the principles of honour 
and its corollary - shame. Both are social building blocks that 
underlie the competitive pressures which account for much of the 
Georgian way of life. The family is of supreme significance as a 
source of social identity, support and standing, while friends occupy 
the dual role of intimates where trust and caring rule; but who are 
also potential rivals in a competition for social standing and person- 
al achievement. Competition is taken to extremes by reckless risk- 
taking; and dare-devilry falls only short of success in valuation. 
1.3 A Word of Caution 
It should be made clear at the onset that there is often a wide 
divergence between stated ideal norms and actual mores. This is 
because the Georgian society is dramatic, which implies public impres- 
sion as against indoor portrayal; high statements and decisive ac- 
tions. A man by Georgian ideals should be resolute, impetuous and 
assertive. And men are those who dictate. 
Hence, when I quote informants saying: "I will kill her instantly" or 
"It is better to be dead in such circumstances" these cannot be taken 
simply at their face value, but should be judged against the said 
backcloth. It should also be borne in mind that speakers disclosing 
information to an outsider will aim to present their culture in 
strong, clear and positive colours. This tendency is in line with the 
Georgian way of demonstrative 'showing-off'. Therefore even personal 
declared actions are more a directive of how things should be rather 
than an indication of how they are. Nevertheless, when measured 
continuously one against the other, both intent and deed could sketch 
a precise picture of the actual workings of a culture. This is the 
aim of the present chapter. 
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2. HONOUR AND SHAME 
Honour, and its corollary, shame, are the driving forces of Georgian 
s oc i ety. Honour is both ascribed and achieved, and so is shame. One 
has constantly to prove oneself. If born into an honourable family, a 
person has to act accordingly - there are clear expectations from men 
and women as to what constitutes honourable behaviour. But even the 
low-born from non-prestigious, even shameful, backgrounds can gain 
recognition by behaving honourably. If lucky, an individual can 
achieve status and elevate his close family with him. For a man that 
would mean showing himself to be courageous and fearless - and this 
applies to a wide range of activities: from bravery on the battle- 
field, through occuping a prestigious position, 1 to taking high risks 
as a performer in the second economy. (While success is desirable, 
failure in such circumstances still counts almost as much as success). 
2.1 Honour 
According to ideal presumptions a man should be loyal to his family, 
his friends, and his (national) collective identity. A man should 
keep his word, and a promise is a promise - whatever the circum- 
stances. 2 Of such a man, it would be said: "Katzia katzuli" - He is 
a man. But manliness also requires a certain physiognomy: a man 
should be broad- shouldered, preferably tall, and give an impression of 
resolution, fearlessness, determination and a sort of repressed ag- 
gression. Accordingly a man who was only 150 cm tall and looked 
particularly fragile came to consult me, 3 in complete sincerity, as to 
whether he would be eligible to claim invalidity (which carries some 
occupational and taxation advantages) on the grounds of his 'unmanly 
1 ook s'. On another occasion a close informant recalled an embarras- 
4 sing moment in his adolescence, when he was made Tamada, on the 
grounds of his impressive physical build - though in fact he was a 
poor drinker. A man is Judged by his drinking ability (an issue to be 
discussed at length in the next Chapter) and "this is considered to be 
a gift of God, " as a Goliath who emerged victorious from a drinking 
competition disclosed to me confidentially. 
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Georgians admire beauty and a beautiful wife is most desirable even if 
her ascribed background has some deformations (eg. a poor family). 
But she ought to conform to the desired image of patiosneba (honesty), 
which implies modesty in character and sexuality and submission to her 
husband - and his family (of particular importance if married to the 
youngest son who traditionally lives with his elderly parents). A 
woman is expected to be soft and gentle physically as well. Yet 
fragility and slimness are unhealthy. 5 Afer all, a woman has to cater 
for her household and she has also the serious task of 'raising the 
young Georgian men' as the well-known poem To the Georgian Mother by 
the 19th Century poet Ilya Chavchavadze, states. 
2.2 Shame 
Shame, which is the other side of the coin, is a sign of Cain. It is 
a sin and contagious. It is particularly bad since it implies the 
loss of honour. Shame can actually kill, and deaths have been attrib- 
uted to a shameful event 
-in 
the family, which the deceased 'could not 
bear to live with. ' Sometimes, as the Georgian saying suggests, 'it 
is better to lose your head than your honour. ' Which means that if 
one's honour is at stake, life matters less. In the famous novel The 
Guardian6 by the 19th Century author, Akaki Tseretel i, the guardian 
tells his protege who has committed an inexcusable sin (he has slept 
with his best friend's wife) and who now wants to kill himself: "You 
are not worthy to die; it is I who should die because I have failed to 
bring you up as a man. " Suicide, the ultimate sacrifice, is perceived 
as compensation, at least partially, for the sin committed and a way 
to restore something of one's lost honour. By denying him the right 
to do so, the old man passes a judgement that the sinner should never 
be forgiven. 
Of course, ideal standards are different from normal practice, and 
there is always a distance between declaration and deed Cattitude' 
versus 'behaviour' in the psychological jargon). In Ashkelon, a man 
whose wife was found indoors with a stranger, and it became public 
knowledge that they were caught in these embarrassing circumstances, 
drove her out to her parents' home and he himself left town for over a 
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year. No one mentioned the possibility of murder or suicide, though a 
close informant thinking aloud, said that "If that had happened to me, 
I would have killed her instantly, for sure. " 
And yet in another case, back in Georgia (Account VI in Chapter 8: 
Crisis Events), the ultimate sin of betraying a partner in an illicit 
business and giving him away to the authorities, did not result in any 
revenge or intolerable shame. The reason being that the victim was 
socially too weak (he had no close friends and was on bad terms with 
his family) to create a stir. Thus this victimization passed unchal- 
lenged. It is not the sin itself then that causes the shame - but the 
impact that is made on one's public image and the need to answer 
accusations, echoed by the victim's relatives and friends. 
Honour is clearly a man's domain, as elsewhere in the Mediterranean 
societies (eg. Peristiany, 1976). Any matter regarding women in this 
respect is relevant only if it bears on the honour of men and if made 
public. Two attempted -suicides made by women during my stay in 
Ashkelon had nothing to do with matters of personal honour. They were 
desperate attempts of protest against the unbearable position of a 
young woman overpowered by her mother-in-law and at the mercy of her 
husband and his family. 7 By making a public affair of what is normal- 
ly a private domestic issue, the two women shadowed their husbands' 
respectability as well as that of their families; they forced outside 
i nterventi on. In one case I know of, the husband's close friends 
compelled him to concilliate with his wife. And for a good reason: a 
friend's shame involves their honour as well. They have a vested 
interest in protecting his honour and he is obliged to take this into 
consideration. In this kind of society a person is not accountable to 
himself alone: he is a 'social animal' (Aronson, 1969) indeed. 
2.3 Trust 
Trust is interchangable with honour. A man who is not trusted has no 
honour: a man without honour cannot be trusted. A Georgian saying 
puts it tersely: "Who has lost the trust of others, he is dead to 
everyone. " In this kind of society to be dishonoured is to face 
social death. It is discredit that extends beyond the individual to 
the whole family. However, not only the core family but associated 
4-5 
in-laws as well as friends and friends of friends (the network): "Who 
loses the trust of others, he loses friends as well" goes another 
Georgian saying. 
Of course trust is a fundamental requirement in the operation of the 
second economy. When dealing illegally one cannot make contracts nor 
ask for the help of the law. Therefore a man's word has to be his 
bond. An 111 egal fi nanci er who used to gi ve 1 oans sol ely on a man' s 
word of honour told me that a person who would misuse the trust given 
to him would be socially excommunicated. 8 
One way to examine the inter-change between trust and honour is to 
look at the way loans are credited at times of crisis. Normally this 
would be without written evidence and for a non-specified term (see 
Chapter 8 on Crisis Events). It is the borrower's obligation to see 
that the loan is repayed as soon as possible. If he fails to do so, 
he cannot escape public knowledge of his shame. 
In Ashkel on I was tol d about an unkept promi se to contri bute money 
towards purchasing a flat for a newly-wed couple. The alleged sinner 
was the father of the bride and it was disclosed to me by the groom's 
father himself, to whom the commitment was made. While at first I was 
flattered by the thought that I was so respected to be allowed into 
his confidence, I soon learned that all the community were aware of 
this fact and it was considered such a disgrace that even a foreigner, 
like myself, should be informed. 
4-6 
3. THE FAMILY AS THE NUCLEUS OF HONOUR AND SHAME 
To be accepted in Georgian society ideally requires the possession of 
descent and membership in families where both sides are noted for 
respectability. Georgian families are bilateral: they trace descent 
on both sides but stress the male line and within it an emphasis on 
agnates - on the solidarity and mutual obligations of brothers. When 
an individual's acts are evaluated this is done in the context of an 
assessment - and a continual reassessment - of his family and its 
honour. The same assessments, though less pronounced, apply also to 
associates and to friends. 
3.1 An Individual's Effect on Relatives 
This perpetual reassessment of personal honour - in the wide social 
circle - brings pressure to bear upon the individual to follow the 
mores, because failure to do so not only damages himself but neces- 
sarily contaminates his relatives as well. A mother told a school- 
master, to whom she went to complain about her daughter whom she 
suspected of seeing a young man without permission: "One of these 
days I might kill her. It would be better that way for her and her 
family. " Another person, whose sister-in-law's brother was convicted 
for a criminal offence, told me: "I am ashamed to show my face in 
public. " Honour and shame project forward and backwards in time. A 
person's deeds will affect his offspring: "This child is doomed" a 
close informant told me, regarding a four-year old boy: "He will 
always be remembered as the son of ... and his father is a total 
failure. " 
The deceased are also part of the extended family. Plisezki (1931) 
notes that, according to popular belief, death is a result of an 
'invitation' by a deceased to his relative to Join him. Gri gol ia 
(1939) quotes a case among the Georgian Highlanders where, in 1881, a 
judicial decree decided against the great- great- great grandsons of a 
husband who had not buried his deceased wife with the necessary honor- 
ary customs two hundred years before. The claim came from the fifth 
generation descendants of the woman. Since it has such an appeal to 
the living, events in the past can be used to manipulate situations in 
the present - the yesterday thus becoming part of the social weaponry 
of the here and now. Similarly, the Georgian Jewish claim for going 
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to Israel, as put forward in the famous letter of the eighteen fami- 
lies in August 1969, was strengthened by the will of their fore- 
fathers: 
"There are eighteen of us who signed this letter. But he errs 
who thinks there are only eighteen of us ... they say there is 
a total of twelve million Jews in the world. But he errs who 
believes there is a total of twelve million of us. For with 
those who pray for Israel are hundreds of millions who did not 
live to this day they march shoulder to shoulder with us 
*.. immortal. " 
(Schreider, 1969) 
The deceased were always present in any feast I attended - the feast 
being the common public gathering of mens 'significant others' (see 
Chapter 5). A toast to their memory would take place at an early or a 
later part of the feast depending on their relation to the toaster 
and how recent their departure was. However they would never be 
omitted. By honouring his deceased a man honours himself. 
3.2 The Place of Women 
Women are important in Georgian society as the articulation points 
between groups of males and as the ensurers of male descent. Whereas 
the honour of men is achieved by assertion and dominance, the honour 
of women is passive and strongly associated with sexual modesty. As 
with manly honour their passivity reflects also on the wider honour of 
their family and therefore on their menfolk, and to a lesser extent on 
that of their associates. A recent observer notes: 
"Despite advances made by women, their position in the household 
and society in general is governed by the rules and mores of an 
often idealized version of Georgia's past. Women are expected to 
conform to an ideal, summed up in the word 'nandilosanil ... 
(which) suggests an image of modest, grace and ae=Aal passivity. " 
(Parsons, 1982, p. 564) 
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Virginity is still a pre-condition of marriage, which is only succes- 
sfully consummated after the wedding night is over. on one occasion a 
close friend threatened to resign his honorary post as best man to the 
groom because the latter declined his advice not to spend the wedding 
night in a hotel in Eilat (which is the Israeli custom) "otherwise, 
how will you prove that the bride is a virgin? " The 'sheet test' is 
the groom's family privilege. 
A woman, however, is not only supposed to avoi di nf Ii cti ng shame on 
the family. She can and is expected to contribute actively to its 
honour - by keeping a clean and well-maintained household, by always 
being ready to receive guests with food and drink, and by keeping her 
beauty and appearance (which do not contradict sexual modesty). Since 
she i s, ina sense, a di spl ay asset to take pri de i n. 
If exceptionally talented, like a gifted pianist or an academic, a 
woman is projecting her success directly on her husband. And since 
this is rather rare, 9 a 'man's prestige gains considerably. When 'Doc' 
once wanted to impress a potential informant, he revealed to him that 
my wife was a professional in her own right and 'a doctoral candi- 
date'. Yet this does not eliminate a wife's domestic obligations; 10 
the fact remains that, however able, a woman can only achieve social 
standi ng vi a her husband. To be unmarried isaf aul t of her and her 
family alike. 
3.3 obligations and Honour 
One's family are one's roots and the entrance ticket into society. I 
believe that my position in Ashkelon was not established until I was 
able 'to prove' that I had a family, which thus provided me with a 
history and a belonging to which others could relate. An almost 
standard greeting question would be: "And how are your parents and 
the family? " 
Since the emphasis is on the male line, the number of brothers is a 
major determinant of a family's strength and hence any member of it. 
The I ack of brothers or the early death of the f ather of the f ami ly, 
or an infertile couple, are shortcomings which damage the whole famil- 
ial unit. This is because male members of the family are the backbone 
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of a person's personal support network - which is the main building 
block of social standing and, among other things, the key to succes- 
sful operation in the second economy. 
Members of a family are expected to stick together and support each 
other. If in need, it is the family's task to help. When I was once 
approached to rai se money in Engl and f or the benef it of af ami ly in 
Georgia whose head was in prison, I had to give my word of honour that 
I would not tell anyone in the community about the request. When I 
wondered about the reason for secrecy, the bitter reply was: "Because 
it's shaming. People will come and ask: 'what happened? why do you 
have to ask outsiders for help? "' What I did not know at the time was 
that this family was negotiating the engagement of a daughter, and 
therefore 'the shame' could have had an immediate adverse effect if it 
had become public knowledge. 
On another occasion in Ashkelon, when a family was required to raise 
money for a wedding ceremony, the contributions fell considerably 
short of the necessary income. 
11 The next day, the close relatives - 
the groom's three brothers and his father's brother together with the 
best man - paid the difference. 
12 
It is symptomatic that during my stay in Ashkelon only one case of a 
public appeal for funding a marriage came to my attention (and this, I 
was tol d, was only the second ti me it had happened in ei ght years). 
In this case the family had no single first rank male relation, except 
a chronically ill uncle. The person who subsequently took upon him- 
self the task of raising the money, by approaching a number of donors, 
was a rather distant relative. He considered it a must to help in 
this crisis, yet he was distant enough not to shame himself and his 
own family by asking for charity. 
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3.4 Wealth and Honour 
As is common to the people of the Mediterranean, wealth is the primary 
determiner of a family's honour: 
11. .. the argument that honour is chiefly related to wealth - is 
an idiom in which differences in wealth are expressed. From 
these differences are derived differences in honour: poor people 
have less honour than richer ones and may therefore be insulted, 
treated as diehonourable, without damage to the honour of their 
superiors. In particular, the women of honour inferiors can be 
seduced with impunity. " 
(Davis, 1977, p. 89) 
It is here that we find the motivation to strive for success and 
wealth and particularly to do better than the comparable reference 
group. And of course the principle is not to hoard wealth but to 
consume it and conspicuously - for everyone to see. As my informants 
say: "When the house is empty - then where is your honour? " 
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4. FRIENDSHIP 
4.1 The Peer Group 
Although one's initial social position is ascribed, the young man 
nevertheless is expected to form his own peer-group with whom he is to 
spend much of his time. Choosing friends is a serious task, upon 
which a person will be measured by the quality and depth of his 
associates. 
The peer group is second only to his family in importance. And since 
Georgian social life is in many respects structured on the basis of 
age, peers therefore become an important source of personal support as 
well as a primary source for social approval. Mars (personal communi- 
cation, 1982) noticed that 80% of people walking together in Tbilisi's 
streets were of the same age group. And a photographer's booth, off 
Rustaveli Avenue, displayed specimen photos showing groups that were 
nearly al I of the same age and sex: 23 out of 26 photographs were all 
of the same age and sex'and the other three portrayed people of the 
same age and mixed sex. 
Partners, who operate the numerous small enterprises of Georgians in 
Ashkelon, are nearly always of the same age group, except for busi- 
nesses run by families. And partnerships in the second economy back 
in Georgia are, according to my informants, similarly organized. So 
it was in the case of The Biscuit Factory (Chapter 6) and in The Four- 
Partners Store (Chapter 7). 
Since Georgian society is very much age-structured, associations and 
referrals to others who are in a different age group will typically be 
channeled through the appropriate relation who is the right age. 
Thus, in order to speak to a man in his fifties or sixties, the best 
way I found was to approach his son, who would be roughly the same age 
as myself - or approach through a close male relative in the same age 
group. 
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The following account discloses how a young person was recruited in 
this way to the services of a second economy 'big man': 
"I was eighteen at the time and the family was very poor - my 
father was just released from jail. 13 I had a stall in the 
market, like my father before me, where I was selling anything 
that came my way. 
"One day I noti ced X observi ng me f rom a di stance. He was the 
14 head of the local cooperative, to which I was subJected. I 
thought he is checking on me, so I carried on working fast and 
efficiently. He approached me and said: 'I got a shipment of 
overcoats. Do you think you could sell someV I replied that I 
woul d sel I anythi ng I can get. 'Al 1 ri ght, then go to the ware- 
house and tel 1 them to gi ve you two boxes' he sai d. I di d as he 
tol d me and sol d the stuf fin two hours. The f ol I owi ng morni ng X 
came around and asked me how was the sale going. I told him that 
I had no problem in. disposing of the goods and asked if he had 
any more. Instead of replying he said: 'Come tomorrow morning 
to my office and bring your dad with you. ' 
"I did not understand what he meant by that and was rather wor- 
ried. However, we did as he told us. The next morning my dad 
and myself entered his room. 
"He offered dad a seat and I stayed standing. And then he said, 
addressing all the time my father: 'I noticed your boy and he is 
clever and industrious. I would like to give him the opportunity 
to advance himself. I will supply him with goods which yield 
good profit. I do that because I know you and trust you, and 
that is why I am ready to give him a chance. However, this is 
being done with the understanding that you guarantee for him. I 
will work with your son in the future as if I am working with 
you. oil 
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4.2 The Meaning of Friendship 
In Georgian one differentiates among three levels of friendship: 
DZMOBILI (DOBILI for women), MEGOBARI and ANKHANAGI - which relate to 
the degree of emotional involvement and personal commitment. 
DZMOBILI literally means 'like brother' and it suggests a very close 
bond. 15 A DZMOBILI is often a blood-brother and even if the formal 
ceremony does not take place, 16 he is considered a blood-brother in 
spirit and counts as a member of the close family (belongs to one's 
'personal cell' in Boissevain's terminology (1978). 
MEGOBARI is a very close friend. 17 Not as close as DZMOBILI (who is 
really a substitute brother) but almost as trusted and committed to. 
While not all my informants would have DZMOBILEBI, everyone would have 
MEGOBAREBI. And they would actually comprise the closer circle of 
friends with whom a person would associate almost daily. Often 
MEGOBAREBI are drawn from the workplace, thus providing a link between 
formal institutional roles and informal social life: an essential 
lead to second economy activity (see Chapter 5). 
AMKHANAGI is the more ordinary kind of friend. To be labeled as 
AMKHANAGI means to belong to one's intimate social circle, but it does 
not imply any particular commitment nor a special bond. 
DZMOBILEBI and MEGOBAREBI are persons with whom you can trust your 
most intimate secrets, with whom you can relax from the pressures of a 
constant need to show off and with whom you do not need to engage in 
the battles of conspicuous display. With them you can share your 
failures without the threat of mockery and ridicule and you can depend 
on their help in any sort of trouble. By definition, such true 
friends are bound to be rare and they have to endure considerable 
testing before a really close bond can be established. 
In Ashkelon I attempted to call ' Doc' my closest friend, 'MEGOBARV (I 
never dared even to suggest that we might be DZMOBILEBI). And while 
he did not object to me calling him so, he made it perfectly clear 
that "to become one' s MEGOBARI is a serious matter. That does not 
happen from today to tomorrow. " This is because such a relationship 
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involves more than just an individual commitment. It is essentially a 
social arrangement involving one's total social resources to what may 
often prove to be considerable obligations. And of course one's 
honour and the honour of the close family and associates are then at 
stake. The choice of close friends is therefore a serious matter and 
the Georgian language contains numerous proverbs stressing this point: 
'Be stow choosing a friend, slower in changing one. ' 
'Tell the secret to your friend and if he keeps it, trust him. ' 
'To know18 your friend you need the time. ' 
'Always prefer old wine and old frienda. 1 
'One old friend is better than two new ones. ' 
'Sudden friendship provokes regret. ' 
'Real friendship does not die. ' 
Betrayal by such close friends is therefore considered a fatal blow. 
Alexander Azbegi, in his novel Khevis-beri Gocha, 19 captures this 
point by describing the terrible consequences of such a betrayal. 
The single son and heir of the aging tribe leader is leading his 
people in the fight against their enemies. At a crucial stage of the 
battle the hero leaves his position to make love to his closest 
friend's wife. As a result the battle is lost and when the bitter 
truth comes out, the old man in his anger and agony, stabs his son to 
death, crying: "He who betrays his friends is not worthy of living. " 
These are then the consequences of betrayal. a ruined young couple 
(the husband kills himself from shame; the wife disappears); a noble 
family uprooted (the hero is murdered, the old man becomes mad); a 
people who lose a battle. Personal betrayal leads to national dis- 
aster. What could be worse than that? 
4.3 The Inbuilt Cultural Paradox 
The ideal standard set for friendship is high, and the tests to which 
a friendship is subject are often considerable. Since Georgians are 
so competitive the peer group becomes the natural arena for contest, 
as it is also the primary social reference group. This means that at 
the same time, young men are pushed to find their friends from among 
their potential rivals. This is why on the one hand we find the 
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almost obsessive pre-occupation with trust, the sanctity with which 
friendship is treated; and on the other hand the ever present suspi- 
cion, uncertainty and insecurity. 
This is why the choice of friends requires good judgement and betrayal 
is considered a major disaster. For those operating in the second 
economy it poses particular problems (see Accounts III and VI in 
Chapter 8). 
Indeed, the high standard set highlights the underlying cultural 
instability. The constant stress on the necessity of loyal friendship 
(and the miseries inflicted by its absence) indicate the very in- 
stability of these relationships, which is the inevitable result of 
competition. Competition after all implies comparative ratings: if A 
is higher in a particular aspect or in the overall valuations than B; 
B is necessarily lower than A. Unless they can operate in different 
leagues (and sometimes not even then) the result of such demonstrative 
comparisons2O - who drinks harder, who dresses better, who is wittier, 
who scores higher in the game - yields suspicion, tension, frustration 
and insecurity. 
As wi 11 be el aborated upon in the next Chapter, one of the f uncti ons 
of the f east (whi ch is usual ly the meeti ng pl ace f or the peer group 
and an opportunity for controlled competition) is continuously to 
reaffirm the hand of friendship and to reassure mutual commitment and 
I oyal ty. 
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5. COMPETITION 
"Georgians ... (are) so avid for personal glory that they will 
sacrifice their fatherland or their -sovereign for the sake of 
their own advancement. " 
(Prince Vakhuahti, the 18th Century Georgian historian, quoted in 
Lang, 1962, p. 18). 
Within family groups spheres of action are well-defined; they do not 
overlap and they are non-competitive - everyone knows their place. 
Beyond the family, however, these limitations are reversed. Since 
insecurity and instability in the perpetual ranking and re-ranking of 
personal relationships is the norm, males have therefore constantly to 
prove themselves as men: CATSI. They are, in this respect, always 
'on show'. They need constantly to demonstrate their worthiness to 
public opinion in general and to their peers in particular. 
The end produce of such demonstrative behaviour will influence the 
Georgian's social standing and affect his honour and hence the honour 
of his in-laws and close associates. The individual Georgian relates 
to honour accruing to families and associates. As only personalized 
relationships count and one's loyalty is committed to these, no sover- 
eign is safe - as Prince Vakhushti said. And his statement is as true 
today as two centuries ago. In such a context there is no room for 
the state nor for any central ly-organi zed, impersonal meta-structure. 
When therefore abusing state-owned resources for the sake of his own 
career and in the service of his personal network, the Georgian merely 
utilizes public - not any individual's - resources in the competition 
for demonstrative success which is imposed on him by the mores of his 
cul ture. Of course the lack of respect for communal property is not 
limited to the Georgians but it is particularly marked among them. 
Competition has traditionally involved conspicuous display. Feasts 
and bouts of excessive and competitive drinking are extensive in 
Georgia; while sitting rooms, which are the essential preserve of men, 
are the physical base for the demonstration of display items. Dres- 
sing up is important, as is eating out - and being seen to do so in a 
social context, that is with friends in cafes and restaurants. All of 
these activities affect a man's standing and influence the shape of 
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his personal support network (to be discussed in Chapter 5). In this 
way the Georgian is pushed to obtain resources which are practically 
non-existent in the formal economy. It is this which provides the 
underlying personal motivation and the dynamic force which boosts the 
Republic's second economy. 
5.1 Conspicuous Consumption, Social Standing and Honour 
The relation between conspicuous consumption and social standing and 
honour are well expressed in the following account. It concerns a man 
in his thirties who recalls his university days back in 1970. 
"It was the autumn term break and my friend -a Christian - 
invited me and two other colleagues to his native village for a 
visit. 
"Firstly, I had to raise some cash, as I was broke at the time. 
I went to see my aunt - my father's sister, who was very fond of 
me and she gave me 250 Rubles. 21 I immediately spent 70 Rubles 
on a present f or my f riend's parents -a smal I marbl e statue of 
Mother Georgia. 22 
"We took the train from Tbilisi and were very warmly received at 
the village station. As the Journey lasted six hours we were 
expected to be hungry, so the table was already set, which how- 
ever was only a prelude to the main feast, later that evening. 
"I brought my best clothes with me: a pair of Wrangler jeans 
with a matching American shirt and Finnish soft leather shoes. 
The farmers admired me with their eyes and my hosts were most 
impressed with my expensive gift. For the younger children I 
brought chewing-gum, which then could only have been obtained on 
the black market, as it was formally forbidden at the time in the 
Soviet Union. I remember hearing people whispering around me: 
'Who is he? He must be very rich and from an influential fami- 
ly. ' To the provincial villagers I probably seemed to belong to 
the highest social circles of Tbilisi. 
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"As a result I was nominated at the beginning of the feast as 
23 deputy-Tamada, very unusual at my age. And I was most honoured 
by being granted the third toast: the first was to Georgia, and 
the second to Stalin. 24 Then came the village musicians and I 
started to pour out money. I remember the greed in their eyes, 
observing the 25 Ruble notes I was holding in my fist. They 
bowed with respect when I passed them the money. 
"Late that night - it was already daybreak - my friend's grand- 
father, who was the senior member of the family and head of the 
household, invited a few of us to his private wine cellar. He 
gave us his best wine, kept for special occasions only. And he 
turned to me and, putting his hands on my head, he said: 'Bless 
you my boy, you are a real man. Your family and your people 
should be proud of you. '" 
5.2 Consumer Goods as Status Symbols 
Since consumer goods are in short supply they have become the focus of 
competition in this culture, their virtue being as display items. An 
informant recalls with amusement that the Georgian State Opera and the 
Rustaveli Theatre were "really a stage to show the latest fashions of 
Prague, Budapest and Helsinki. " Imported goods, being more scarce 
than home-produced ones are in great demand. A shoemaker complained 
to me: "My own make was superior in quality, but there was little 
demand. What counted most was the label saying it was a foreign 
product. " A shopkeeper confirms this point. "Anything foreign would 
go, regardless of quality. Foreign produce is used also as a legiti- 
mate perk. -The best workers obtain particular items (eg. furniture) 
which are normally reserved for the elite. " 
It is no coincidence then that positions connected with imports of 
consumer goods should be considered desirable. One of my informants 
for instance, a person with a notably weak personal support network 
was nonetheless nominated to a particular post as manager of a ware- 
house of imported goods. This position was so prone to corruption 
that only such a socially weak person would be trusted to occupy it. 
A person with an extensive social network would not have been expected 
to be able to resist its pressures. In this example we can see one of 
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the ways in which the guardians of the formal economy sometimes are 
able to apply and adopt the core values of Georgian culture in its 
service. 
Not all goods are therefore 'up for grabs' in Georgia. Some consumer 
goods are allocated in strict accordance wIth a person's rank. ZIL 
refrigerators, for instance, the best of their kind in the Soviet 
Union, have therefore a long waiting list. And the village general 
store manager (see Chapter 7) did not dare to fiddle with this par- 
ticular item. "People would go mad if they found out that somebody 
had Jumped the queue by bribery or pressure. " After all, in a society 
where public demonstration is the norm, no one can afford to ignore 
the perils as well as the benefits of public display. Since house- 
holds are vehicles in such a display, ZIL refrigerators are as much 
display items as are clothes (Account V in Chapter 8 on Crisis Events 
highlights the dangers involved in trading with consumer goods in high 
demand). 
Competition then boosts the second economy because of the need for 
lavish and extravagant consumer goods. But it also pays from another 
angle. Through close involvement in the second economy a person is in 
the position of being able to do many a favour. He becomes socially 
popular and expands his personal network. Consequently he may expect 
to obtain a favour in return. Thus the direct pay-off - his profits - 
enable him to show off his worthiness by dressing properly, by enter- 
taining his friends generously, by providing for his children. The 
second economy therefore yields high returns. In a cultural setting 
of competitive25 individualism, where instability and insecurity rule 
personal relationships, the system turns into a perpetuum mobile: an 
ever-increasing supply for a basically insatiable demand. 
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6. TAKING RISKS 
6.1 Risk Taking as a Cultural Imperative 
Reckless risk-taking is a valued macho attribute in Georgia and the 
successful gain both in honour as well as in resources. Grigolia 
(1939) discloses that among the Georgians of Megrelia it was customary 
for a young man to steal at least one horse before he could get 
married, as proof of his courage and bravery. And the more daring the 
accomplished theft the better. Of course this applied only to theft 
committed outside one's kinship group. 
Risk-taking, however, is also a necessary attribute for business 
ventures and its high social valuation provides a necessary validation 
for activity that is formally discriminated against. This urge to 
gamble therefore goes some way to explain why people accept the con- 
stant pressure of daily risk-taking when they engage in regular second 
economy work, and also why the entreprenurial spirit should be so 
pronounced in Soviet Georgia despite Moscow's persistent attempts to 
control it. But these are entrepreneurs of a different mould from 
those traditionally associated with Western capitalism, with the de- 
velopment of thrift and with Weberian ideas of deferred gratification: 
these are gambling entrepreneurs concerned with spending and display. 
And while success is important, failure is not considered a defeat. 
Daring is what counts. A man is expected to challenge his fate - and 
if he fails, his honour is not affected. 
In a folk tale studied in Grade 7 (ages 13-14), The Tiger and The 
26 Young Man, both man and beast fi ght each other inafi ght f or 11 fe 
or death. The tiger loses the battle and his life. Yet the young 
man's mother pays her respect to the tiger's mother. She. comforts her 
saying that her son fought bravely. He lived like a man and though 
his life was cut short, his memory will be cherished. 
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6.2 Risks and the Second Economy 
The taking of risks is essentially linked to the operation of networks 
as providing the basis of one's personal support in crises. Having a 
large and strong network means taking less risks, since networks are a 
major resource to take advantage of in times of need. The absence of 
an effective network (Chapter 9) either means limiting a person to 
less risky Jobs or involving him in a greater chance of exposure and 
conviction. Whatever his personal circumstances, however, in no way 
can the average - not the exceptional - Georgian male conform to the 
model of Soviet Economic Man. Formal income counts for only a small 
proportion of total income and it is extra income from the second 
economy that is vital to a full social role that requires excess in 
f easti ng and in di spl ay. Georgi an men not only benef it economi cal ly 
from 'screwing the system' - their very honour as men demands that 




To become, say, a physician is very prestigious. Therefore it 
might be worthwhile for a poor family to make economic sacrifices 
in order to finance a son's medical studies. His success in this 
would yield high returns in prestige for all his close relations 
(see al so Chapter 9). 
2. Grigolia (1939) notes that hand-striking was considered necessary 
to cement a deal among the Georgian Highlanders. And it did not 
lose its power even if later a fraud was discovered on the part 
of one of the parties. 
3. See Chapter 2 for my roles in the community. 
4. Tamada: the toast-master at a feast. The Tamada is expected to 
lead the drinking party and should therefore be a hard drinker. 
5. Yet whiteness of the skin is a sign of beauty. Is it because it 
suggests that the woman is a lady and can afford not to work hard 
indoors or out of doors? 
6. Listed among the four most popular (recalled) literary pieces 
studied at school in the Literature Survey. The novel is studied 
in the 9th Grade (age 14-15). It also appeared in Samshoblo 18, 
1981 editions (the Georgian compatriot newspaper distributed 
abdod) which should be another indication of the popularity of 
this piece. 
7. Both drank a common household substance (liquid bleach) - an 
epitome of their grievances. 
8. This being said, it should be noted that a money-lender is him- 
self socially marginal and particularly vulnerable in this re- 
spect. 
9. In rural Georgia. In the big cities it would probably not be as 
rare. 
10. Mars attended a picnic organized by the members of a university 
department, comprising both men and women academics. However 
only the women prepared food and drinks and they cleared up 
afterwards. (personal communication, 1982). 
11. The Georgian way of contributing to a wedding ceremony is by 
paying (in cash) the approximate costs of a meal per head. Hence 
the payment for the ceremony is usually made after the celebra- 
tion from the cash presents received. In Georgia, where commod- 
ities are the problem (and not money) food and goods are the 
common presents. 
12. It is the groom's family responsibility to cater for the wedding 
ceremony. 
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13. His father was in jail for 'economic crimes', a common feature 
among my informants. 
14. Cooperative of artisans and small traders. 
15. This is more common to the rural areas than the big cities. 
Apparently, both the term and the bond are less in use in the 
latter. 
16. The act itself is described in Chapter 3, paragraph 3.2 (a). 
17. The word literally means 'someone who eats with you from the same 
dish'. 
18. Also in the meaning of testing. 
19. This is one of the four most popular literary pieces learned at 
school, according to my Literature Survey. 
20. As noted before, what happens outdoors in the public arena, is 
what matters. 
21. The average formal monthly pay for that year, including bonuses, 
was 145.7 Rubles (Georgian SSR in figures, 1976). 
22. The symbol of Tbilisi: a huge figure overlooking the city, 
holding a dagger in one hand and a wine cup in the other. 
23. Tamada is the toast-master who runs the feast. He sits at the 
head of the table. If the table is very long and there are many 
present, a deputy will be nominated to supervise a section of the 
table and lead a party of the guests. 
24. On the sequence of toasting see Chapter 5. 
25. A common expression of greeting in Georgian - 'Gomerdjoba' (literally means: 'victory be with you') equivalent to 'hello'. 
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1. THE NATURE OF NETWORKS IN GEORGIAN SOCIETY 
Personal support networks are a key concept in understanding the 
workings of Soviet Georgia's second economy. Networks dictate marital 
choices (Chapter 4), are a prime all ocator of resources (Chapter 7), 
influence one's occupational options (Chapter 9), dominate recruitment 
and career development (Chapter 7) and set limits to the scope of 
expansion for enterprises (Chapter 6). It is networks that may final- 
ly determine if, how long and in what way a man will spend time in 
jail for economic crimes (Chapter 8). 
1 
It is the aim of this chapter to introduce the concept of personal 
support networks and show them in action within the framework of the 
feast - an age old social institution which has acquired new dimen- 
sions in Georgia under Soviet rule. 
1.1 The Structure of Networks 
By using the concept of networks, we follow a well established prec- 
edent in more than a dozen fields in the social sciences, organiza- 
tions, communication theory and in adJacent disciplines since World 
War II (Sarason, 1977). 
(a) Frame 
Ego is the focal point of his network. His centrality is clearly 
marked when considering the interaction pattern of a network (see 
f ol 1 ow i ng). Ego's network is kinship-based: Georgian families trace 
descent on both sides but stress the male line and within it an 
emphasis on agnates - on the solidarity and mutual obligations of 
brothers. The network extends beyond one's core family to include at 
least intimate friends: Negobarebi (see Chapter 4, paragraph 4). 
Since in Georgia's structure the peer group is second only to the 
family in importance as a source of social ranking and support. The 
personal support network therefore consists - following Boissevain's 
(1978) terms - of a personal cell and an intimate zone. That is a 
minimal, not a maximal definition. And it assumes a stable network, 
since kin are ascribed and Megobarebi have to endure tests over time 
before considered as such. 
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Extent 
Even by its minimal definition the scope of a network is considerable. 
Let us examine the following examples (Figure 1). Ego has a father, a 
brother and two uncles - father's brother and mother's brother and a 
wife (who has a father and a brother). He has also two close friends 
(Megobarebi) and so do each of the other males in the network. This 
again is a conservative estimate. It does not consider Dzmobilebi 
(meaning like brothers) whom some people have, while quite a few of my 
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However, even this conservative estimate suggests that Ego has eight 
members at the core of his network and 26 more as close 'friends of 
friends' (Boissevain, 1978), that is, people who are as committed to 
Ego's core of eight as the latter are committed to him. This means 
that Ego has a 34-man strong legion at his disposal. 
(c) Primary Functions 
The network's primary functions, are basically two-fold and could be 
termed a social network and a resource network. 
The social function corresponds largely to its peer group components 
which are manifest in social time spent together. In addition how- 
ever, the network (and not only peers) operates as a reference-group, 
setting standards of behaviour against which the individual measures 
himself and is measured. This is clearly expressed in drinking behav- 
iour during the feast (see later). And it accounts for the social 
pressure put on the individual Georgian to match the standards of his 
close associates - for instance in living standards. 
The Resource Network 
Our main concern here however is with the second aspect of the net- 
work: its function as a reservoir of resources, that is, the combined 
skills, statuses, material resources and institutional affiliations of 
its members. This bears three different, though not unconnected 
meanings. 
Firstly the network functions as a power base. In this respect 
it allocates scarce resources and opens up opportunities limited 
to the members of the network alone. For instance, career oppor- 
tunities. Personal contact can be very useful in seeing a candi- 
date through the entrance exams to the university, in finding a 
job and later on promotion. Or, for example, in providing access 
to scarce commodities, be it a car or a pair of shoes. In these 
respects the network operates as a kind of exclusive club, where 
the number of members is limited (and membership is strictly by 
personal nomination), yet members are allowed - even enouraged to 
bring in their close relations and friends. 
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ii) Secondly, the network operates as a shield. By making it known 
who his friends are, a person may gain immunity from troubles. 
An i nf ormant recal Is how as a young man he was once stopped by a 
gang of youths while walking at night in the 'wrong' district of 
Tbi 11 si. "They probably meant to rob me tel Ii ng f rom the way I 
was approached, when one of them said: 'Leave him alone, he's a 
friend of .. ." The same applies to operations 
in the second 
economy. One of my informants, a retailer, tried to associate as 
much as he possibly could with the Head of the Police, in order 
that he would be less pressurized by other members of the force. 
However, the Head of Police would be reluctant to be seen with 
Just anyone, since this might have an adverse effect on him. 
"Show me your friends and I will tell you whoyou are" goes the 
Georgian saying. 
Bearing in mind this last point, one can now understand why social 
associations, particularly in public, are so important, since they are 
an opportunity to display one's social support network - that is, 
one's social power base and shield. 1 
iii) Networks have another important function: as emergency pools, in 
times of trouble. This is elaborated in Chapter 8 on Crisis 
Events (paragraph 3.2). Just to clarify the point, in emergen- 
cies networks can mobilize vast resources as a member's career, 
future and even his life may be at stake. Consequently its 
reverberations will weaken associated members of the network. It 
is then that a network will spread to its maximum capacity, often 
involving dozens of people, some of whom will never meet the 
protagonist for whose sake they have been mobilized. 
Maintenance 
Networks, like other forms of social organization need continuous 
nourishment if they are to flourish. The main mechanism for this is 
through feasting. 
Feasts provide the opportunity to reaffirm the friendship and commit- 
ments within a network by mutual exchanges of respect (toasting to 
each other and to one's close relations - past and present) as well as 
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by symbolic sharing of common resources: time, labour (put in the 
feast), food and wine. 
Further, feasts - particularly formal feasts like weddings, are a test 
of standing commitments. Attendance on such occasions is obligatory 
because it proves the good will of the participants, but also the 
exi stence of the bond f or al 1 whom it mi ght concern. Itisa publ ic 
decl arati on: thus, I had to attend al 1 maj or f ami 11 al events of my 
close informants and when I left for London, they attended my farewell 
feast. 
Feasts are also the recruitment ground for new entrants to the network 
- an opportunity to demonstrate social skills of wit and drinking as 
well as conspicuous display of wealth. (See for example the case of a 
stranger from the big city attending a village feast: Chapter 4, 
paragraph 5.1). 
Another way a network is maintained is through the transition of 
reciprocal help. Most notably this could be evidenced in formal 
events like weddings, where each participant contributes a donation to 
2 meet the cost of the celebration. The emphasis, however, is on the 
obligation to accept the donation, which forms a standing commitment 
(formally recorded) to be reciprocated in due course. 
On the occasion of the first Georgian funeral I attended in Ashkelon, 
I was amazed to see the grandson of the deceased being given cash 
donations by mourners and recording them in a small notebook. Even- 
tually I asked him what it was all about. He felt embarassed and 
said: "Believe me, I don't need the money, but I must take it. This 
is our custom. " Grigolia, who researched the Georgians in the 1930's 
similarly notes: "the custom of reciprocal help is regarded as ob- 
ligatory ... and if anyone did not fulfil this ... he was regarded 
with distrust. " (p. 175) 
It is these standing commitments which can activate dormant networks 
when the need arises, while the denial of these obligations could be a 
severe blow to the person involved and result in the collapse of a 
network. Both possibilities are elaborated in Chapter 8. 
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1.2 Interactions in Networks 
(a) Transactions 
Any transaction will normally be initiated by Ego to a core member of 
his network and if necessary through him to another member - and so on 
- until the required service is obtained. To illustrate this point, 
let us consider a simple interaction involving a trio in which I 
participated. 
When Gerald Mars first came to visit me in the field he was the 
honorary guest at a feast organized by 'Doc'. As is normal practice 
with Georgians, the feast involved masses of food and drink, and Mars 
- for whom it was a first experience - was most impressed. In case he 
was fooled into thinking that the honour was purely his, 'Doc' en- 
lightened him "It's not really you we are honouring but Yochanan, " in 
other words he emphasized the fact that by honouring my guest, he was 
really paying his respects to me. The movement of this interaction is 
graphically presented in Figure 2. It shows the transaction going 
from Doc to Mars via Altman. That is, I was both the direct object of 
this interaction and the axis that deflected it further. The figure 
also indicates that by honouring my guest, I owe 'Doc' a favour and 
that by the same token Mars owes me a favour, since it was through me 
that he obtained a service. 
Mars 
Al tman Doc 
Figure 2A Transaction in Ashkelon: Who Gives and Who Receives 
This pattern of movements does not rule out the establishment of a 
direct bond between Mars and 'Doc', but this is essentially a poten- 
tial bond. It is only symptomatic that while Mars brought with him a 
present for the host and his wife, this present was ascribed to me (as 
well as to him) and both of us were thanked for it. This should 
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really cause no surprise, since a bond means a commitment and why 
commit oneself to someone on your first meeting? 
3 
When after a time I went to London and 'Doc' payed me a visit there, 
Mars reciprocated (see Figure 3). The movement reversed in the same 
pattern. By Georgian standards Mars repayed me the favour by honour- 
ing my guest and 'Doc' again attributed this generosity not primarily 
to Mars but to me. This time 'Doc' presented a gift to Mars and was 
rather anxious to know whether I considered it appropriate: after all 
the gift was addressed on my behalf. 
Mars 
Al tman Doc 
Figure 3A Transaction in London: Who Gives and Who Receives 
The understanding of this pattern is essential in realizing how the 
second economy is supported by an informal personal support network 
complex. I believe it goes a long way in explaining, for instance, 
the temporary success of Shavardnadze in reducing the second economy 
(after his ascent to power) by eliminating several key figures. With 
the elimination of a single significant individual, a whole network 
collapses with him. In this sense a person is indeed irreplaceable. 4 
This pattern of interaction has also far-reaching implications for the 
scope of illicit enterprises and especially the limits of their expan- 
sion. It also explains why illicit factories (Chapter 6) require 
partners - since no single person can possibly encompass the complex- 
ity of an ongoing production and distribution process in a single 
network. On the other hand retai I ers (Chapter 7) who have no choice 
but to chase goods wherever they can find them, have to take risks and 
depend on ad-hoc transactions, often lacking the safety and commitment 
provided by the security of the personal support network. 
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(b) Contents 
Interactions between network members are multi-faceted, that is, they 
are not confined to a specified and restricted function. Members of a 
network are expected to contribute in a variety of ways according to 
emerging needs. This includes donations of money or money's worth, 
particularly in emergencies (Chapter 8, Account II on crisis events). 
As well as using one's position and influence to help others. In 
other words: a network may be viewed as a reservoir of social re- 
sources which in its totality comprises the personal, social and 
economic resources of its members - latently at Ego's disposal. 
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2. THE STRUCTURE AND PROCESS OF FEASTS 
Travellers to Soviet Georgia have often remarked on the excessive 
generosity with which people there treat each other (e. g. Maclean, 
1980; Papashvily, 1973). It is regularly noted that Georgians spend 
considerable time and resources on organizing and consuming large 
feasts, and of how strangers are enthusiastically welcomed and incor- 
porated into them. In Ashkelon I attended over twenty feasts and 
this figure could easily have been tripled had I not declined numerous 
invitations. 5 When outdoors it is apparently quite common for diners 
to send over a couple of bottles of wine or a dish of meat to stran- 
gers at another table (Maclean, 1980; Samshoblo, 1981). Mars (per- 
sonal communications, 1982) experienced such generosity at a picnic 
site outside Tbilisi. When this happens the tables are likely to 
merge, names and addresses are exchanged and hopes expressed of con- 
tinuing the relationship that the feast has established. 
The importance of feasts is indicated not only by the time and re- 
sources expended on them, but by the number of people involved in 
their prior preparation and the degree of formalized behaviour which 
precedes a feast, dominates it, and continues thereafter. Perhaps the 
most telling indication, however, is that the Soviet authorities have 
officially frowned upon Georgian feasts arguing that they not only 
represent a massive misuse of resources but that these are often 
purloined from official sources, represent a misuse of Soviet property 
and absorb energy that should be put to more socially - that is offi- 
cially - approved ends. (Hone, 1982; Reuter, 1982) 
The first questions that arise, therefore, have to do with why should 
Georgians be so hospitable and so generous, not only to fellow 
Georgians, but often to complete strangers? 
2.1 The Structure of the Feast 
It might seem at first sight to be stretching rational classification 
when we include as feasts, events that range from informal ad hoc 
gatherings of 5 or 6 people, to those that are highly formalized, 
meticulously pre-arranged and, in my experience, have numbered over 
1,000. It is justified to do so, however, because, under the general 
title of 'feast, we find that all these gatherings possess a common 
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structure. So although feasts may be extensively pre-planned over 
many months, or are sometimes arranged on the spur of the moment; 
whether they are composed predominantely of kin or of neighbours or 
friends; or whether the putative purpose is to welcome a stranger or 
to cement a deal , they nonethel ess al 1 possess the f ol 
1 owi ng struc- 
tural features. 
(a) Head of Table 
Each feast has an appointed Head of Table - the Tamada, who is normal- 
ly (but not necessarily) the host, or the owner of the premises if the 
feast takes place in a home. It is the Tamada's job to direct the 
order of the proceedings and in particular to offer the toasts that 
punctuate the feast from its beginning to its end. He is selected on 
a number of criteria that ideally emphasize the idea of authority and 
worthiness. He is always male and usually older than the rest of the 
company since age is a virtue in Georgia. He may be the most eminent 
person present, and he s hould certainly be verbally affluent, sponta- 
neous and witty. In addition, however, and most important, he must be 
able to hold his drink, since it is he who sets the upper limit. A 
Tamada, therefore, is one who should naturally be respected by the 
others, who should be able to elevate the emotions of the audience, 
,6 who should in fact be 'catsi . 
The feast will start with the Tamada calling for order and quiet, 
which is important as an acknowledgement of the respect in which he is 
held. Heads of Tables have been known to get quite irritable, and 
even angry, when they cannot obtain the silence they feel is required, 
7 
since this reflects upon their inability to establish control. 
(b) Toasting 
The feast is punctuated by toasts which are the central feature of a 
feast; there might well be as many as twenty or even more toasts in an 
evening, and some toasts have been known to last as long as an hour. 
Wine is normally poured into crystal glasses, each person taking his 
wine from the bottle nearest him though a Guest of Honour will usually 
be served first - at least at the beginning. There are often differ- 
ent measures of glasses but the normal capacity would be some 150ml. 
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Crystal (or crystal like) glasses are used because they are considered 
expensive and therefore good for display. 
8 But being transparent they 
also do not enable men to cheat on the amount of alcohol consumed. 
That is - honour is literally 'on the table' and everyone can observe 
everyone else's standing. 
While a toast will always start with the Tamada - he dictates the 
issues and addresses the speeches9 - he will later pass the right to 
toast and speak to another. He will do this by clinking his glass 
(prior to emptying it after his speech) against the glass of his 
nominee who then addresses the company. This second toaster might 
then in his turn pass the right to a third and so on, which explains 
why Georgian feasts can last f or up to ei ght hours. At 1 arge f easts 
where there are several tables, such toastings serve to link the 
tables. One can often observe a toaster rising from a table at one 
corner of a hall and with a full glass, shouting to someone who is 
seated at a far corner. The other will also rise - both then greeting 
each other loudly - and simultaneously emptying their glasses while 
standing facing each other. In this way, as the evening proceeds, all 
participants become enmeshed in a matrix of personal linkages. 
10 
Feasts are always set in the same framework. At its start the Tamada 
will announce the first toast, which is always an honouring of those 
who are the cause of the gathering. They might be the bride and 
groom, a visitor, "who has brought us here in his honour, " or "the 
occasion of completing the roof of our host's new home - and we all 
look forward to next year when all of us will sit here celebrating the 
completion of the entire house. " The end of the feast is similarly 
marked by a common toast - the toast honouring the Tamada and the host 
(and hostess) who have organized and kept the gathering together. 
2.2 Focusing and Linkages: The Toast as Integrator 
Between the first and last toasts, feasts similarly possess a common 
structure. It is a structure by which the idealized values of the 
society and the levels of social organization above the personal 
network are both brought together and made concrete and manifest 
through the personalities at the feast. There are thus toasts to the 
Land of Geor gia, and if foreigners are present, to the land of their 
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countries as well. If the feast brings together the staff of differ- 
ent institutions these institutions too will be toasted. There is 
thus a focusing through individuals of ideal and abstract valuations 
on the one hand, and by treating individuals as representatives there 
is a linking of concrete organizational affiliations on the other. 
A typical example of such linkage and focusing through those present, 
can be gained by considering aspects of the feast that Mars (personal 
communication) attended in Tbilisi in the Spring of 1982 to honour a 
young woman on the occasion of her graduation. 
The Tamada was the senior professor of her university department and 
one of the oldest people present. The gathering comprised both sexes 
and ages from twenty to over seventy, members of both sides of the 
girl's family, her husband's family, Junior professors and staff from 
her department, a couple of professors and their guests from other 
university departments, some neighbours, two foreign guests, who were 
brought by two different visitors, and some of the girl's friends. 
The second toast was to the girl's parents and to the parents and 
grandparents, both alive and dead, of all those present; and indeed 
this toast was then extended to the virtues of parenthood in 
general. 11 The third toast was to honour two visitors: Mars, as an 
Englishman, and an East German; both from countries which had been at 
war, both now united in friendship at the same feast, both learning 
that Georgia was a land of peace where over 40 nationalities lived in 
harmony. The toast that followed was to the girl's mother, to mother- 
hood, and to women in general. The Tamada then elaborated on the role 
of women as providers of beauty and love, both in general and specifi- 
cally as related to the people present. There then followed a series 
of toasts to the professor's own department, to its staff and to other 
departments and their staffs, who were represented at the feast. The 
twelfth toast, in this marathon (but typical) feast of twenty toasts, 
was to Georgian women and Armenian women, particularly significant 
since this was a mixed gathering of Georgians and Armenians - the girl 
being honoured having mixed parentage. The Tamada emphasized that 
Georgian and Armenian women were different, yes, but also similar in 
their essential femininity. 
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As the evening proceeds, and after everyone present has been toasted, 
the toasts often become either so widely abstract that they cover 
everything and everyone such as toasts "to the divine spirit, " "to all 
on our land, " or they become so specific that to the sober celebrant 
they appear quite silly, like drinking "for the electric light, with- 
out which we wouldn't be able to see what we are doing here, n and 
which sometimes allow for competitive and excessive bravado. It is at 
these 1 atter stages of af east that men mi ght wel 1 snatch up a vase, a 
jug, a shoe or a hat, 12 fill it with wine and attempt to empty it at a 
single draught. Others present will then be coerced to attempt to 
match or exceed the feat. It is this type of excess that caused 
Fitzroy Maclean to describe Georgians as "much, much harder drinkers 
than anyone else in the world. " Such gargantuan revelling can be 
appreciated as doubly competitive when it is realized that men are not 
only expected to drink, but are also not expected to relieve them- 
selves during the evening and that they are indeed required to stay in 
the room so that private urinating, purging or vomiting cannot offer 
any unfair advantage. 
At one of the feasts in Ashkelon I sat beside a man in his fifties who 
was bitterly protesting about the "stupid young lads" who had started 
to compete. "What's the point in it? Now they are like big men and 
then they'll vomit their souls and it will take them two days to 
recover, " he preached. How surprised I was then when he finally 
joined the competition himself. And he explained it thus: "I have no 
choice. This feast will be remembered for days and those who had a go 
will praise themselves as great warriors while I will be considered 
feeble. " In Ashkelon one can sometimes tell the course a feast has 
taken by the number of men strolling around the next day - having 
forcibly had to take the day off work. 
Toasts are interspersed with singing and by recitations of poetry both 
established and spontaneous and, if there is a musical instrument or 
an orchestra present, with dancing. The songs and the poetry - like 
the toasts - will be chosen to develop the same principles of linkage 
and focusing that integrate and incorporate those present into a 
single fellowship. Thus at the Tbilisi feast there was a recitation 
from Shakespeare in Gerald Mars' honour, a song by Mendelssohn to 
honour the East German, and songs that praised Tbilisi as a uniquely 
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beauti f ul ci ty, and Georgi a as a1 and of proud men and I ovely women. 
There was also an attempt to sing an Armenian song which foundered 
because most of the guests were Georgian and did not know the words. 
If there is dancing as the evening proceeds, people will not sit where 
they previously sat but will, after each dance, sit in a new place so 
that members of the feast mingle and linkages with new people can be 
establ i shed. 
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3. THE PLACE OF FEASTS IN GEORGIAN SOCIETY AND CULTURE 
3.1 Competition and Cooperation 
The feast can be understood as an institution reconciling two themes 
that run through Georgian culture. The first is the great emphasis 
placed on competition; the second a concomitant need for cooperation. 
Both these themes are evident in the selection and role of the Tamada. 
In keeping order his job is to mediate between conflicting competitive 
interests, hence his personal qualities are so important, particularly 
his standing as a drinker and his social situation as a person of some 
eminence. By his personal standing and his eminence he not only 
honours the gathering, he is above the general level of competition. 
But he is also primus inter pares, and it is in this dimension of his 
role that he has to carry out his tasks with grace, elegance and 
persuasion. A too blatant display of authority has no place at a 
feast. 
Competition, as has been indicoted, is particularly evident in com- 
petitive drinking by men. But it is also evident in the furnishings 
to be seen crammed into the family lounge where most feasts are held. 
Here are di spl ayed in gl ass-f ronted cabi nets, chi na, gl ass, cutl ery 
and servi ng bowl s- al 11 tems used at f easts. When a coupl e become 
engaged, amongst the gifts they are bound to receive are such house- 
hold items for display and feast-giving. But competition is also 
evident in the way the feast is served, not only in the range of 
dishes which are brought on in a continuous stream through the even- 
ing, but because they are served on small plates. These are over- 
fiII ed and, as the eveni ng proceeds, they have to be pi 1 ed on top of 
each other thus presenting an image of excess. 
If the competitive theme is dominant in men, and the way men behave, 
the cooperative theme is mainly evident in the role women take in the 
feast. It is women who are primarily responsible for obtaining the 
food, for cooking it and for cleaning up after the feast. For these 
purposes women need to exploit the network of their kinfolk and their 
neighbours. The cooking will be carried out cooperatively both in 
separate kitchens and communally. The table will be laid by a group 
of women and the serving of guests will be similarly carried out by 
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them as will the clearance of the feast and the cleaning of the 
kitchen. 
It would be a mistake, however, to equate competition solely with men 
and cooperation as only the prerogative of women; though women are 
less competitive than men they are competitive. A woman, for in- 
stance, will compete on a man's behalf and will gain personal prestige 
by demonstrating the speed and efficiency with which she can produce a 
whole range of dishes for an ad hoc feast. And, in a similar way, the 
feast also permits and encourages a modification of male competition 
as the evening proceeds. Though broccadacio drinking might well 
dominate a feast during its early and middle phases, the bonhomie of 
cooperative fellowship asserts itself in the latter phase of the 
feast. It is then that elaborate personal valuations are made, 
friendships are sworn, addresses exchanged, and at the end of the 
feast men might well be found eating from the same plate and drinking 
from the same cup. 
3.2 The Feast as a Network made Manifest 
So far the feast has largely been considered as an event that operates- 
at a local level; as a gathering of people selected on different bases 
and coming together in fellowship. But the feast also serves a wider 
purpose and one well recognized by its participants. It links and 
binds together people who possess different affiliations, who repre- 
sent different places, institutions, occupations and kinship linkages. 
And it is in understanding this role of the feast and the latency 
inherent in the links it encourages, that we can appreciate why the 
feast is so important in Soviet Georgia and perhaps too why it should 
be officially discouraged by the Soviet authorities. This is because 
it is in the manipulation of such ego-focused networks that Georgians 
can and do influence and manipulate the organizations of the State. 
When one conceives of the feast in this way - as a network made 
manifest - it can be seen how it mediates between the individual in 
his unremitting search for prestige and the organizations and 
institutions of Soviet Society with which he has constantly to deal. 
As seen in an earlier example, participants in the feast become con- 
crete representatives - 'embodiments' - of more abstract entities. It 
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can be seen that the English and German scholars for instance, became 
representatives of their respective countries; the professors repre- 
sentatives of their institutions and individuals of their families. 
Hence both general as well as specific interests become linked and by 
the same token individuals gain idealised, properties - they become 
archetypes of their wider affiliations. Consequently, one can under- 
stand why toasts for such abstract entities as womanhood or nationhood 
become highly significant: a failure to meet expectations by an 
individual reflects adversely on the wider grouping of which he is a 
representative. A man who cannot consume the right amount of wine not 
only shames himself but reflects adversely on his wider personal and 
institutional affiliations. 
As honour and prestige are vitally linked to conspicuous consumption 
and display, consequently one can see why scarce goods should be 
highly prized, the more so since consumer goods are in chronically 
short supply in the Soviet Union. But it is not just in the obtaining 
of scarce goods that networks are necessary - they are necessary too 
at all the myriad points of contact which link the Soviet citizen with 
numerous state organizations. I have details of network links that 
were vital in obtaining preferred jobs, scarce permits and licences, 
places at university and which moved my informants out of trouble when 
they came up against the formal sources of state control (points to be 
addressed more fully in subsequent chapters). In a very real sense, 
therefore, expenditure on feasts can be understood - not as wasteful 
and profligate misuse of resources, but as the bases of shrewd invest- 
ment and as representing the conversion of material resources to 
social ones that in their turn can be reinvested for further and 
future material return. The feast therefore binds together people 
into a powerful ego focused resource gathering core, which allows it 
to exploit its environment by capturing significant people on its 
periphery. 
3.3 The Feast's Place in a Soviet System 
It is the feast therefore, that becomes the scene where decisions are 
made, institutional links are cemented and commitments exchanged. An 
American who spent a long time in Tbilisi often failed to find offi- 
ci al s at thei r pl aces of work, yet she coul d al ways fi nd them at the 
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numerous feasts she attended. Thus, the Head of the Foreign Relations 
Department of the University of Tbilisi attends five feasts a week! 
according to his statement; while the Department of Sociology has a 
big feast every three months and smaller ones every fortnight or so 
(Mars, personal communications, 1982). This is an enormous investment 
in time, money and energy, which can be Justified only if it yields - 
as it does - good returns. 
Simis (1982) describes a feast of public prosecutors, lawyers and 
judges held in a private room in a seaside restaurant in Sukhumi. One 
wonders where, then, a juridical case is determined: in the Court of 
Justice or in a scenic restaurant! The local officials in Ashkelon 
learned from experience that they should be cautious about attending 
feasts as this usually necessitated a reciprocal favour. One who was 
not cautious, the chairman of the Jewish Agency, had - by the end of a 
feast - doubled his intended contribution towards the building of a 
13 Georgian synagogue in Jerusalem. Before feasting can commence, 
serious arrangements - like engagements - must be agreed, since drink- 
ing in fraternal companionship might put guests off their guard and 
squeeze out concessions. 
In a centrally planned hierarchy such as the Soviet economic system, 
where decisions, nominations, allocations of resources and commodities 
are expected to follow the bureaucratic model and Communist ethics - 
the network becomes the main body which functions along different 
11 nes: according to the inherent values of the said culture. The 
feast therefore is modified to deal with that particular reality by 
accommodating persons from various work-settings. Indeed, both in 
Georgia and Israel, the overall impression is that many feasts are 
based on the workplace. 
5-19 
In assessing the role of the feast in Georgian society one would err 
by classifying it as merely a colourful event, expressing hospitality 
and generosity and typical to the Georgian culture. It certainly is 
all of these things but it is only by considering its function as the 
seat of personal support networks, that one can appreciate the feast's 
wider and fuller implications and understand why it plays such a major 




This display is particularly marked at the engagement ceremonies, 
where the two families are each displaying their gallery of 
supporters -a show of human resources at the disposal of the bride and groom and their families. 
2. This is the case in Israel. In Georgia one contributes consumer 
goods such as scare food or clothes. 
3. When I Joined my informants (especially in the early days of 
fieldwork) at large formal feasts (such as weddings), it was 
common for my present (a sum in cash) to be refused. These gifts 
of money are recorded in the presence of the guest and form a 
standing commitment. They declined my gift because there was no 
direct connection between us and they saw no point in accepting 
(and owing to) a stranger! The mutual obligations of network 
membership are considerable and are therefore not entered into 
lightly. And Sahlins (1965) points out in this respect that "if 
friends make gifts, gifts make friendsn (p. 139). 
4. During my fieldwork I faced the dilemma of breaking off relations 
with a key informant, knowing it would result in the loss of his 
whole network as well. (See Chapter 2, paragraph 5.1 (b)). 
5. Advice given to me by 'Doc': "A man who honours himself does not 
respond to any invitation. " 
6. Man in Georgian, but also in the macho sense. 
7. Someti mes cri teri af or the sel ecti on of a Tamada conf Ii ct, and 
this is especially so if someone has been selected on the basis 
of their close kinship link with the prime performer. This, 
however, is most likely to occur when the feast is kinship-based 
as at a wedding (and more so among Jews than among gentiles). 
These gatherings are usually larger than ad-hoc gatherings and 
are able to be pre-planned. In these cases there is a multiplic- 
ity of tables and a sub-Tamada is appointed to each table, which 
reduces the overall role of the main Tamada who, though he may be 
selected on the grounds primarily of his close kinship attach- 
ments, might fail to impress on the criteria of witty or fluid 
speech. 
8. At spontaneous gatherings cheaper utensils might be used like glass 
cups. 
9. To relate it to themes discussed earlier in the chapter, the Tamada 
functions as the focal point of the temporary organization - the 
network assembled at the feast - by channelling the movement of the toasts. 
10, And see Elam (1980) for a graphic presentation of the toasts in a 
Georgian-Jewish wedding. 
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11. At one feast I attended, the story was recounted of a small child 
of four who had asked his grandfather: "Grandfather - you are very 
old, when are you going to die? " The reply was: "I will die when 
you die because as long as you live my name will live on at occa- 
sions like feasts. " 
12. Traditional Svaneli hats (of the Georgian mountain regions) are 
particularly suitable for that purpose. 
13. Ma'ariv (Hebrew daily), 3rd May, 1981. 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
There has been little systematic work on the operation of Soviet 
factories and even less on their place within the Soviet second 
economy. The seminal work is Berliner's (1957) study of factories and 
their managements derived from interviewing refugees as part of the 
Harvard Project on The Soviet Social System. He focused on the formal 
organization of production and his mention of second economy institu- 
tions was concentrated on the Tolkachi - the middlemen 'pushers' or 
'fixers'. 
1.1 The Tolkach Phenomenon 
Berliner was concerned with showing how the Tolkach enabled manage- 
ments to achieve their production targets and therefore acquire their 
achievement bonuses by removing bottle-necks, by rearranging targets 
with official connivance and generally by smoothing relationships with 
significant others beyond the physical boundary of the factory. In 
short, according toBerliner and his followers, the Tolkach, though 
involved in informal and often illegal means was concerned primarily 
with exploiting official channels. "'Blat'l is the grease in the gears 
of the economic system which serves to keep the mechanism running more 
smoothly and quietly. " (Berliner, 1957, p. 327) 
The 1 ogi cal devel opment of the Tol kach rol e has, however, been un- 
explored. Given the nature of the role and the required personality 
of its practitioners, it might be expected that they would, where 
possible, try not to limit themselves only to the use of informal 
means in the service of formal ends. As one of Mars' UK informants 
expressed it ". .. when you get to fiddling things for them, you 
obviously get to fiddling things for yourself. " (Mars, 1982, p. 69) 
In Georgia, though the functions of the Tolkach are well understood, 
the word Tolkach is not known - nor is there an equivalent in the 
Georgian language, and I did not encounter such a breed among my 
informants. This is not to suggest that such activities are not found 
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in Georgia, still less that they are not necessary, but to suggest 
that in Georgia 'fiddling for oneself' has been carried to its logical 
extreme - it has been institutionalized. As Chapter 4 on Core Values 
has intimated, every Georgian male is expected 'in his soul' to be 
something of a Tolkach. Thus, we shall see in Georgia, there is no 
need for these functions to be limited to particular individuals. As 
a result the nature of the informal adaptations of Georgian enterprise 
has taken a rather different turn from that traditionally found else- 
where in the USSR. 
1.2 Expansion of the Informal 
It is in Georgia that we find the logical development of illegitimacy. 
Here the formal enterprises have been more fully'OL'6'0 
4"' " T'c' " by i ts i nf or- 
mal adaptations than possibly elsewhere. The means have become ends. 
My data includes examples of factories regularly producing up to four 
times their formal output: that is, producing four times more than 
stioulated by the formally designated Plan. This, of course, means 
not only that production is expanded beyond legal limits but that raw 
materials have to be obtained, that a distribution network with secure 
outlets has to be developed, that transport has to be organized and 
that significant individuals at all points of this production/ 
distribution line have to be motivated, rewarded and if necessary 
bri bed or even threatened - to pl ay thei r part in thi s expansi on of 
output. 
What is reveal ed, is an economi c system that mi rrors the f ormal ,I egal 
system. It is a system that shows many of the features and responses 
to problems faced by capitalist economies in the West. Managers here 
also have the problems of maintaining constant output when circum- 
stances and events conspire to make for erraticism; they are subject 
to succession crises when key personnel move and are in some respects 
at least, as reliant on the market for their products, as are any 
Western management. In other respects the similarities also appear 
more pronounced than do the expected differences. For example one 
finds that illicit profits are distributed in Georgia on the basis of 
shareholdings and that factories are bought and sold. But these 
similarites are deceptive. These are Soviet factories set in the 
overall context of socialist planning and control. These controls and 
6-2 
the Plans which they support are extensive and are able to be main- 
tained by Draconian punishment. In delineating Georgia's illicit 
production and distributive system, one can discover the unique way in 
which members of one culture have successfully adapted to the rigid- 
ities imposed by another. 
1.3 Background to this Study 
During my investigations I obtained information on three different 
factories, located in three different regions of Georgia. One, 
employing two hundred people was in the food industry, one was a 
textile factory with about one thousand employees, while the third 
involved light metal manufacturing and employed under a hundred. For 
each of these I managed to obtain cross-checked information from 
different managerial levels within each factory, thus corroborating 
the amounts of their illicit production, the difficulties in obtaining 
raw materials, the problems involved in the products distribution and 
the range and extent of their necessary external involvements. In 
addition I obtained considerable anecdotal data from a wide variety of 
informants who had different lower-level sub-managerial contact with a 
variety of different factories. Most of these people were shopkeepers 
and drivers who corroborated the major factory case data. 
This data is now presented as a case study which concentrates particu- 
larly on information derived from the food industry. In addition, 
however, and where relevant, I introduce comparisons and distinctions 
that arise from the other two cases as well as from my other inform- 
ants. It will be appreciated that certain facts have been changed so 
that identification of particular events and locations will not be 
possible. In my opinion, this does not detract from the concrete 
evidence of the material nor from its validity as a vehicle for pro- 
viding an understanding of how illicit production and distribution 
work. 
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2. THE BISCUIT FACTORY: SOME GENERAL FEATURES 
2.1 An Introductory Note 
The enterprise described below will be referred to as the 'Biscuit 
Factory'. It is a medium-sized factory and employs several hundred 
staff. It produces biscuits and, in addition to the requirements of 
its formal Plan, it illicitly and consistently produces extra biscuits 
in the ratio of-4: 1, that is - four informal biscuits to ten formal 
ones. This is a rather safe output. I will show later how the 
approach of this management consistently emphasizes safety. I have 
however come across factories where illicit production has been 
erratic and where production has on occasion reached up to ten times 
more than in this case: that is, where production has reached a level 
four times higher than the planned output. This dimension of safety 
versus riskiness will be elaborated later. 
2.2 Setting up the Illicit Enterprise 
Illicit enterprises, like regular ones, have their rational struc- 
tures, respond to market forces and are bought and sold as has been 
noted by others (eg. Simis, 1982). In the biscuit factory case the 
business was inherited by 2 of the 3 partners from their fathers. The 
third, a qualified engineer as production manager became so indispen- 
sable that he was offered a share equal to the others, that is: 
2 profits were divided equally among the three. 
In the case of the textile factory the enterprise grew from a small 
scale textile workshop employing four men. It grew not from the 
initiatives of distant planners, but because of the enterprise and 
pressure of its formal director. This man expanded production to such 
an extent that he was able to persuade the appropriate authorities to 
supply him with larger premises and more plant and to do so on three 
successive occasions as he outgrew capacity at each stage. He was 
able to expand because his informal capacity was growing faster than 
his official capacity permitted, and it was his earnings from this 
source that were used to bribe the appropriate formal authorities and 
obtain their necessary sanction at each new level of expansion. In 
all, this entrepreneur's capacity expanded in four stages: from a 
staff of four, to forty, to several hundred, to almost a thousand 
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before he achieved his final site. What lay behind his expansion was 
the prospect that he could offer greater illicit profits to those who 
controlled the sources of legitimate state capital. 
To return, however, to our biscuit factory: its three partners shared 
all the responsibilities of their private enterprise. Their indi- 
vidual responsibilities corresponded to their formal roles which were 
the three top functions in the legitimate, state-owned factory: these 
were the directorship of the enterprise; its production management and 
its stock warehouse control which included responsibility for account- 
ing. These positions and their incumbent personal contributions will 
be more fully discussed later. 
2.3 The PLAN and its Flexibilities 
An easy and relatively risk-free way to engage in illicit production 
is to have a formal production target - THE PLAN - which allows leeway 
for additional produce. The way to obtain this is by seeking coopera- 
tion of the person(s) responsible for setting the formal planning 
targets and, by influencing them to obtain as lenient a planned target 
as possible. There is nothing novel about this - as writers on the 
working of the Soviet economy have long ago observed (eg. Berliner, 
1957; Nove, 1976). But usually this is done to maintain the official 
production of a plant, while in second economy production its purpose 
is to reduce the level of official output in order to capture the 
spare capacity for illegal production. Fiddling of capacity in this 
way is then the first and simplest method of achieving illegal produc- 
tion. It provides an easily-achieved flexibility which allows machin- 
ery, people and time to be employed to produce more than The Plan 
requires - with the additional produce then able to be aimed at the 
lucrative private market. 
There is another and similarly simple way in which the Plan setter - 
the official who sits in Tbilisi and to whom an annual pilgrimage is 
made, may be of assistance. This is for him to permit a further 
degree of flexibility by allowing for a higher level of waste in 
production process than would normally be strictly necessary. Such a 
high rate of waste will then leave spare raw materials to be used for 
illicit produce. Both of these methods which each demand a degree of 
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official connivance can only provide a relatively small surplus, 
however. To maximize illicit output most attention will have to focus 
on the illicit manipulation of the products' raw materials. 
2.4 Maximizing Illicit Output 
To produce more than the Plan asks for on a regular basis requires 
first and foremost extra raw materials. These can be either obtained 
from outside the enterprise or the firm's legitimate supplies could be 
'milked' to provide a surplus for illicit production. Whatever 
measure is chosen the decision on how to obtain raw materials is a 
'key variance' factor (to employ an established concept: Trist, 1981) 
which will have a major influence in shaping the structure and conduct 
of the illicit production/distribution process. 
There are several alternatives and these are listed below. 
Alternative A- Cheating on the Quality3 
Let us return to the biscuit factory. Biscuits need the following 
i ngredi ents: flour, sugar, eggs, fat, yeast, spices, preservatives, 
artificial colours and water. This is not a comprehensive list. In 
principle, as with other products, the list contains some components 
which are almost free, others which are easy to obtain - like water or 
spices and some which are relatively hard to obtain, or are costly 
like: sugar, eggs and flour. The simplest way to overcome 'hard to 
obtain' products, as in this instance, is to use less sugar or eggs 
than is required by the standard (and in the Soviet Union everything 
has a standard) or to use cheap substitutes for dear. However these 
methods are also easily detectable to any thorough control - though 
perhaps not to the naive consumer. Since control methods are integral 
to the Soviet economic system, consequently there is always. the pos- 
sibility that the fraud might be discovered - which would necessitate 
a massive cover-up operation in order to keep the illicit enterprise 
goi ng. 
The all pervasive likelihood of a sudden check applies not only to 
food. One of my informants with whom I discussed the incidence of 
checks by authority and who used to be a bricklayer in Georgia com- 
mented: "Well, food is only half a trouble; food is eventually 
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consumed - but if you fiddle with bricks, they stay forever ... You 
always live haunted with the fear that one day the fiddle will be 
detected. " And yet this method has some considerable advantages as 
the extra raw material is attainable and in constant flow from inside 
the plant -a benefit not easily ignored. 
The biscuit factory entrepreneurs, however, refused to employ this - 
the most common method, so that the volume of their illicit production 
necessarily remained limited. In all the cases I came across in which 
the level of illegal production was much higher than the legitimate, 
people had to adopt this alternative (or the next one, which is a 
variation only) in order to obtain a sufficiency of raw materials. 
The management of the biscuit factory, however, used deliberately to 
stick firmly to required standards and for three good reasons: 
as stated, they were able to avoid the risks involved in the 
operation of sudden and unplanned checks; as well as the danger 
of a long-term detection ("you never know in whose hands a packet 
of these biscuits might end up"). 
its products were thus able to achieve a good reputation and were 
able to sustain a demand for their illicit produce; 
their high standard provided a basis of reputation on which they 
could count in times of need. "The rumour spread" said one of my 
informants "that we are strictly straight. It was considered 
almost inappropriate to check on us. " It also became a source of 
strength for other figures, who had some responsibility for 
running of the (formal as well as the informal) business. "The 
Mayor (who was on our payroll) was very proud when in other 
places he was welcomed with a handful of our products. " Thus, by 
ignoring Alternative A, the biscuit factory lost the opportunity 
of maximizing its output but avoided considerable risksý 
Alternative B- Cheating on the Quantiýy 
This alternative is a variation of Alternative A. In the biscuit 
factory example, it would mean the manufacture of its biscuits at, 
say, 9 grams instead of the compulsory 10 grams. In this way it would 
free a 10% extra supply of raw materials. This method is rather 
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common in some industries where the raw material comprises such goods 
as metal, wood or cloth, in which it is difficult for the consumer to 
check the amount involved in manufacture. As one of my informants 
from the textile factory explained: "If you're making stockings, for 
instance, it's not easy, even for expert controllers to determine a 
deviation from the standard. The standard itself allows flexibility - 
it has to - due to human error and machine variability. " However, 
with foods that are sold in fixed quantities a consumer may detect 
that he has received short-measure. This is where much of the danger 
lies - the weak point in the chain. No one can anticipate to whom the 
goods will be sold or the standing of those who will buy them (see the 
case of the Komsomol - paragraph 5.2 W). Planned safeguards are 
normally employed against 'traditional' overt dangers only: the 
pol ice and the sources of regular controls. (Account V in Chapter 8 
on Crisis Events deals with an 'irregular crisis of such a kind). 
Alternative C- Falsifying Qualities 
While in alternatives A and Ba manufacturer will attempt to sell a 
cheap product as if it was a perfect one - another alternative is to 
consciously sell a second rate good at the price set for a first. 5 
This practice then encourages a manufacturer to make as many seconds 
as he possibly can. The surplus of raw materials then becomes his 
property and is available for further production. An informant gave 
the following account of how he acted as a distributor for production 
achieved by this method: 
"One day I went to Kharkov on a regular working trip and as usual 
I was looking for a business opportunity. So I went to a shoe 
factory, with which I'd already done some deals in the past. 
They were producing galoshi -a sort of rubber boot, much in 
demand in rural areas for use on muddy roads. I met my contact 
man there and he suggested to me that I should buy a whole series 
of galoshi which were really supposed to be 'disqualified goods'. 
Really, there was nothing wrong with them: they were all perfect 
Class A items - but this was the Levi. 
6 So I bought three rail- 
way wagons full of galoshi: small, large, medium; galoshi for 
women, for children, half-boots, full-boots, extra long boots - 
thousands of them. They were all stamped inside with Uzenyon 
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Brak that is 'faulty product', which means they were supposed 
either to be destroyed or sold at a special few shops which 
specialize in such merchandise. I paid 30 Kopeks a pair, which 
went straight into my man's pocket, as the goods were officially 
declared as destroyed. I shipped them all back to Georgia where 
each pair fetched 2.08 Rubles. After, of course, rubbing out the 
false statement. It took months to sell out the whole stock but 
it made a nice little deal. " 
The main disadvantage here, however, is that such a 'combination' has 
to be a one-off event. One cannot go on producing defects continu- 
ously, and it is consistent operation which marks successful illicit 
production. One can see that for illicit production to really suc- 
ceed, it needs to be continuous and this in its turn needs the appli- 
cation and support of an extensive personal network. Such networks 
are expensive to maintain both in obtaining material and social con- 
tacts. This type of maintenance is only made worthwhile by a long and 
enduring commitment. 
Alternative D- Copying the Existing Product 
This alternative was the one adopted by the biscuit factory. It 
produces superfluous goods - more than the quota but not excessively 
more and it makes its illicit production indistinguishable from its 
formal production. In this way advantage is taken of existing machin- 
ery, the production process and the existing work force. 
Because such illicit output is indistinguishable from legitimate out- 
put it is able to pass undetected at all points in its passage from 
production to the consumer. This is particularly important in its 
movement from the factory to the store. The presence of ubiquitous 
road patrols at all main intersections in Georgia, as elsewhere in the 
USSR, makes the transport of illicit goods a high risk aspect of 
illicit production. Once in the store, however, copied goods can 
readily pass as official goods. 
The incentive for the retailer in stocking copied goods is obvious: 
he gets private produce, which is an exact copy of the state produce 
but at a cheaper price. In this particular case it was sold to 
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retailers at 15% less than the official price. 7 This allows him 
considerable profit without having to sell at an artificially high 
price. 8 
This method though safe is difficult to expand upon, since it depends 
upon the same productive resources required for the Plan, only more 
so. And it also has problems - the constraints and difficulties will 
be examined in detail throughout the remainder of this chapter. 
Having made a choice, let us now examine in detail how the biscuit 
factory conducted its illicit operations. 
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3. ORGANIZING BLACK PRODUCTION: HOW THE BISCUIT FACTORY DID IT 
3.1 Obtaining Raw Materials 
As we have seen, most methods of obtaining extra raw materials involve 
'milking' supplies from formal production, thus reducing either the 
official products' quality or its quantity. Our entrepreneurs, how- 
ever, decided not to follow this path. So how did they obtain their 
raw materials and from where did they come? "You buy them in the 
shop, like any ordinary customer" my informant explained. "Wel I not 
like any ordinary customer" he continued "but basically what we 
needed were daily household goods: sugar, flour, eggs, fats and salt. 
So we had contacts with our four shops which we used to turn to for 
our regular supplies: of course we paid them more than the normal 
price. After all, the shopkeeper takes a risk in selling a large 
quantity to a sole customer. In urgent cases, though, like if we were 
expecting a possible control9 and we had just consumed a lot of offi- 
cial raw material for our private ends, we could always get the extra 
stocks from a bigger number of stores. If we were really desperate, 
though, we might even have to go to brokers who we knew had the know- 
how about where to get the stuff we needed, but who would need paying 
extra. Some of the supplies we needed would be part-exchanged for 
ready-made biscuits we delivered to the same shops. " In this way a 
complete cycle of mutual interests and of reiterated commitments 
between shop and factory were maintained over several Years. 
3.2 Packing and Labelling 
A frequent and universal hurdle that bedevils much black production is 
involved in obtaining ingredients which make up the final product but 
which are not made in the factory. In this particular case these 
comprised the packaging and labels. Like raw materials, they too are 
supplied according to the official quantities designated in the Plan. 
Consequently it was necessary to have contact with a printing workshop 
and with a packing paper manufacturer. Mars (Personal Communications, 
1982) visited a tea plant in Georgia which manufactures five different 
varieties of tea. They are supplied with five different boxes, five 
different labels, and five types of packing paper - each supplied by 
one manufacturer (fifteen manufacturers in all). The plant is penal- 
ized if they retain stock for more than one month. 
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Whatever the reasons for this practice, it certainly serves as both a 
safeguard and control against illicit production. At the same time, 
however, it highlights the inbuilt paradox of the system. After all 
collusion with only one of the fifteen suppliers allows at least some 
illicit dealings. Thus, the more sanctions a hierarchy imposes, the 
more power leaks from the centre to the periphery. In this case, the 
workshop chosen (presumably because of personal contact) was some 50 
miles from the factory, which added the additional risk of transport- 
ation (on the risks inherent in using illegal transport, see below). 
Usually the print-run would be made only once or twice a year, to 
reduce the risks involved as well as to lower costs. But there was 
still the problem of storing these components. To store them in the 
factories' warehouse would be too dangerous. There could be no pos- 
sible legal Justification for holding large stocks of such items, so 
different people - normaly not directly connected with the private 
enterprise would be used to store them on their premises - usually for 
short periods. 
And yet to be dependent on an outside source for produce and supply is 
a major risk - there is always the danger of being detected, not 
through any fault of one's own but as a result of the exposure of a 
secondary manufacturer. The biscuit factory faced a real crisis on 
these grounds with one of its label suppliers (Account IV in Chapter 
8, see paragraph 2.2). 
It is for this reason this that every effort is made to contain 
production of secondary ingredients inside the enterprise. Necessity 
is the mother of invention or as the Georgian saying goes: "When you 
are desperate - you always find a way out! " The following case illus- 
trates this: 
"Some of the biscuits needed a special nut on the top and-our 
supplies of these were limited according to the specified produc- 
tion Plan. This might seem a very tiny detail but nevertheless 
it's a crucial one. You just can't complete some biscuits with- 
out the right nut. Now, where do you get them from? It happens 
to be that not only are they supplied from outside, (the factory 
and the locality) but they are imported from another republic. 
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So we had no hope of obtaining extra nuts from the official 
source. 
"At the beginning then, and for two years, we used to cut down 
the full-sized nuts into halves, so that we doubled the available 
quantity. There were times when two girls used to sit the whole 
day long slicing these nuts and various explanations were pro- 
duced to account for this: that some of the nuts came spoiled 
and the faulty bits had to be removed, and so on. But it looked 
as if this could not continue for long. So, we worked out a new 
substitute which we made ourselves out of local ingredients so 
that it coul d be produced in the f actory and whi ch was cheaper. 
And it looked and tasted the same. I was prized for that inven- 
tion and so we switched to artificial nuts. " 
From my discussions with informants I was assured that this kind of 
inspired innovation and adaptation is almost a routine in black pro- 
ducti on. It is indeed fn this- sector of the economy that innovation 
and a fast adaptability are institutionalized. It is not surprising 
either that the 'formal' economy benefits indirectly as well. 
3.3 Manpower and Machinery 
The next question to be answered is by whom and with what are the 
black products to be made. Normally I found it to be with factories' 
existing manpower and with state-owned machinery. 
In some industries employees are not aware at all of the fact that 
they are working for private ends. If a management employs alter- 
native A or B to obtain its extra materials, only those involved in 
certain stages of the production need to be involved in overt know- 
ledge of the deception. In the case of the biscuit factory, these 
were those involved in preparing the dough and in operating the elec- 
trical machinery. The rest, the majority of production line workers, 
the packers, and the cl erks, woul d not be i nvol ved. Here the i ntel - 
ligence principle: 'the need to know', operates clearly. The fewer 
involved, the less likelihood that knowledge might be misused. Thi s 
kind of deception was usual practice in most cases of black production 
that I discussed. 
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In the biscuit factory there was, however, a higher than usual chance 
of detection because of the necessarily regular movement of raw 
materials from other than officially expected sources and this neces- 
sarily involved a wide extension of dangerous knowledge. The entre- 
preneurs were therefore cautious. They acted on the assumption that 
all their employees might have some idea about what was going on (even 
though this had never been discussed with them) and they remunerated 
all of them accordingly. 
The time needed for black production normally causes further concern. 
In the bi scui tf actory thi s rai sed no maj or probl em as the rati o of 
private to legal produce was rather modest: 0.4: 1, and the annual 
contribution by the Plan fixer in Tbilisi was designed to leave room 
for additional produce without much difficulty. However, occasionally 
even here overtime and even weekend work was sometimes required. 
In the other cases I know of, where the ratio of illicit produce was 
much higher, the people-selected for regular overtime were carefully 
chosen - not only for their occupational merits but also on the bases 
of trust, loyalty and familial reference. 
Black production necessarily involves the extra and sometimes the 
excessive use of machinery. In the biscuit factory, however, this too 
did not prove a major problem, possibly because no faults or premature 
amortization could be directly attributed to above-normal use. In 
other cases, however, two different methods were adopted to enable 
machinery to last longer: firstly, machines were declared broken at 
more or less fixed intervals in order to establish a false norm for 
breakage which took into account the factories' additional black 
production; and second, those spares which were worn out, as a direct 
outcome of excessive use, were either maintained or acquired privately 
- usually via official channels and for an adequate reward. 
3.4 Stock and Book-keeping 
A universal problem exists when two parallel production systems oper- 
ate under the same roof and especially when one is official and the 
other is black. This involves having to balance an account for all 
the elements of production used in both systems, and to keep a feas- 
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ible and a reasonable ratio of final stock to raw materials. These 
accounting problems become crucial in the Soviet system because of the 
ever present fear of a sudden control swoop. Control over production 
(under the responsibility of the Ministry of Trade) would come in the 
form of an audit carried out once or twice annually and the dates of 
these would usually be known beforehand. This kind of intelligence is 
one of the services expected of the regularly paid local officials and 
it therefore serves to defuse the danger inherent in such audits. As 
has been stated, however, the real dangers arise from sudden unplanned 
swoops. The aim then is to perpetually keep all elements in balance 
so that any sudden control will not find too much or too little 
produce in relation to the expected balance of raw materials and 
supplementary items such as packaging and labels. 
This need for balance certainly affects both the production and the 
distribution of black goods. In the biscuit factory, since the man- 
agement had decided on a policy of caution, the tendency was always to 
produce in small quantities only and to do so on a continuous basis. 
Linked to this and maintained rigorously, as a matter of high prior- 
ity, was the policy always to move all goods out of the factory to 
their designated customers as soon as possible. However, if there 
should arise an unexpected demand for black goods, then it would 
always be possible to take some from official production since the 
product was the same. When this happened the balance between produc- 
tion, stock and book-keeping needed to be re-establishedlO and this 
usually meant acquiring the missing raw materials quickly. 
Book-keeping in the 'second', informal biscuit factory was relatively 
simple and tended to be verbal and not written. For some time a 
second set of books had been kept on his own private premises by one 
of the partners, but this practice was subsequently abandoned. The 
close and daily relations between the partners allowed an efficient 
transfer of information and decisions were always able to be taken on 
the spot. This was also the case in the metal factory. 
In more complex systems with a higher rate of illicit business and 
especially when deliveries were not made on a strictly cash basis, 
some record of illicit book-keeping was essential. I found that 
typically these records were kept by a key figure in the enterprise, 
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often the warehouse manager who controlled the flow of stock and who 
in addition was normally responsible for formal accounting. This was 
the case in the textile factory. 
3.5 Distribution 
The distribution of illicit biscuits was normally limited to only four 
shops who were also taking official goods - thus allowing use of the 
normal channels of distribution. As the illicit output was rather 
modest there was never any real problem of choice in assessing who was 
suitable as an approved outlet and who was not. But even with greater 
quantities to dispose of, I found in other industries that distrib- 
ution (apart from transport - which will be discussed later) was the 
easiest element to organize in the whole complex of the private enter- 




An understanding of the role of transport is a key element in under- 
standing second economy activity within the USSR. As a 'key variant' 
(Trist, 1981), it determines, to a great extent, the effectiveness or 
otherwise of the illicit enterprise and often the limits of its expan- 
sion. 
I will discuss the issue of transport here in the context of the 
factory and again when addressing the principles that govern the 
organization of retail business in Georgia. As almost the only means 
of transport available to factories is road transport, I will focus on 
it in this chapter and discuss its various alternatives in the later 
discussion of retail distribution. 
The problems of delivering goods by road are identical whether the 
movement is to the f actory -in the f orm of raw materi al s- or f rom 
the factory - in the shape of made up products. Whether at the begin- 
ning or end of the process, however, transport is invariably a bottle- 
neck for those involved in illicit production. The difficulties 
involved derive from the controls exercised by the police who patrol 
all main roads and who are based at road intersections throughout the 
USSR. The typical way of dealing with police road patrols is to bribe 
them or those who control them. There are problems, however, that 
arise when one comes to bribe a road patrolman. Since the base level 
policeman is relatively Junior and is likely to be frequently changed, 
this itself makes for uncertainty. Another problem is that only one 
straight policeman on a route can Jeopardize a whole undertaking. 
Because factory managements find that their biggest transport problems 
come from road patrols, they naturally try to reduce their dependence 
on road transport. It has been suggested to me that one of the 
principal reasons Soviet factories so often reduce the quality of 
their goods by fiddling their constituents is because this method at 
least supplies them with raw materials and, in doing so, increases 
their independence from transport hazards. 
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4.1 Obtaining Transport 
The fi rst question to consi der isf rom where do managements obtai n 
their transport? The supply of vehicles is strictly controlled and 
their allocation limited. Georgia, however, has the largest number of 
cars per capita in the Soviet Union (Kipnis, 1981) which is indeed an 
excellent indication of its primary position in the Second Economy. 
The most common and the safest way to obtain access to transport, is 
simply to employ official vehicles, whether in the formal service of 
the factory or of the retailer, and to use them only partially for the 
transport of illegal items. But transport requires not only a vehi- 
cle, it also needs a driver - and - not any driver will do. In the 
biscuit factory, for instance, only one of the factory's two drivers 
could be trusted though both were technically proficient. Normal 
driving skills, however, are not enough: a driver in the service of a 
private enterprise has also to be able to cope with emergencies (eq. 
by being able to cope when stopped by road patrols) and to have sound 
social contacts (that can be activated for instance, in emergencies). 
But the most desired characteristic of a driver according to several 
of my accounts, is that he must above all , be discreet - he must be 
trusted not to speak out about what he sees. 
One cannot, therefore, underestimate the importance of a driver where 
the Job involves delivering illicit goods. Even if formally the 
responsibility for the content of a delivery is not his - as for 
instance when he is accompanied by the person in charge of the goods - 
he still has to account for the excess mileage which will often be 
involved. Because he is technically liable for only small offences, 
he theref ore becomes a potenti al weak 11 nk in the pri vate f actori es 
chai n of securi ty. Thi sis why dri vers have to be caref ul ly chosen, 
are well rewarded and possess a prestige well in excess of their 
formal social standing. 
After the questions of vehicle and driver have been satisfactorily 
solved, any collection or delivery of illicit goods still has to take 
account of two further issues: documentation of the goods and road 
patrol s. 
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4.2 Documentation of Goods ('Faktura') 
Any purchase of goods involves an accompanying documentation called a 
'Faktura', which serves the functions of a detailed log of quantities, 
prices, times and personal certification. Table 1 presents the doc- 
umentation - the Faktura - used for the purchase of merchandise in the 
biscuit factory. 
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Table 1: Faktura of the Biscuit Factory 
FAKTURA* 
The Product KG Packing Price per Total Time" 
(Boxes) unit 
Round chocolate so 1 50 R 50 R 09: 30 
biscuits (loose) 
Round chocolate 50 100 0.50R 50 R 09: 30 
biscuits (wrapped) 
Triangle vanilla 50 1 40 R 40 R 10: 00 
biscuits (loose) 
Triangle vanilla 50 100 OAOR 40 R 10: 00 
biscuits (wrapped) 
In Total 200 2+200 180 R 
Dept. A- Vendor's name + signature 
Dept. B- Vendor's name + signature 
Dept. C- Vendor's name + signature 
Accounts approval (signature) 
Factory management (signature) 
Filled in four copies: one to the client, one for the selling 
department, one for accounts and one to be left at the gates of the 
factory. 
Time goods were handed over to purchaser. Usually it means time 
the car was loaded in warehouse with the appropriate goods. 
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As is shown in Table 1, the Faktura is designed to specify the con- 
tents of a consignment and to state the responsibilities of Job 
holders in relation to it. It is designed to minimize error and make 
discrepancies easy to detect. As a result, it identifies and makes 
vulnerable those who are involved in illicit production or distrib- 
ution. Obviously, if one moves extra cartons which are not accounted 
for in the Faktura or the whole delivery is unofficial, then the 
people involved face some danger. To provide needed protection from 
the Faktura, four typical methods are employed. These firstly depend 
on using dual records, second on the multiple use of records, third on 
the use of taxes, and finally what can be called 'opening the road'. 
(a) Dual Records 
A dual record involves the creation of a document with only temporary 
val i di ty. Such a document describes the correct shipment that is in 
transit and it is produced at the appropriate check points, for the 
departmental accounts and to the security staff at appropriate gates. 
The only difference between this document and a bona fide Faktura is 
that these copies are not recorded until the safe return of the 
driver. Then, all dual documentation is destroyed and an alternative 
Faktura can be prepared and, if considered necessary, be recorded in 
the books. It is this method that operates in the more sophisticated 
illicit factories such as the textile factory that have a large output 
to dispose of and who needed to transport it for distribution along 
routes at a distance from their power base. Dual records in these 
circumstances also allow some degree of control over a large and 
steady flow of illicit produce and permit the maintenance of some form 
of continuous (even if temporary) record keeping. 
(b) The Multiple Use of Records 
In the biscuit factory where illicit produce and shipment was not a 
matter of daily routine and where illicit output was relatively small, 
the method used was more primitive. The driver would first complete 
one legitimate delivery journey backed by true documentation. He 
would then rush back to the factory for a second, identical load, this 
time of illicit produce. He would still keep the same documents and 
so they served him twice. This was possible in the biscuit factory 
case for two reasons - firstly, the unofficial produce matched the 
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official: it was identical in all respects, and second, distribution 
lines were short, so that the time discrepancy between the first and 
second departures was minimal. 
This type of deception is only possible when deliveries are relatively 
infrequent and when they take place within a relatively small radius 
of the factory. It reveals, however, a structural dilemma for small- 
scale business, in that expansion often appears to be limited by the 
inability to distribute beyond a small constraining radius. As dis- 
tributional distance increases, the hazard of involvement with ever 
more distant patrols who exist increasingly beyond the scope of one's 
network, al so i ncreases (see Account IIIin Chapter 8f or a si mi I ar 
case). The management of the biscuit factory consciously decided to 
limit its operations to its local scene because it lacked both the 
social and economic'resources to capture these more distant sources of 
state control. 
The multiple use of docu-mentation does not, however, end with the safe 
arrival of goods at the store. One shopkeeper explained: 
"If, say, I get 100 units of lampshades from a factory, and this 
is official, on a Faktura, then I will keep that Faktura as a 
cover for any future unofficial transaction. But it's only 
useful if I can get the same product from the factory as a 
private venture. However, I'll never take more than 90 units 
unofficially. Then, if it's necessary, I can always produce the 
true documentation and claim: 'You see, I sold ten items but 
unfortunately this stock is not in demand. I can't get rid of 
it., In this way I can use one official Faktura for months, all 
the time privately ordering the same product again and again but 
never to the full amount specified in the document. It would 
look too suspicious not to have sold a single item over a long 
period of time. " 
(c) The Alternative - Taxis 
Taxis have the advantage of not being normally suspected by road 
patrols of serving as a means for illicit delivery. They can there- 
fore be used for goods which could not possibly be covered by formal 
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documentation, as for instance, where the illicit product differs 
widely from those the factory is chartered to produce. For example, 
if a factory that manufactures copper plates for industrial use only 
unofficially switches to produce household items such as pipes for 
domestic supplies, saucepans, plates and ornaments (Georgia is ac- 
claimed for its copper artistic work) then the factory cannot back its 
unofficial deliveries with any relevant documentation. It would then 
use the taxi service instead. 
For the taxi driver this would prove a worthwhile collaboration. 
According to my information, a moderate estimate of illegal transport 
frequency for the average driver is one trip a week, which would 
amount to some 30% of a driver's total weekly income. One informant, 
a taxi driver from a rural town, estimated that hardly 10% of the taxi 
drivers he knew would not collaborate in such illegal journeys. Agri- 
culture proved to be an almost unlimited source of income to taxi 
drivers since many of the villagers who trade their produce in the 
market-towns lack any means of transport. 
(d) 'Opening the Road': Taking Advantage of the Controls 
Another method is of particular interest. This is because it high- 
lights one of the fundamental weaknesses of the formal system of 
controls and central planning. An informant explains: 
"One way of 'playing it safe' in getting both extra raw material 
for private produce and transport would be to speed production at 
the beginning of the year (or the month)11 thus exhausting the 
existing stock, providing materials would reach us in a steady 
flow, according to production targets. We would then ask offi- 
cial permission to withdraw additional raw materials from the 
central warehouse or perhaps from another similar factory, on 
account of the expected future supply. With this official per- 
mission, of course, will come official transport authority. Or 
we would announce a machinery failure which resulted in a line of 
faulty produce, again 'urgently' needing raw materials. We will 
then find a volunteer among our sister-plants who would agree to 
'lend' us our needs; thus we would get not one, but two official 
permits which allowed us raw materials and the allocation of a 
vehicle, driver, petrol and adequate documentation to travel 
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between two points: once to receive the materials and later to 
return them. " 
This method takes advantage of the very safeguards built into the 
system and which are designed to make misuse difficult. It involves 
finding a reasonable excuse to obtain an extraordinary travel permit. 
Once this is achieved, the system itself will guarantee a safe jour- 
ney. 
4.3 Road Patrols 
Road patrols are carried out by policemen. They operate especially on 
the metropolitan, main and high roads. Some are mobile and others are 
posted at particular points, especially crossroads. Each is linked by 
radio to a particular regional police station from which they operate. 
It is regarded as a relatively lucrative job since they are expected 
to take their share in the second economy. From the accounts I ob- 
tained, the following is very typical: 
"Say I'm on my way wi th 111 egal goods and a pol i ceman stops me. 
He asks me: 'Can I see the Faktura? ' (Bill of Lading) so, with- 
out direct reply I hand him over a handful of notes, meaning: 
'Here is your share; good day officer: I never met you - you 
never met me. ' 
"This would usually be enough. But not always. Sometimes I 
would add: 'Look, I already lost any profit I hoped to make, ' 
meaning that he should not make me any further troubles. And 
that is - not to tell his comrades on the radio that a victim is 
around. But this would not always help, since policemen often 
&work' in companionships. So. after picking up his share, the 
officer could announce on the radio: 'Be careful to observe car 
... registration no ... which comes towards you. I already 
stopped him and got some money - now you can have a go. ' Some- 
times you would argue and if the officer is stubborn you can 
always say: 'Look, mate, that's it. If you don't like ityou 
can report me. And then what wi II you gai nV and sometimes one 
would not earn a penny because on his route he would be squeezed 
- that is stopped several times and pushed to give large sums. 
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"It happened to me that I was short of cash - but this was no 
major problem. If a price was agreed then this would be accepted 
as a commitment and you could come after a few days or a week and 
pay out. More than once I would go to the officer's home to hand 
him the money and he would invite me for a feast which would cost 
him more than what he gained from me. But food and drink belong 
to a different world. " 
It is always better to make deliveries during normal working hours and 
even more so in rush hours when jams of traffic make detection more 
difficult than usual. Obviously, a transit van at night looks highly 
suspicious. 12 A retailer recounts his routine worries while trans- 
porting goods by road: 
"On the way to where I pick the goods, I used to stop at the 
police post that might endanger me on the way back. I woul d 
di scl ose my i ntended purchase and negoti ate a pri ce. Then, on 
return, after I got all I wanted, I would hand them over the 
agreed sum. Sometimes, when we got more than one car, we used to 
stop the van - at some distance from the road patrol post and 
with the other car we would go to check who is on guard and 
negotiate a price. If there were two it would be more expensive 
than if only one was on guard and then there were of course 
different persons: some more lenient, some more greedy. Some- 
times we had to cut through by-ways, since it seemed to be too 
costly to obtain their consent. "13 
Road patrols seem to have entered Georgian folklore, at least in 
Ashkelon where many of the discussions on street corners during warm 
summer evenings would nostalgically turn to ways of outwitting or 
bribing road patrols. Most of the following case details were obtain- 
ed by involvement in such a discussion. In these accounts, there is 
always the likelihood of exaggeration and boasting. Where accounts 
were not verfiable by a second source, they were nonetheless subject 
to internal testing at different times (see Chapter 2 on Methodology). 
"I used to do regular transits mainly of leather and other stuff 
for the produce of shoes. The route was a very long one, 250 km, 
and therefore risky - since it involved policemen and road pa- 
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trols from several regions and I had this encounter with officer 
G, who was on patrol at ... G stopped me one day and told me in 
an amicable manner, but unambiguously: 'Look here, B, I know 
about your business, so why won't you give me a monthly salary? 
It can only be for the best. ' I accepted this in principle (what 
else could I do? ) but we didn't agree on the sum, so we broke off 
discussions. A week later, to my bad luck, he stopped me with my 
van loaded. I was saying to myself: 'You have had it this time, 
B- there is too much overcargo in the van. ' But I had no 
choice, so I stopped and he said to me (there were two of them: 
he and the driver). 'All right, open the van - let's see what 
you got there. ' So I told him straightforward what I got in and 
he replied: 'Right, so what do you suggest we do now? You know 
perfectly well that I am in a position to arrest you on the 
spot. ' So after such introductory sentences, he finally said he 
wanted 5,000 Rubles in exchange for not disclosing me to the 
authorities. So I said to him: 'I haven't got the money with 
me. You know what? - 
Come with me to where I unload the stuff and 
I'll get money from some people there who owe me. ' 
"So off we went and then we unloaded the van and dispersed the 
goods to different places, all in his presence (this was done on 
purpose: once the goods are unloaded and dispersed there is 
hardly any proof of illegal delivery). And I gathered some money 
and gave him 500 Rubles which were worth 5,000 Rubles in old 
notes. Then looking at him with innocent surprise, I said: 'You 
were not thinking I was going to pay you 5,000 new Rubles?, 14 
And G, cursing and laughing at the same time, responded: 'The 
way you screwed me - no Jew ever did. ' 
"In the coming months I was very careful not to have our ways 
cross again. I had full information on the timetable of road 
patrol posts along my route, so this was not too difficult to 
manage. However, after some five months I wasn't able to avoid 
him on one particular trip, so what did I do? I decided that 
this time I will not, as usual, go in the van but in a private 
vehicle. And I told the van driver: 'If G stops me you go on 
and pass him as if its none of your business. ' And indeed it 
worked. I was not driving the car, but my friend was at the 
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wheel and we had pi cked up a gi rl who wanted a 11 f t. Both were 
sitting in the front and I was at the back pretending to be 
reading a book. I guessed G might spot me but that he would not 
figure out the distraction of the second vehicle. We were stop- 
ped and G said to me after flagging us down: 'Hey, be careful 
not to tire your eyes with too much reading. ' He sounded very 
contented to have spotted me. 'Well, let's not waste any time - 
tell me yourself what you've got with you this ti me. ' I started 
to cooperate with him, in order to distract his attention from 
the road where the van, which was three minutes behind me, was 
eipected to pass. 
"'You caught me this time' I said 'But tell me, have I not been 
fair with you in the pastV I tried to seem as if begging for 
sympathy, in order to gain time. And after the van passed safe- 
ly, Ifi nal ly sai d: 'Al 1 ri ght, I wi II open the boot f or you - 
you can see for yourself: there is nothing in it. ' G almost 
died. 'God, screw my mother if you haven't fixed me again' he 
shouted 'now you must tell me how you did it. ' 
"I didn't tell him but I gave him 100 Rubles so that he wouldn't 
feel too bitter on me. " 
Road patrols are a constant threat to illicit goods deliveries but, 
like other deterrents to the smooth operation of illicit trade, once 
they have been 'captured', incorporated into the social network, and 
can take their share of illegal profits, their monopoly of power 
(though limited) can be utilized to contribute to the continuous flow 
of illicit production and distribution. 
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5. THE INFORMAL STRUCTURE OF THE INFORMAL FACTORY 
00ne hand washes the other and both wash the face. " (Georgian proverb) 
This expression often arose when discussing the second economy with my 
informants. When inquiring what it meant, the common explanation was 
that the only way to succeed in illegal activities is through co- 
operation - like the hands that have to co-operate in washing each 
other. Co-operation always means the fusion of the formal with the 
informal -a fusion expressed in a mutual common concern. 
5.1 Partnership 
One universal characteristic of factories producing for the second 
economy is the need for collaborative effort, ie. for partnerships. 
This is a marked difference to the operation of stores. While the 
unofficial side of even a large super-store can be run by one person, 
I did not come across any factory (even those with only six employees 
including the managers) that ran without some sort of co-operative 
partnership. Partnerships are necessary because of the complex nature 
of illegal manufacturing which, as has already been seen, involves not 
only the dual production but also the dual organization of deliveries: 
raw materials into the factory and final products out of it. ý It would 
appear that the meshed complexity necessary for illicit production 
means that no single person and no single personal support network is 
able to encompass all the necessary bonds to keep the operation going 
and to ensure the mobilization of support in times of crisis. - 
I shall now examine in some detail the functional relations among the 
three partners of the biscuit factory and assess the role of their 
personal support networks in establishing and maintaining their 
factory's informal organization. 
The factory's General Manager had the strongest personal support 
network core with a total score of 16.15 It is not surprising that he 
held the most senior position in the factory since his network core 
was probably even stronger than the figures suggested as his father 
was general manager of another biscuit factory in a nearby region. 
The combination of a father (first-rate obligatory bond) in a powerful 
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position in a similar plant, goes a long way in asserting one's own 
standing. 
The Stock/Warehouse Manager who al so acted as Accountant had a weaker 
personal support network core, with a value of 10. However, he had a 
particular strength: three members of his family worked in middle 
positions (though in different capacities) at a nearby factory. Two 
of the three were dealing with stock control and book-keeping in the 
same area as himself. 
The Production Manager's position is particularly interesting since he 
had a very weak network with a score of only'7. His father was dead 
at the time he entered the factory and he had no brothers - that is, 
no first-rate bonds. He however had some unique contributions which 
helped him in taking up a share in the partnership, though not without 
a struggle. Initially he had difficulty in entering the factory. 
This is his story: 
"I was at the time in my late twenties, very poor indeed and we'd 
just had our fi rst chil d. I was studyi ng and about to compl ete 
my degree as a food production technician, but failed to find any 
adequate Job. The only openings in my area at that time were in 
the biscuit factory. Id already approached them and was told 
that there was no vacancy for me. 
"To my luck, I was at the time a member of the local football 
team - and rather an important member -I was the centre-forward. 
The coach was very sympathetic to my plight and said he would try 
to help. He took the occasion when the Mayor, himself an enthu- 
siastic football fan, came to a training session before an impor- 
tant match. When the Mayor asked, as a matter of courtesy, if he 
could be of any assistance to the team, my coach presented my 
probl em: 'How can X concentrate on his game when he's got so 
many worries and often he is not even fed properly? ' he asked 
him. 
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"The Mayor asked to see me and said: 'Is it true what I hear 
about you? ' and I replied: 'It is indeed, your honour. ' 'Al 1 
ri ght then, ' he sai d, 'I'l 1 grant you aIi cence f or a shop. ' He 
assumed that as with most Jews I wanted to do business, and a 
licence is worth money - not officially of course, but in prac- 
tice one could not get one unless it was paid for. I said: 
'Thank-you, your honour, but I am not a businessman - all I want 
is to practise my trade. ' 'And what trade is itV, inquired the 
Mayor. So I went on and told him about my studies and my wish to 
join the local factory and that I heard they have vacancies but 
that I'd already been refused. 'You mean you want to be regis- 
tered16 in the factory? ' asked the Mayor. It took me quite some 
time to convince him that I actually wanted to work there. 
"The Mayor then said: 'Leave this with me. 17 Tomorrow morni ng 
go to the factory and at 8.00 am precisely wait outside the 
General Manager's office. ' So I did. I was there on time - 
really quite some time before that, and I remember the Manager 
entering his room without even glancing at me, and then at 8 
o'clock the telephone rang and I overheard bits of the conversa- 
tion. The Manager's voice became softer and softer and he 
sounded more and more apologetic. At one particular instance he 
was saying that I was refused because they didn't want to offend 
me with a simple Job and all the managerial positions were filled 
up ... Shortly afterwards the Manager came out of his office 
and I was immediately accepted to work. " 
The P roduc ti on Ma nage r's e xcepti onal qua Iific ati on s- tech ni ca Ias 
well as social (he was the only Jewish footballer in the town's team) 
- meant that he had access to people and resources not usually ap- - 
proached by Jews. He was also renowned for his drinking capacity, so 
that for all these reasons he gradually came to adopt the role of the 
factory's 'foreign minister' in the words of a companion - it was he 
for instance who made contacts with officials which, traditionally, 
would involve hard feasting in local restaurants. 
During the sixties there was a drive by the authorities to install 
only professionally qualified people in senior positions. Thus, the 
Production Manager's genuine qualificationslS became an enhanced asset 
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- especially as his partners lacked adequate credentials, and this 
further added to his total social attributes and allowed him to com- 
pensate further for his weak network core. 
It is important to note, however, that while the core of a personal 
support network is based on familial bonds - its extension and indeed 
actualization - often depends upon the age-based peer group. The 
three partners were part of the same peer group, which helped to ease 
their personal relationships with each other. In addition, however, 
each of the three partners had some three to four close friends19 
(altogether ten friends) who formed part of their overall total social 
support network. In a very real sense, therefore, the factory manage- 
ment, as an entity, had its own social support network. 
Decision-making regarding illicit activities was highly informal. This 
was firstly because the three had a close relationship, secondly 
because the level of illicit produce was relatively modest and finally 
the production process was fairly continuous and both the sources of 
raw materials and the number of agents for the final product were few. 
Indeed in this factory illicit production did not require frequent 
decisions: it had become largely routine. 
Another reason f or 1 imi ted deci si on maki ng was because a degree of 
specialization existed between the partners. The Production Manager 
would deal with outside agencies, while the Stock Controller quite 
naturally took over the functions of stock balancer and book-keeper. 
The General Manager tended to deal with manpower and hence took re- 
sponsibility also for extra work and extra remunerations. But in no 
way were these specializations exclusive, and roles tended to overlap. 
Apart f rom the three partners, who shared prof i ts equal ly, the em- 
ployee most closely involved in running the illicit enterprise was a 
foreman on the production line. He was a Gentile and he of course 
brought to the enterprise his own personal support network. He also 
contributed muscle to the coalition. He not only looked ugly and 
could be extremely frightening but he also had a proven record of 
ability as an amateur boxer. Like the Production Manager, he too had 
climbed to his position by having the right qualities at the right 
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time and place. In a particular crisis (described in Chapter 8, 
Account VI), muscle and a frightening visage were thought to be neces- 
sary, and he had carried out the job as 'heavy' to perfection. Since 
then he had become closely associated with the factory's illicit 
activities. Though he did not have a share in the partnership, he was 
frequently remunerated 'to keep him happy', as my informants put it. 
5.2 The Factory as an Open System 
Figures 1 and 2 present the organizational layout of the biscuit 
factory showings its formal and illicit production processes. The 
striking overall impression is the overlap of both structures: the 
process of production, the organizational responsibilities and the 
inclusion of outside factors are largely identical. All parties 
involved in planning the factory's formal operations have a stake in 
its illegal activities. The person responsible for setting the prod- 
uction targets, the local government official who licenses the plant, 
the head of the enterprise who has administrative responsibility for 
the factory and last, but not least, the shop-floor workers are all 
involved in both aspects of the factory's production. 
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The only difference between the working of the factory's formal and 
informal structures are a number of additional bodies: the police 
force - who are always involved in illegal activites and expect to be 
bought off or else ... and the Komsomol - the Communist Youth 
Movement - which occupies an exceptional role in my case study. Fac- 
tories have usefully been seen as open social and economic systems set 
within an overall environment with which they engage in interactions 
(eg. Katz and Kahn, 1966). This simple conception applies Just the 
same to illicit factories engaged in the wider system of second 
economy relationships. 
As in any transaction there are at least two parties to a deal. Not 
only have the factory managements a vested interest in obtaining the 
co-operation of the agencies which govern their operations, but the 
latter are likely to have corresponding interests as well. Sometimes, 
as the saying goes, 'the calf wants to suck and the cow wants to 
suckle', which only suggests that certain enterprises with potential 
spin-offs are prone to pressure from their surrounding environments. 
All my informants who held managerial positions agreed that pressure 
to operate illegally is just as likely to come from outside the enter- 
prise as from within it. One manager explained: 
"You cannot afford to be innocent. Different people expect you 
to pay them and if you don't they'll either see you're removed 
from your job - that is, if you don't take their advice and 
resign - or they'll incriminate you. This last possibility isn't 
too difficult. Everyone makes a mistake from time to time, only 
in Georgia it's assumed that there are no genuine mistakes and 
any incident - anything at all - can be used as a pretext against 
you. You either pay or you are out of business. It's as simple 
as that. " 
This kind of duress may come from any of the three bodies which have 
some sort of control over a factory: the professional heads (the 
organizational superiors and planners), local government and the 
police force. All of them may expect remuneration, whether or not 
anything illegal occurs. 
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It is in this respect that the concept of an organization as an 'open 
system' gets a special meaning within th e Soviet Georgian economic 
context. In the same way that a formal organization is subect to 
transactions with its environment and to some - often considerable - 
extent is shaped by its demands, so too is the informal organization. 
(a) Head of Obyedineniya 
It can be affirmed as a general rule that any organization in a 
bureaucracy like the Soviet economic system is accountable to a higher 
authority. In each of my cases the direct dependencies varied from 
factory to factory. As with the biscuit factory, the professional 
directorate (who also set the production targets) sat in Tbilisi, the 
capital, and the head of Obyedineniya (Association of Enterprises), 
which incorporated some other local industries, appeared to have only 
administrative responsibility (the exact nature of which I do not 
know). However, he rarely intervened in the running of the factory 
and used to limit his contacts to twice annual visits. This does not 
imply that he was uninterested in the informal biscuit factory. On 
the contrary, he expected to be remunerated and indeed he was, con- 
siderably so: he used to get a share of the profits and was the 
highest regularly paid official on the biscuit factory's payroll. 
(b) Plan Quota Official at the State Ministry 
This is a most influential position, since its holder determines 
production targets. The position has no direct link to illicit pro- 
duce but it certai nly has a determi nant ef f ect on f ormal producti on 
and hence, indirectly, also on the informal production. 
When this official is lenient on the level of production targets, the 
factory can achieve two aims: first, to better the chances of com- 
pleting its designated tasks and secondly in having more control over 
its available resources - that is, more free staff time and an under- 
utilization of machinery, which both increase the discretion of the 
factory's management. 
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The importance of attaining the first aim: cutting-down production 
targets, cannot be over-estimated. It is not only because of the 
obvious spin-offs for illicit produce, but also for the smooth running 
of the formal organization. It is in this that one can see, perhaps, 
the clearest interdependency between the formal and informal economies 
as this applies at factory level. 
(c) The Municipality 
The local government in the Soviet system usually has no direct power 
over a factory. Nevertheless, because of their elevated positions, 
high-ranking officials do have a say even over organizations not 
within their jurisdiction. After all, they are closely connected with 
the Party20 and through them with the police. They know the regional 
officers as well as other important figures like the -local prosecutor 
and judges. All are linked by being senior Party members. It is 
because of this that Mayors* and Deputy-Majors2l are in a position, 
literally, to choose their protectees. An informant, who used to be a 
chauffeur to a small town's mayor - and therefore occupied the classi- 
cal 'gatekeeper' position - knew a good deal of what was going on 
unofficially. He told me: 
"The Mayor woul d not take money f rom anyone. He coul dn't do it 
for two reasons: First, it was too dangerous - everyone knew him 
and everyone watched his movements; even to buy some unlicenced 
i mported cl othes f or hi swife and chi I dren he had to have a go- 
between. Secondly, his honour demanded that he wouldn't take 
unselectively. After all, he couldn't be committed to anyone. 
So he used regul arly to take hard cash only f rom f our peopi ein 
the town: the top men in the two largest factories (each employ- 
ing a few thousand employees), the head of the largest regional 
Kolkhoz (who needs the local municipality's permit to market 
unsolicited goods) and the head of the local commerce department. 
This is not to imply that he would refuse occasional gifts from 
other sources. " 
* Chairmen of the Executive Committee in Soviet Terminology. 
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(d) The Police 
While it is advisable to get the consent of the parties discussed so 
far, prior to launching any illicit venture, it will be practically 
impossible to proceed and market the illegal goods without being 
assured of backing from the local police. The trouble-shooting func- 
tion of the police force lies in three main areas: 
in controlling the roads; they can literally block distribution, 
since any delivery must be accompanied by detailed papers 
(Faktura), discussed earlier. Any irregularity over a Faktura 
can easily be presented as a criminal economic offence. 
in fighting corruption, especially via the 'economic police' - 
OBOSS, whose locally responsible officer will be affiliated to 
at least a regional police headquarters. It is the task of the 
OBOSS to be aware of what. is 'real ly' goi ng on In thei r di s- 
trict, and job holders are remunerated accordingly. 
in dealing with citizen complaints. Anyone can approach any 
police station and issue a complaint which, if registered, has to 
be dealt with. While most complaints are against goods bought in 
shops, once such an Investigation starts it can easily extend and 
perhaps incriminate the goods manufacturer. 
The police force are the major recipients of 'salaries', both in the 
number of people involved and in the sums of money paid. Even the 
typical small factory list would be likely to consist of the area 
police, the OBOSS officer, and possibly someone on the road patrol 
f orce. 
In the case of the biscuit factory, which was an important employer in 
the town, there were usually four on the regular pay list: the head 
of the town's police force, his deputy, an OBOSS official and his 
ai d. 
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(e) The Komsomol 
The Communist Youth are the champions of Soviet ideology- they are 
indoctrinated from early adolescence and those who prove dedicated to 
the cause will eventually rise to Party membership. 
In the meantime, they cultivate the right and uproot the wrong. One 
of the wrongs they are often concerned with is the flourishing second 
economy. 
It was found, in several accounts, that the Communist Youth are often 
used by the police or similar functionaries as bait to help incrimi- 
nate illicit enterprises, probably because youngsters are less suspi- 
cious than adults and perhaps also because they are an available and 
motivated corps (see Account II, Chapter 8, Crisis Events). 
As members of the Komsomol are good at detecting illegality, they may 
be just as good at making a profit out of it. This is what happened 
in the case of the biscuit factory: 
"One day the person in charge of the local Komsomol comes into my 
office and introduces himself. He tells me that one of his 
scouts bought a box of chocolate biscuits and found they were 
lacking in weight. He then contacted the local bureau of com- 
merce and got their clearance to come and inquire at the factory. 
"I explained to him how this sort of thing may happen. Firstly, 
the standard allows for some variation in weight, secondly it may 
be due to machine error. The important thing, however, is that 
the average of a production line will come out right. And that 
was the absolute truth. 22 
"He thanked me f or my expl anati on but the f ol 1 owi ng day he re- 
turned with three officials from the local government. They 
asked me to expl ai n to them the f ai I ure in wei ght and so I di d. 
Only this time with some anger and impatience, pointing out that 
this person is wasting my time and that he already was explained 
to once. I said that I considerd it an insult to be approached 
in such a manner. They accepted my replies and apologized. 
Before they left, I called the Komsomol chief to a corner and 
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said to him- 'I wonder about you. You really should have done 
better' I sneered at him. 'You really thought you could stop the 
factory? Do you realize how many people's income is dependent on 
this factory? It you wanted a little share, you should have said 
so - but now, what have you got? you got nothing. ' 
"However, this was not the end of the story. Some two weeks 
later, the gatekeeper called me and said the Komsomol chief is at 
the gate. I went out to him and he said: 'I was passing by and 
just thought perhaps I can get some fresh cookies to take home 
"So I went to the stockroom and prepared him a nice parcel with a 
lot of goodies, including a nice portion of butter and gave it to 
him. 'Take this today and come again next month andyou'll get 
some money. ' And so he did. Regul arly. " 
The Gatekeeper 
The gatekeeper is a special breed of functionary. Officially he is 
not employed by the factory and is therefore an outside agent. He is 
in principle like the other outsiders who can affect the factory's 
working. The distinctive characteristic of this role lies in its lack 
of power. Nevertheless a gatekeeper can be potentially powerful (or 
potentially dangerous) to whoever wishes to pass through the gates 
unnoticed. 
The gatekeeper is a civilian who is appointed, and in the employ of 
the police. His duties include monitoring the movement in and out of 
the factory during the working day, and after working hours to secure 
the building and equipment from break-ins. This is a round the clock 
job, normally occupied by two or more (usually by three) persons 
working in shifts. It is interesting to note that in the last ten 
years of the illicit biscuit factory only one of these positions 
passed to another - which indicates how much careful consideration is 
given to choosing the right person. Thus, one of the gatekeeper's 
wives was a production line employee in the factory - in this way he 
had a high vested interest and hence a strong commitment to his un- 
official employers. 
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5.3 Size and Informal Structure 
Having obtained systematic evidence from only three production units, 
it is hard to draw firm generalized principles about the informal 
structure of an illicit enterprise. My data however suggests that the 
biscuit factory, being a medium-sized enterprise, involves the maximum 
spread of regularly paid officials. This, it would appear, is because 
the biscuit factory was not big enough, and therefore, not powerful 
enough to operate without adequate external protection, while on the 
other hand it was not small. enough to escape the attention of rela- 
tively low-level external functionaries, able to be useful on the one 
hand or difficult on the other. In other words, the biscuit factory 
was an ideal target for external exploitation. Both internal partners 
and external officials could both gain considerably - yet no party 
could gain excessively. Each internal partner's net gain of approxi- 
mately 1,000 Rubles a month equalled the factory's total expenditure 
on bribery. So that of the total illicit earnings of 4,000 Rubles a 
month, 25% was necessarily expended as bribes. Any excess of this 
would not be worth paying in view of the limited overall size of the 
takings and the payment of less would involve excessive risk. 
On the other hand things were different in the textile factory case. 
According to several sources, the general manager "held the town in 
his fist and was afraid of nobody. " Having a thousand man enterprise 
and being one of three major employers in the town he held consider- 
able formal power in aspects of the town's affairs that extended well 
beyond the limits of the factory. "He would actually nominate the 
mayor" explained one source. Friedgut (1974) has the following to say 
on Kutaisi's Truck Factory Director - Georgia's second largest and 
that city's biggest employer: "Ne) is perhaps the city's foremost 
el i te personal i ty, f or he is connected wi th everybody of any i mpor- 
tance locally, and many nationally. He is a member of the executive 
committee of the Soviet and of the gorkcom, 23 a deputy to the supreme 
Soviet of Georgia and a candidate member of the Central Committee of 
the Communist Party of Georgia, and has served as a delegate to the 
Georgian Party Congress and the 24th Congress of the CPSU. The 
breadth of his activity overshadows even that of the city's first 
secretary" (p. 270). 
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Such a person would not be expected to pay the wide range of local 
salaries to lower level officials (see following) - to the lower 
levels of the police force for instance, or the Komsomol chief who are 
too socially distant from so important a figure. He - and hence his 
enterprise are too powerful to come under such local pressures. None- 
theless illicit salaries do have to be paid but they are paid to fewer 
but higher level officials - and each receives a greater amount than 
in the case of the biscuit factory. Thus, for instance, while the 
Mayor of the biscuit factory district would receive only occasional 
presents, the Mayor of the textile factory was on the regular 'pay- 
roll'. Though we lack the richness of detail that is available for 
the biscuit factory, I do know that overall bribery payments though 
considerably high-eirin absolute terms - were much less than the 25% of 
overall payments paid out by the biscuit factory's management. 
The management of an enterprise of this calibre is therefore, in a 
position to gain considerably by illicit operations. By all accounts 
the textile factory management were known to be very rich: "he was 
the King of the Town" it was said of the General Manager. It would 
appear that the textile factory's operations permitted a greater share 
of illicit profits to be retained and though this had to be distrib- 
uted to a greater number of partners it nonetheless offered them high 
level of disposable income. 
The 11 ght metal f actory was too smal I and too i nsi gni fi cant to be 
bothered by even local level authorities. Its illicit scope of activ- 
ities was both limited and sporadic. Most work was solicited by close 
friends and family members and the secrecy of the operations was 
considered paramount. There was therefore no need for permanent 
figures on the 'payroll' and definitely no prominent ones. After five 
years of operation'the workshop changed ownership, and it is signifi- 
cant that the replaced central figure took up a position as a van 
driver: he realized that previously he had aimed too high (see 
Chapters 8 and 9 in this respect). When operating in the second 
economy small is not too beautiful. 
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An increase in the scale of illicit operations would appear to bring 
in diseconomies as numerous local level officials necessarily become 
i nvol ved. When the level of illicit products transcends this locally 
set limitation, the illicit factory appears able to enjoy the benefits 
of scale by buying its protection at a higher absolute price but at a 
lower unit cost. 
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6. THE RULES IN BRIBERY 
So far it has been seen that for a factory He. the biscuit factory) 
to operate illicitly, or to take an extremist view, for it to operate 
24 at all, different office holders have to be remunerated. It is the 
purpose of this section to discuss the various 'rules' that shape 
these remunerations. 
There are four sets of questions to be answered: 
- What is exchanged? 
- What does the factory gain that necessitates a reward? 
- What is the form of payment? 
- What is known about the flow of the payment? When and how is it 
pai d? 
- What is the price and how is it fixed? 
6.1 What is Exchanged 
In this particular case we have considered the roles of four parties 
external to the factory who each have a say in its illicit operations. 
These are the PLAN quota official, the local government, the local 
police and the Komsomol. The first two, including the head of the 
factory group to which the factory management is formally accountable, 
have a say in the formal running of the factory. They in effect 
license the operators to do their job (this includes professional and 
administrative supervision). In a similar way, they assist in the 
informal running of the factory - the PLAN official by reducing the 
production targets or allowing extra waste; the head of Obyedineniya, 
by authorizing the personnel, the Mayor and local government officials 
by 'turning a blind eye' to the movement of goods to shops. In a real 
sense they therefore 'licence' the factory's informal operations and 
therefore I call the payments for these services Licensing Fees. 
On the other hand, the police (and Komsomol) have no connection with 
the formal enterprise. Their job lies in the prevention and detection 
of crime, and their services are required for two purposes: 
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To ensure that they do not inquire into the affairs of the enter- 
prise and do not detect any deviations from regulations 
In case of detection, either by their own people or by others 
outside the organizations (eg. customers' complaints) - to func- 
tion as official defences against incrimination. 
This is why they are paid and I term their receipts Hush Money. 
6.2 Forms of Payment 
It might be useful to differentiate between a strictly cash payment 
and other rewards. The latter will usually be a gift, which has a 
monetary value, but which is also embedded in Georgian culture. Thus, 
after a first meeting, it is customary to give a departing guest a 
present, which symbolizes two things: 
(a) that the person is respected and honoured 
(b) that the first meeting is hoped to be an opening for good 
relations and similar occasions in the future: 'untying the 
foot, 25 is the Georgian expression. 
To clarify the point consider the following incident which occurred 
during my field-study. The head of the town's shop licensing depart- 
ment told me: 
"I entered a grocery which had recently been taken over by two 
new Georgian owners: they applied for a license and, as a matter 
of routine, I came to have a look at the applicants and the 
premises. While browsing through the shelves, I carefully ob- 
served the scotchs on display, being a lover of Whisky, and the 
two partners noticed this. I was then asked if I drank Whisky 
and I confirmed that I did. We went on discussing and comparing 
different brands and the next thing was that on leaving, two 
bottles were placed in my car .. ." 
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In all of the three factories this kind of gift giving was normal 
practice. Whenever important officials came to a factory, they would 
normally be invited to a nearby restaurant where behind closed doors 
("it is no good to be seen in public") a short feast would take place, 
led by the factory's 'foreign minister' - the one most socially skil- 
led who could thereby make maximum use of his relevant skills. And 
finally on their departure they would leave with a nice package of the 
factory's produce offered with the best regards of the management. 
The Mayor and his deputy who had no direct hand in the biscuit fac- 
tory, were still considered influential enough to be offered periodic 
feasts and were approached in a similar manner. 
"The Mayor would not normally take bribes from factories like 
ours. He would do so only if there was a special reason, like a 
crisis which required protection from prosecution. But they 
would love to receive a nice cake, especially prepared for them, 
on celebrative occasions, so that they could show it around. " 
The biscuit factory's shop-floor workers, for very different reasons 
would also, normally, receive a non-cash reward of extra produce. 
"We didn't want to give them cash, because this is clearly an 
offence and why bother? ... Today we are friends - tomorrow 
perhaps you go to the police and complain. So we preferred to 
give them gifts, like: sugar, flour, butter or eggs - this is 
not too committing yet these are a real perk. They were perhaps 
not extremely happy with what they got, but they would make their 
calculations and see that they were still better off than most of 
their colleagues in other plants. " 
It should be noted that the 'payment' and consequently involvement of 
shop-floor workers in the racket is not usually necessary. Especially 
where the primary fiddle includes cheating on the quality or quantity, 
the shop-floor workers would have no idea of what the real quality or 
quantity should be. Although the biscuit factory employed a different 
method for obtaining raw materials, its employees did not necessarily 
know what was going on because the proportion of extra produce was 
rather modest. Their share in profits was therefore an extra safe- 
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guard, characteristic of the way the biscuit factory handled its 
ill icit operation. 
6.3 The Pay: How it is Fixed - When, Where and How it is Paid 
As might be expected, the answers to the above questions are largely 
contingent, according to different criteria. The case of the biscuit 
factory is elaborated in Table 2. 
'Salaries' 
One fact which comes through very clearly in Table 2 is the quite 
formidable rate of pay in excess of their official salary, for each 
person involved. Of course, for some this would be only part of their 
'total rewards' (Mars, 1982). The term 'salary' is the common jargon 
for these kinds of monthly payments and it is one of the character- 
istics of the producer in the Soviet economic system which differen- 
tiates him from the retailer. 
In an economy of scarcity power lies with the producer. He can sell 
virtually anthing he produces. His only worry is that he might not be 
able to produce enough. By paying regular salaries the manufacturer 
therefore aims to ensure regular production. The storekeeper on the 
other hand pays out only ad hoc bribes since the nature of his 
throughput is in its turn ad hoc. 
One benefit of the factory management's determined pressure for a 
continuous commitment is that it encourages a series of continuous 
ties which - when times are hard - allow an inbuilt flexibility. Both 
sides may benefit from such flexibilities in that credit may be 
extended - sometimes for several months to a regular customer. 
It is known from retailers (whose businesses tend to fluctuate more 
than manufacturers) that long range credits have tended to take flex- 
ible account of seasonal variations. 
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Powers, as already discussed, may be either obstructive; preventing 
access to illicit business (the 'licensing' agencies) or reactive; 
exercising punitive powers for breaking the law (the policing bodies). 
The factory partners recognised that control over both types was 
crucial to the smooth running of a manufacturing enterprise. But this 
did not mean that both kinds of power-holders were treated in the same 
manner. 
The PLAN officials, for instance, were approached with much care. Not 
only had they exclusive powers over formal production demands, but in 
addition they were also remote. The annual pilgrimage to Tbilisi was 
always a worrying event, involving considerable uncertainty about its 
outcome (except, of course for the fee). The other parties, who were 
local, were much more predictable and also more subject to pressure. 
In a sense, all local bodies - the municipality, the police and the 
Komsomol shared similar interests: "they shared from the same plate", 
was an expression often used to describe their mutual interests. 
Because the biscuit factory's management was embedded in a whole 
series of local bribery payments, the factory's continued wellbeing 
was of permanent concern to a wide range of local interests. It was 
to this fact that the Komsomol chief was referred when trying to 
blackmail its management. "Do you realize how many people's living is 
dependent on this factory? " This very fact gave the enterprise a kind 
of security - local interests worked as a stabilizer, thus allaying 
any fears the management might have had about a steady flow of pro- 
duce. 
Power is strongly associated with the illicit pay it can attract and 
hence the employees were in a poor bargaining position. Their only 
power lay in trying to inform on the factory management. This would 
give them little more than the pleasure of revenge and definitely the 
sack. However, one should not underestimate the dangers, especially 
within the context of an 'honour and shame' society. To be a man 
implies that one might well feel bound to challenge another even 
without hope of winning if one's honour is felt to be at stake. (See 
Accounts III and IV in Chapter 8 regarding this matter - also, Chapter 
4, paragraph 6 on Risk-Taking). 
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The biscuit factory was therefore most anxious to keep its staff 
happy. As one informant put it: "They were perhaps not extremely 
happy with what they got, but they would make their calculations and 
see that they are sti 11 better of f than most of thei r col 1 eagues in 
other pl ants. " 
(C) Risks 
Risks are expected to be paid for but are independent of the state of 
one's powers. The most clear example, in our case, is that of the 
gatekeeper who took considerable risks. If a factory is subject to an 
investigation with the intention of incriminating its management, the 
gatekeepers are unlikely to escape with impunity. It is their task to 
prevent all thefts and in monitoring the movement of goods they are 
easily implicated by their handling of log books. 
From a recipient's view the best position to be in is one receiving 
high bribes and involving no risks. A good example is that of the 
Komsomol chief who ordered his troops on voluntary missions to cast 
out the evils of society thus enabling him to choose his prey from a 
secure position. Provided he was not too greedy (which would turn 
potential clients and their local patrons against him) and provided he 
did not blackmail all exposed cases (he could then show results to his 
superiors) he was able to secure a good bargaining position. 
6.4 Powers, Risks and Pay 
The relation of Powers and Risks to the rate of pay they can attract 
as evidenced in the biscuit factory are presented in Figure 3. 
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Figure 3: The Biscuit Factory's Payees, their Associated Powers and 
Risks - as related to the Average Pay this Position Attract- 
ed over 10 Years 















PH = Police Head 
PV = Police Vice 
PO = Police OBKhSS 
p= Police Officer 
PL = PLAN Official 
0= Head of OBYEDINENIYA 
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Very Low Low Medium High Very High 
As it shows, both Powers and Risks appear independent of each other. 
Generally the higher of the two dictates the rate of pay. Thus, the 
Komsomol chief seems to have very low risks in covering up for the 
biscuit factory but has considerable powers. His pay is then dictated 
by his powers. On the other hand, gatekeepers are low in power but 
bear quite considerable risks - hence their level of risks will set 
their rate of pay. This tends to be a rule that applies across a 
variety of corrupt occupations with the notable exception of the 
Mayor. The Mayor (and his deputy) are very powerful, yet do not 
receive cash. I believe this is so for several reasons: 
(a) They have no direct link with the factory. 
They can choose to take money from a wide range of enterprises 
and since the taking of bribes involves a two-way relationship 
these very seni or of fi ci al s tend to be sel ecti ve. (See f urther 
in Chapter 7 on The Store). 
(c) It could well be that the Mayor and his deputy, by virtue of 
their positions, do not need cash. Their rewards are the ben- 
efits of privileged access to scare resources that are outside 
the cash nexus. Their real rewards appear to lie in getting the 
extra personal services and recognitions which money cannot buy. 
Having a unique shaped cake in a public celebration is more 
beneficial than a handful of Rubles in an economy where currency 
can buy little for the better-off citizens. 
The extrapol ati ons of Fi gure 3 suggest that at the 1 ower end, posi - 
tions which are very low in both power and risk are in the unfortunate 
state of 'have nots'. They are unable to earn any extra rewards - 
that is if they choose to work in the manufacturing industries. The 
shop-floor workers of the biscuit factory were lucky in having some 
power as they could in principle, identify the fiddles (as the manag- 
ers feared). But if the main system of cheating had been different - 
namely cheating on the quality or quantity - they would tend to have 
been rewarded only with their official pay (as was the case with the 
textile factory). On the other hand, when either powers or risks 
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become high - as when a crisis occurs and immediate action is neces- 
sary even a small-scale position can momentarily offer enormous 
rewards (see in particular Account III in Chapter 8 for a detailed 
presentati on) . 
6.5 Personal Bargaining 
A final factor affecting pay must now be considered - personal bar- 
gaining power. While looking at Table 2 and Figure 3, some close 
association between a postion's power and the pay it attracts, can be 
established; this does not necessarily maintain a direct correlation. 
As one informant put it: "There are small ones who are real bastards, 
who blackmail you and insist on getting more than they deserve; while 
there are big ones who are more lenient than expected from their 
position. " 
This is not reflected in Table 2 or Figure 3 as these give the average 
fi gure of pay over a peri od of ten years, but I understand f rom both 
the biscuit factory an d other sources that personal variance was 
paramount. 
In one example from the history of the biscuit factory, the OBOSS 
police official refused any 'salary'. This was not because he dis- 
liked bribery, but because he was scared. The biscuit factory part- 
ners, who were so cautious in their ways, felt very disturbed that 
this key figure could not be corrupted and their concern was shared by 
other recipients. Finally, a way was found to pay the OBOSS man 
through the area police officer. Thus a modus vivendi was established 
with both parties reasonably satisfied: the partners got a binding 
commitment and the OBKhSS did not receive a direct bribe. 
On another occasion one of the factory gatekeepers 'tried to be too 
smart' and insisted on receiving extra payments for each illicit 
transaction in addition to his monthly 'salary'. He had ultimately to 
be ousted from the Job, as his greediness was not only out of all 
proportion to the usual rate of pay but was inappropriate as a method 
of pay in production. Ad hoc payments as opposed to salaries are the 
appropriate means of bribery at the retail level (see Chapter 7, The 
Store). Because factory production work is a regular activity, ad hoc 
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payments are not appropriate. 'Salaries' ensure the long-term commit- 
ment of recipients which is essential for the continuous flow of 
production. 
Bearing in mind individual differences, prices seem to have remained 
stable over the years (due to minimal inflation in the 60's and early 
70's) and from place to place. Since interests were looked at as 
long-range commitments, the important factor for a recipient was to be 
on the payroll, while from the payer's position the importance lay in 
ensuring protection. The security of continuous mutual benefits sta- 
bilized the pay rate. Where bargaining is rigorous as in crisis 
events, especially when there are no established relations and no 




1. 'Pulling Strings'. 
2. It is no coincidence that the three partners were all of the same 
age-group, since they were not only partners but good friends as 
well. This contingency between age and business relations is 
reflected in previous discussions of Georgian core values and of 
the role of the feast in Georgian social life. Age-based peer 
groups are the basis of Georgia's social (and therefore also 
occupational) structures. 
3. Alternatives A and B correspond partly to what Berliner (1957, 
Chapte r 10) 1 abe 1s 'f aIsifi cati on of rep orti ng'. The crucial 
difference, however is in the fact that the means serve very 
different ends. While Berliner's informants aimed at facilita- 
ting the fulfilment of their Plan targets, my informants aimed at 
achieving extra capacity for surplus production. 
4. The picture is more complicated. There are in addition other 
sound structural reasons which also dictated the choice of the 
biscuit factory. They will be highlighted later on when I ex- 
plain the structure of the factory. 
5. Many products have several (usually 2 or 3) types of quality, 
which are taken advantage of by producers as well as retailers. 
For a fuller account see Chapter 7 on The Store. 
6. Levi denotes 'left' -A Russian nickname for informal activity as 
opposed to 'right', the formal economic activity. 
The rate varies in different industries between 10-20% cheaper 
than the official price. 
8. One of the maj or worri es of a retai 1 er when sel Ii ng at ahi gher 
than permitted price, is that he is vulnerable to citizen com- 
plaints, police raids or even blackmail (see Chapter 7). 
9. There are three types of control (all of which involve stock 
checks). There is first the routine audits which occur on ex- 
pected dates; second there are irregular checks instigated by 
local sources which are usually known about in advance and final- 
ly, and most feared of all, there are unscheduled swoops which 
are planned from outside the locality. 
10. As it is almost universal practice in the Soviet Union, the 
biscuit factory was no exception in doctoring its accounts. The 
only difference being that it also had to account for the move- 
ment of illicit goods. 
11. The very opposite of the well-known Soviet phenomenon of 
'storming' - the tendency of plants to lag behind schedule at the 
beginning of a period - then speed up production when approaching 
the end of the designated Plan. 
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12. See Account II in Chapter 8. 
13. It is no coincidence that most reports on road patrols are from 
shopkeepers rather than producers. The economic reality in the 
Soviet Union dictates that shopkeepers chase for goods, and hence 
will, frequently, take responsibility for deliveries. It is 
retailers, therefore, who are usually confronted by road patrols. 
However, if detected and prosecuted, the blame does not escape 
the suppl ier. Therefore any illegal manufacturer gives careful 
consideration to destination of his goods and attempts to supply 
adequate road protection. 
14. The old Ruble was revalued by one-tenth in January 1961, but 
people were still expressing values in old Rubles even during the 
70's. 
15. For the method of calculating the value of network cores see 
Chapters 5 and 9. 
16. It is common practice for indiv. iduals like footballers to gain 
extra income by being registered officially as a worker and 
thereby obtaining income without really doing any work. Teams 
frequently bid competitively for particularly desirable players 
in th is way. (Thi s wi 11 be f urther el aborated and di scus sed in 
Chapter 9 in the section on 'The Second Economy and Everyday 
Life'). 
17. One should realize that the powers of a Soviet Mayor are far- 
reaching. In a sense he is the head of his community in a wide 
range of aspects and he bears responsibility for the economic 
operations within his region (see for instance: Friedgut, 1974; 
Hough, 1969). He is referred to - in Russian - as 'Master of the City' (Khozain Goroda). 
18. The formal requirement for qualifications created a thriving 
market in false documents for 'fixers' to facilitate entrance to 
institutions of higher education (see Chapter 9- the section on 'The Second Economy and Everyday Life'). 
19. Close friends at the level of Megobarebi (see Chapters 4 and 5). 
20. The 'elected representatives of the people' (the official name) 
are really 'selected representatives of the Party' as Zemtsov (1980) suggests. 
21. "Why give money to the deputies - the deputy Mayor, the deputy Head of Police? " I once asked. "Wouldn't it be sufficient to 
give only to the head of the hierarchy? " "And what am I supposed to do when the head is on vaction? " came the decisive answer, "Perhaps close my business?! " 
22. Indeed it was. As we have seen, the biscuit factory did not 
cheat on the quantity. 
23. The Party's Town Committee. 
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24. Since expectations exist for rewards, whether or not the enter- 
prise functions informally. As one of the biscuit factory man- 
agers put it: "You cannot afford to be innocent ... you either pay or you are out of business. It's as simple as that. " (Para- 
graph 5.2 in this Chapter). 
25. The person's foot is considered 'tied', that is - prohibited to 
enter one's place until invited in, which symbolically unties it. 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
1.1 Characteristics and Problems of Retail Trade in the Soviet 
Economic System 
Since the Second World War (Goldman, 1965; Skurski, 1972) and particu- 
larly during the Brezhnev era (Shapiro, 1978) the Soviet consumer 
became increasingly choosy and critical in his appetite for sophisti- 
cated, good quality consumer goods. (What Goldman, 1963 has called 
the 'second development stage of marketing'). 
Yet, despite significant attempts to take greater account of consumer 
demands (Greer, 1973; Robin, 1978) the Soviet economic system is not 
geared to easily adapt to a 'consumer market'. There are several 
reasons for this: 
Soviet planning has traditionally placed emphasis on production 
rather than consumption. What Wiles (1962) has called 'the 
producer's primacy-'. It is of course a very different process 
from that of the West. 
Whereas in the West there is an immediate feedback from the 
consumer to the producer, whose interest is directly affected as 
to whether the goods he has made are cleared or not - the Soviet 
way is very different. A direct effect of consumers on producers 
- and certainly on planners - is absent. Neither are accountable 
to the consumers who purchase the goods. And the latter can 
neither directly nor immediately influence decisions made on 
their behalf in a centralized command economy. This is bound to 
slow down any changes in planning or production. 
Putting aside the relations between consumers and planners/ 
producers, a multi-level bureaucracy is bound to make mistakes 
when catering for consumers, as Goldman (1963) points out. Each 
level may only slightly deviate from the initial intention but 
the accumulated effect of a multiplicity of levels can be highly 
distorting. And this does not take into account problems of 
incorrect reporting, a common artifact at the producer's level 
(Nove, 1977; Berliner, 1959). It is a combination of these that 
brings about the often noted misalignment of the needs of consum- 
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ers on the one hand and concerns of planners and producers on the 
other. 
Distortion apart, a multi-level bureaucracy necessarily implies 
that feedback will take a long time to reach the different lev- 
els, influence decisions and allow for innovative changes to take 
pl ace. 1 
In such a system, which has also a bias to a 'scientific' ap- 
proach to planning, the neglect of design which is not quantifi- 
able, particularly affects consumer goods. And in a display 
conscious culture like Georgia, design becomes a principal deter- 
minant of consumer preference. 
This neglect of design in the concerns of central planning is 
further compounded by the distance directives travel from the 
centre to the provinces, which makes it even more difficult to 
cater for local tastes. The reforms of the 1960's allowed for 
increasing local autonomy in consumer decision making: Greer 
(1973) indicates that each republic has its own fashion design- 
ers. But this is only a relative amelioration. 
While in the large-scale mass-production of producer goods a 
centrally controlled economy can be efficient, it is not easily 
geared to cater for individual variants which also implies neces- 
sarily small scale produce. Again, in Georgia, where individual- 
ism is highly valued, personalized consumption is high: there is 
much emphasis on personal services - that is: having one's 
regular barber, tailor, hatter. 
Given the above restraints in catering for consumer needs, it is not 
surprising that we should find a fertile ground for the development of 
illicit production and distribution. This can be more successfully 
geared to accommodate local taste, adapt to the rapid changes of 
fashions and respond to reqdirements for design and personal style. 
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With the removal of the planner's influence on production, as it 
occurs in Soviet Georgia's second economy, we find two factors permit- 
ting an increased influence of consumer choice. Firstly, that produc- 
ers having a greater degree of local involvement can more readily 
cater to specific designs; and secondly, the storekeeper for his part 
is able to influence production by reflecting his customers' demands. 
In this way consumers preferences as these are mediated through the 
stores can influence production. While stores acquire a new standing 
in the (second) economy - closer to the position of their counterparts 
in Western economies. 
1 .2 The Four Stores 
This chapter is based mainly on data collected from four stores which 
operated in Georgia during the 1960's and early 1970's. In some 
instances other shopkeepers were questioned. 
Just as in the case of the factories, information was cross-checked 
for reliability and validity (see Chapter 2 on Methodology). This 
material was supplemented by many other informants -a diverse cross- 
section of the community: eg. manufacturers, distributors, artisans, 
peddlers, drivers, railway workers, and of course the consumers them- 
selves. 
In order not to break confidences entrusted to me and to ensure ano- 
nymity - names, intimate details and exact places have been omitted. 
Nevertheless, in all other respects the information is accurate. 
The four stores were selected for the following reasons: 
(a) Geographical location - The stores operated in three different 
areas of Georgia, the East, the West and the South-West. 
(b) Town vs. country - One was based in a village, another was situ- 
ated in a busy market town, and the other two were in rural 
towns. 
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(C) Size - one was a general store with 25 employees and a turnover 
of 250,000 Rubles a month. Two stores had four employees each and 
an approximate turnover of 100,000 Rubles apiece. The fourth 
business was a one-man market stall (for which I have no details 
of turnover). 
The four stores were vastly different in the way they organized their 
illegal activities and I will elaborate upon this later. 
All stores sold consumer goods. The general store comprised the 
following departments: trikotaih (cotton lingerie), soft furnishings 
(fabrics sold by the measure), men and womens clothes, childrens 
clothes, shoes (including stockings), perfumery, fancy goods, house- 
hold appliances, electrical appliances, construction materials and 
agricultural tools (this being a village store). Surprisingly enough 
it did not sell foodstuffs. I inquired why this was. "I had to fight 
for that" was the reply "I made it clear from the start that I 
wouldn't have any food in my store. " Another shopkeeper remarked "I 
would rather lose the shop than cater for food. " As a matter of fact 
none of the four shops dealt in foodstuffs. There were three valid 
reasons for refusing to have anything to do with food. 
(a) The prospects for illegal earnings are limited - "How much can 
you over-charge for a loaf of bread? " was one comment. However, 
it might be quite another story in Georgia today now that food 
shortages are more common. My informant hailed from rural 
Georgia, where food was abundant due to the numerous thriving 
freehold plots (which produce about half of theAm out- 
put). 2 The very poor derived additional income from home made 
baking (Papashvily, 1973), and self-produced wine and spirits 
were the pride of every household. 
(b) Dealing in foodstuffs is less prestigious than other merchandise 
"You get messed up ... it's dirty work" explained one retailer. 
(It is worth mentioning that in the 1960's most of the foods in 
rural Georgia were unpacked and distributed in bulk). 
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(C) Unless one caters for expensive tastes the chances of social 
spin-offs are virtually nil. "On the weekday, I would return 
from the allocation centre - my friends knew they would have 
first choice. They would come to my shop in the evening and 
pick-up the best. " Thus the clothing retailer was not only able 
to make profits by selling to close (and therefore trusted) 
friends, but also benefited from being an 'influential' man who 
could supply scarce commodities and demonstrate his worthiness to 
the members of his personal support network. 
The three other stores dealt mainly in clothes - these being the most 
desirable commodity to handle (see Section 6 in this chapter for a 
fuller explanation). 
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2. THE FIVE SINS OF A STOREKEEPER 
X was the first person I decided to approach about his black market 
activities. He was a shopkeeper and I broached the subject warily: 
"I've heard that sometimes there are strange goings-on (Kombinatsia)3 
in Georgian shops. Have you ever come across any? " He seemed to find 
my cautious and uncertain approach amusing. He smiled and replied: 
"Sometimes! If you take the law and regulations by the word then you 
start breaking them the minute you open your door in the morning. Not 
to mention communist morals .. ." (the narrator was a Communist Party 
candidate) as a storekeeper I was a true sinner. " 
During my investigation into the affairs of Georgia's second economy I 
became familiar with five indictable 'sins' each of which is liable to 
grave consequences (if caught and sentenced). They can be divided 
into two categories: 'sins' against the State and 'sins' against the 
customer. 
2.1 How the System Should Work 
Before delving into muddy waters, a word about how the system operates 
formally. Officially goods should be purchased through legal chan- 
nels, usually an Allocation Centre (which will be discussed in the 
next section) although in certain circumstances, eg. where the alloca- 
tion centre is very remote and a major plant is considerably closer, 
direct access to the manufacturer is allowed. 
A store would have a scheme (Plan) which states required annual gross 
income and monitors monthly accounts. The overall monthly balance is 
sub-divided into various categories, in order that departmental per- 
formance can be assessed. A Plan would usually be flexible enough to 
allow for seasonal variations or any other changes. However, the 
scheme operated on two false assumptions: it assumed that goods were 
bought and sold at the correct retail price and that the store only 
catered for a particular area. 
In actual f act, only some of the goods were bought and sol d at of fi- 
cial prices. And a shop's clientele largely depended on its reputa- 
tion for stocking a good flow of quality goods. Although the village 
store was supposedly catering solely for the village community and the 
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near vicinity, it became well-known and attracted custom from a much 
wider area than the planners anticipatedL "It was common knowledge 
that anything you want, you first try us. It was said that one could 
even get bird's milk in my store. " The store manager was proud of his 
reputation for meeting practically any of his customers' requirements. 
2.2 Defrauding the State 
(a) The First Sin - Trading with Unlicensed Goods 
A store is licensed to trade only in certain items which are clearly 
def i ned. In, order to incorporate some private enterprise, the shop- 
keeper introduces goods for which he does not have a licence. See the 
case of the market stallholder described in detail in Account II, 
Chapter 8. He was licensed to trade in only thirty-four items but had 
two hundred and forty in stock when his stall was raided. Not only 
were these goods unlicensed and therefore acquired illegally but some 
had also been unofficially manufactured. 
It is a common practice for clothing manufacturers to design garments 
that imitate foreign designs specifically for the private market (at 
the time Western jeans were being widely manufactured underground). 
Needless to say these privately manufactured clothes competed with 
official clothes and netted a big slice of the market. It appears 
that sales for official clothes are rapidly declining. A report in 
1978 stated that Soviet 'official' clothing and footwear had to be 
marked-down to less than half price and had caused losses amounting to 
more than 1,700 million Rubles. (Binyon, M. The Times, 16.5.80). 1 
have not been able to obtain any figures peculiar to Georgia, but I 
would not be surprised if its share in this exceeds the national 
average. 
b) The Second Sin - 'Swinging' the Plan 
Since the Plan is calculated on total sales and not broken down into 
individual items it can be 'worked' in more than one way. A store- 
keeper explained: "Firstly, if you charge more for certain items than 
you should and hence obtain a private gain, you can always pass some 
of it to the official books. Or if you ever sell things which have 
nothing to do with your particular business you can still claim some 
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of it or all of it to be items X, Y, Z. Money is money and no one can 
know where it comes from. But you've got to be careful to have your 
pockets filled with cash, so that when a sudden control comes and your 
books are not balanced, you can show the cash and say: "I Just happen 
to hold all the morning's income with me. We were so busy I had no 
time to register it. " 
In other words, one can sell unauthorized goods and 'wangle' the Plan 
simply by 'swinging' the official Allocation of Goods (this will be 
discussed later). That is, getting hold of desirable commodities - 
selling them at a profit and then striking a balance by filtering a 
proportion through to the State. In this way, an authorized clothes 
shop can rise to be an exclusive sportswear store. This was the 
achievement of one of my informants. It is ironical that goods sold 
on the black market can eventually end up as 'official' profits. Some 
of it would trickle back in the form of a bonus for exceeding the Plan 
- if this was the desired effect. In this way ". .. everyone was 
happy. I always fulfilled and usually slightly over-fulfilled my 
targets. 4 I was considered a successful manager; my career prospects 
looked rosy and my boss was delighted. He also benefited from having 
such a good subordinate. " (Greer, 1973, mentions several cases - 
quoting the Soviet press - in which awards for overfulfilling the Plan 
were won by enterprises using apparently the same method). 
On the surface these 'rackets' might appear relatively easy but this 
is certainly not the case. Regular check-ups are carried out: every 
three to six months there is a stocktake and from time to time suppos- 
edly 'surprise' swoops (advance warning is usually given). Every 
item in stock is specified in minute detail. One of my inform. ants 
recounted an incident where an official failed to find a specific 
needle. This was a genuine case of lost stock and had nothing at all 
to do with subversive activities (needles are too trivial). However, 
a 'black mark' was put on the manager's personal file together with a 
sarcastic remark saying that the official could not understand how a 
store that can't produce a needle manages to effect such a good sales 
turn-over. 
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This then is the second offence committed by retailers. By 'working' 
the Plan to their own advantage they subvert official strategy and yet 
to all intents and purposes they are hardworking upholders of Soviet 
policy. 
Above all, this state of affairs magnifies the intricate interwoven 
dependency of the two economies: first and second - one mirrors the 
other. 
2.3 Defrauding the Customer 
(a) The Third Sin - Selective Sale 
Selective sale is the key to successful trade-for a second economy 
retailer. The reason being that unselective access to goods might be 
disastrous. There are numerous examples of this and several are given 
in Chapter 8 (Accounts I, II, and IV and Section 2.1). The principle 
itself is well established in the formal economy. Soviet official 
trading does differentiate between higher and lower ranking customers 
to such an extent that there are 'special' shops for an elite circle. 
The second economy retailer adopts this concept inasmuch as he se- 
lects: "the safest to sell to are family and close friends. Then to 
friends of friends" explained an informant. It is in this respect 
that the network comes in as a selection criterion. And one measure 
of how good a network is depends upon how many scarce commodities it 
has to offer its members. 
(b) The Fourth Sin - Falsifying Trade Descriptions 
This is one of two ways in which the customer is swindled. It could 
be argued that the onus is on the customer to beware when hastily 
buying scarce goods. An informant explains how it works: 
"Lets take an example - towels. There are three sorts of quality 
(many products have three sorts of quality). Each sort is recog- 
5 nized by its label. Differences, especially between the first 
and second would sometimes be insignificant and difficult for an 
experienced person to notice. The easiest way to differentiate 
between the sorts of towels is by weight. Sort A should be 
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230 g, sort B- 195 g and sort C- 185 g. The difference in 
price between each classification would be 50-70 Kopeks and that 
is a lot of money, especially if you sell in considerable 
amounts. 
"There would be enough work to occupy a person for days Just 
taking off labels. From clothes this would be relatively easy, 
from china a special blend of acetone would be used and sometimes 
you can't hel pit. On certai ni tems the detai Is are i mpri nted, 
like cutlery, irons, mixers. " 
One of my informants once got a huge quantity of galoshes (rubber 
boots) to sell (discussed in Chapter 6) and which were in great demand 
as it was winter time, but his rate of sale was determined by the time 
needed to take off the identifying labels. 
After taking off the labels the merchandise would be sold as a higher 
grade product. Usually -it would be 'upgraded' one stage. An inform- 
ant explains: 
"We woul d special i ze in cotton-wool , sol df or 1.60 Rubl es, 1.30 
Rubles and 0.90 Rubles per unit. There were only slight differ- 
ences between them and as it came loose it was difficult to 
distinguish. We would normally stock the third and second grades 
only and sell the third as second and the second as first 
quality. " 
(c) The Fifth Sin - Overcharging the Customer 
Overcharging for selected goods is another common method of swindling 
the customer. Although in a way it is an unavoidable consequence of 
the second economy system. The retailer has to pay his superiors 
'licensing fees$ and protection ('hush') money. 6 He also has to make 
the manufacturer or middle-man an attractive offer for good quality 
and scarce commodities. Thus he 'rolls' the excess in price over to 
the customer. This is to be expected where a buyer has to chase for 
goods. The customer is the last link in the chain and therefore has 
to bear the costs. 
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Usually the customer is only too glad to have obtained the goods and 
therefore has no qualms about overpaying but this is not always the 
case - overcharging by stores is the most common of citizens com- 
plaints (see Chapter 8, section 2.1 for further details). 
The practice of overcharging is more common in villages than in towns. 
The main reason being that stores in town have usually got direct 
access to manufacturers' who will sell them under-the-counter goods at 
cut priceS7 (see for example The Biscuit Factory, Chapter 6). Once 
goods have been obtained in this way there is no need to take any 
further risks as sale at the official price still yields a nice profit 
(in the case of The Biscuit Factory - 15%). 
The village stores however are remote from industrial centres and in 
order to survive they have to opt for this method. Also, since they 
know their customers more intimately than the city stores they face 
less risk of complaints; it is in the customer's interests as well to 
keep their local store going. Otherwise, they will have to travel to 
the city and buy quality goods and it is always better to have 'your 
man' to approach when in need, even if it means regularly paying more 
than the goi ng rate. 
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3. OBTAINING ILLICIT GOODS 
There are basically two ways of obtaining illicit goods. Either 
directly from producers or through intermediary sources. Both methods 
will be described. 
3.1 Obtaining Goods from Manufacturers 
Both town stores had regular contacts with three to five manufacturers 
at a time. The factories were local or located a short distance from 
the town. Although in one case my informant used to travel regularly 
over 100 km to obtain particularly desirable merchandise. My inform- 
ants would normally go once a month to collect goods which had been 
requested over the telephone or ordered the month before. Sometimes 
this would not be necessary - certain manufacturers preferred to send 
their representatives with samples (as is normal practice in the 
West). Representatives frequently called at the market where one of 
my informants ran a stall. Not only was it lucrative from the manu- 
facturer's point of view (there were fifty-five shops and stalls in 
the market) but it was absolutely essential for my informant and some 
of his colleagues who ran their businesses single-handed. Unlike the 
other stores in my sample, where at least one member (usually the most 
senior one) would be mostly away from the premises chasing goods - 
this informant worked alone (with occasional assistance from various 
members of his family). 8 
The purchased goods were transported either by the retailers them- 
selves or by the factory's official transport. This would be rela- 
tively easy since illicit goods cannot be distinguished from official 
merchandise as in the case of the Biscuit Factory (see Chapter 6, 
Section 3.1 about the Faktura). 
When, however, the i 11 icit produce is not the same, there seemed no 
point in chancing the use of official transport. Under these circum- 
stances private cars or taxis would be used. The latter having the 
flexibility of short-notice availability and relative immunity from 
road patrols. After all a patrol would be really paranoid (or have 
been 'tipped-off') to search a passing taxi. 
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3.2 Obtaining Goods from Intermediary Sources 
Similarly to illicit production, illicit distribution exploits the 
formal system - bending regulations to meet its needs and subjecting 
the centrally controlled bureaucracy to Georgian market forces. 
Most goods are purchased, formally, at specially designated Allocation 
Centres (in Russian Tsentral Bazi). Goods are purchased not with 
money but with Bills of Allocation denoting only a general commodity 
(eg: footwear, textiles, perfumery) and total price. The bills are 
issued by the organization to whom the shop belongs and when it is 
transferred from the store representative to the allocation clerk 
(Tovaroved), it becomes a proof of purchase. 
Since only a category and a total price are given, the content of the 
transaction is dependent upon the needs of the purchaser on the one 
hand - and availability on the other. And so they are indeed. Only 
that store's needs aredetermined by the (informal) potential of 
making a good profit and availability is largely dependent on the 
Tovaroved's good will, which is measured in purely monetary terms. 
A retailer would come to the allocation centre with three aims in 
mi nd: 
(a) To obtain everyday goods for the routine running of the store - 
accessible items which require no extra cash to obtain or sell 
them. However, he would not buy goods for which there was no 
market ds this would necessitate unnecessary labour and space and 
spoil his achievement record (the Plan). 
(b) Secondly, he would bring a list of 'orders' - not necessarily 
customary products but 'orders' from clients, friends, family for 
scarce products or unusual goods. 
(c) Thi rdly, a purchaser comes wi th the i dea of I ayi ng hi s hands on 
anything worth having - ie. anything that can be sold at a high 
profit. 
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The allocation official has two aims in mind: to sell the unusual and 
quality goods at as high a price as possible and to get rid of the 
poor quality items and those not in demand, so that his Plan's (which 
includes sundry goods that must be disposed of) requirements are met. 
A customer who agrees to give extra cash will get the better products 
- consequently (since there is a zero total sum) somebody else will 
get the inferior goods. He is thus able to apply 'stick and carrot' 
pressure so that the person who bids higher for unusual products will 
also get ordinary goods 'free of charge'. An informant explained: 
"I would get a periodic allocation to purchase a certain amount 
of goods (according to the Plan). Take for instance, clothes. 
They are, according to Soviet standards, divided into: cottons, 
wools, linen and synthetics. Now in each category I could pur- 
chase for an overall amount during the given period with contents 
and time of purchase at my discretion. So I would get say half a 
mi 111 on Rubl es al I ocati on f or cottons. And I mi ght pref er to 
purchase with it only underwear because it sells well. " 
'But why should the Tovaroved agree? ' 
nEither because I do him a favour and accept some stuff no one 
wants, or because I make a deal with him on other matters - or 
simply because I pay him to allow me to choose the contents of my 
al 1 ocati ons. " 
The intermediary agent is indeed in a prime position. And since he 
deals with a closed circle of clients, who cannot risk losing him as a 
source of informal supply (unless he upsets somebody too much - see 
Account III in Chapter 8) - 'He is a King' - an expression often used 
to describe the holder of this position. One would therefore have to 
adopt a humble approach: 
there could be a negotiation on the extra price to'be 
c ashed, but very gently and with respect. Because if he gets 
furious with you - you get nothing. He has got another million 
clients besides you. " 
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For the purchaser and his store he is a vital link. As this is 
essentially a sellers' market his capacity to survive depends upon his 
relations with the supply agent. The village store manager who had 
few contacts with producers would have to spend most of his time at 
the allocation centre: 
"Almost every day I used to go to ... I knew I had nothing to 
do there - and still I would feel an urge to go. " 
On some occasions the allocation centre turned into a meeting place 
and more-or-less became a social club. These social gatherings were 
an arena for gossiping, exchanging information and a natural bargain- 
ing ground for business matters. 
Similar to the allocation centre, there is a certain type of travel- 
ling broker - the expeditor who supplies to villagers unable to regu- 
larly attend the allocation centre; or to a one-man business where the 
proprietor is unable to leave his premises. He would take orders from 
the storekeepers and like his senior colleague - the Tovaroved - would 
be remunerated for any extra service or just for carrying out his 
regular duties. As with the Tovaroved, each transaction would be 
negotiated separately and paid for on an ad-hoc basis. 
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4. TRANSPORT 
Soviet Georgian retailers are continually on the move. To be success- 
ful they must be prepared to endure long and difficult Journeys, and 
unsociable working hours. 
My informants used to go at least three to four times a year to 
Moscow, Leningrad, Kiev and the Asian Republics, to attend specially 
designated retailer markets where allocation allowances might be ex- 
changed and where certain surplus produce could be obtained in excess 
of normal allowances. And they used to travel extensively inside 
Georgia to the principal trade centres of Tbilisi, Kutaisi, Sukhumi, 
Batumi, Samtredia, Akhaltsikhe, Gori, Tskhinvali and others. One 
informant visited half a dozen trade centres on alternate weeks - 
these were not regular liaison trips. Visits to the administrative 
headquarters occurred on average once a month. 
Compare this with the. Biscuit Factory example where the General 
Manager used to travel not more than four times a year to his regional 
administrative headquarters, while the Production Line Manager only 
attended prof essi onal conf erencesl once in 2-3 years. 
Long-distance travelling calls for a different mode of transport: 
travelling by car is long and tiring. For longer distances Georgians 
prefer the railways or air travel; and this allows one to gain an 
insight into their function in Soviet Georgia's second economy. 
4.1 Rail Service 
The i nf ormati on on rai 1 transport is based on evi dence deri ved f rom 
rail workers as well as that obtained from the four stores. In addi- 
tion several contributions came from small traders - pedlars, artisans 
and others - who would not miss an opportunity of visiting the metro- 
polis to conduct some business. 
Let us take as an example a business trip from Georgia to Moscow and 
consider the various stages a passenger takes along his route. Our 
passenger is carrying two suitcases full of goods, eg. either export- 
ing fruits or flowers from Georgia to RSFSR in the high season or 
importing some fine Finnish leather shoes or Czechoslovakian china. 
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(a) Obtaining Illegal Access: Two Alternatives 
To begin with he has to have a reservation for the Journey and his 
seat. This is not at all simple. At certain times (weekends) and 
seasons (Spring and Summer) it is difficult to obtain a reservation on 
direct trains. Not only because traffic is heavy but also because the 
railway workers 'cash in' on these peak travel periods. This is how 
the system operates as practised by a porter in a busy railway sta- 
tion. 
Each station has a limited number of allocations for each train. So, 
from a given number of tickets (x), only (x-n) are available to the 
public. The n left would be sold unofficially, by the collaboration 
of cashiers and porters. The porter inspects the potential travellers 
and approaches those whose faces are familiar (that is, either people 
he knows personally - or who travel frequently on the route). With 
the consent of the passenger-, he would purchase a ticket for him on 
the 'sold-out' journey.. For that, he would charge the customer on 
average an extra 40%, from which two-thirds would be taken for himself 
and one third would go to the cashier. 9 
For a passenger who is carrying illegal goods, it is not enough to 
gain access to the desired train. He can try and 'insure' his cargo, 
and a good way of doing it is with the collaboration of a porter. 
"A trader would approach me" says my informant and say: 'I'd like 
to carry with me two cases with goods. Can you arrange itV (the 
trader is wary of arousing police suspicion since they are ever- 
present in the station. In main stations the economic police 
MUMS) are present as well). "I would then approach a police- 
man, normally the Head of the Force on the spot, and say: 'I'll 
give you three Rubles to put two suitcases on the train, OKV He 
can refuse of course, and then nothing happens. If however he 
agrees I'll take 10 Rubles from the trader, give the police three 
Rubles and put the cases on the train. " 
There is an al ternati ve method of i 11 egal ly acqui ri ng passage on a 
train by approaching the wagon steward. The steward would probably be 
more than happy to oblige since he could charge the traveller the full 
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price and sometimes more (overcharging is not necessarily direct but 
the tip is incorporated in the high price of the ticket). The steward 
would keep the entire sum unless a controller happens to check the 
wagon in which case he would have to give up half of the official 
price of the 'sold' ticket to him. 
But how come there are vacant seats? A steward explains: 
"Say a train leaves Batumi to Sukhumi via Poti. On leaving 
Batumi the station would telegram Poti for the number of vacant 
seats in excess of the BRON (the designated seats on the train 
for each station) on this particular trip. The station receives 
the figures from the steward and he would tend to decrease the 
number of vacancies, so that the next station (Poti) will not 
sell as many tickets as it should. " Thus extra capacity is 
created which becomes the possession of the wagon steward. If, 
however, there is no room left, the steward could always accommo- 
date one or even two passengers in his personal cabin: and 
sometimes I would even put them in the passages. " 
The personal cabin would be an ideal place to hide goods as no con- 
troller would check there - this would merit a special tip. 
A third possibility of gaining an illegal train ticket is by approach- 
ing the 'sold out' ticket office. This is the usual practice in air 
travel and will be discussed in the following section. 
(b) Choice of WagonlO 
There are four classes of travel - the deluxe grade is the MEDGINAROD 
which offers private compartments and accommodates only 16 passengers. 
The first class is called the MIAKI and also has private compartments 
- seating for 26 passengers. The second class, the KUPEROVANI, is 
available in four seater compartments usually accommodating 36 passen- 
gers. The third class - the PLASKART - which has no compartments 
carries about 58 passengers. The prices are fixed according to choice 
of travel. The lowest grade seat is charged at the basic rate - for 
the other classes one pays the basic rate plus a surcharge of 15%, 
25%, 75% respectively. A typical long-distance train comprising of 
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fifteen wagons would take one Medginarod, two Miaki, five Kuperovani 
and seven Plaskart. 
No one would dare to travel on the Medginarod as it is restricted to 
VIP's, and travelling on it would interfere with the non-salience 
principle of trade rules (Section 6 of this Chapter). After all - the 
last thing one wants on such a Journey is to attract attention. One 
could travel on the Miaki if a satisfactory explanation for the pur- 
pose of the journey can be given. Consequently traders prefer the 
Kuperovani, which, with its closed cabins and fewer passengers, en- 
ables concealment of illegally transported goods. 
(c) Additional Costs 
Even when a seat on the train to Moscow has been secured there are 
still additional expenses to be considered. After all, a Journey of 
2-3 days, requires considerable contact with the steward: he provides 
the travellers with bedding, teas and other provisions for which a tip 
is customary. This would normally amount to about 10% of the price of 
the ticket (anything in the region of 1-3 Rubles). 9 On arrival and 
departure, the services of a porter are often required. This service, 
costs approximately 30 Kopeks officially and with tipping it would 
frequently, according to my information, amount to I Ruble. 9 
4.2 Air Travel 
There is heavy air traffic between Georgia and other Soviet Republics 
as well as within Georgia. Four daily flights connect Tbilisi to 
Moscow, while Kutaisi and Tbilisi (the two largest cities) have an 
almost hourly service. Prices are very competitive: only slightly 
dearer than by rail (about a third more on the Tbilisi-Moscow line). " 
(a) Air'Transport Compared to Rail and Road Transport 
Drawing an imaginary continuum of closed/open boundaries, we will have 
on the one extreme road transport - while at the other extreme we have 
air transport with rail travel somewhere in the middle. 
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Compared to road transport, the rail service has many more defined 
boundaries: main terminals, definite route and stations and a regu- 
lated system of transporting people and goods. While by road, the 
only 'closures' are road-patrols. 
Air transport is even more restricting with only a few terminals and 
finite destinations and operation times. The space for manoeuvre 
regarding passengers and cargo is very limited compared with the rail 
service. To begin with, tickets are issued upon proof of identity and 
the number of travellers as well as the scope for cargo is quite 
def i ni te. Consequently control is relatively easy and expected to be 
tight. 
However, in spite of the restrictions, advantages are considerable. 
The main advantage, namely: the speeding communication and supply 
lines is a great asset when one considers the vast size of the Soviet 
Uni on. One of the store managers who quite often used air transport 
states: 
"One cannot imagine the saving of time and energy between taking 
a plane to using the rail. This could mean the difference be- 
tween up to two working days - taking the distance from Tbilisi 
to Kutaisi (the two main cities in Georgia) - compared with an 
hour or so flight each way. For long distance travel the two are 
practically incomparable -I once went to Moscow and returned the 
very same day: a way which would take by train at least 4 full 
days. " 
(b) Gaining Illegal Access 
An informant explains 
"I approach the cashier with my identity card, as is required by 
regulations and in it the official sum plus a5 Ruble note. 9 He 
returns my personal documents with a ticket, less the money. 
Sometimes I have to add a Ruble or two or even more, and some- 
times he would return me my money, signalling that he is sorry 
but there are no vacancies left. And he really doesn't have any. 
You count the people waiting to board the plane and see there are 
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indeed many around. Sold-out flights are very common especially 
to central destinations like Moscow. 
"So your 1 ast hope is to have a word wi th the pi I ot. If you go 
between Kutai si and Tbi Ii si you pay hi m 50% and more on top of 
the official price, and you try to convince him about the urgency 
of your cause and then he might give you a seat near his cabin, 
probably in place of one of the stewardesses - in which case she 
will get a share. Alternatively, he might allow you to stand all 
the time. " 
'And if the pilot doesn't cooperateV I asked. 
"Then you either return home or go to the rail station" was the 
reply. 
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5. THE ORGANIZATION OF THE INFORMAL STORE 
The organization of informal activities in the four stores differed 
considerably in several important aspects: 
(a) The 'real' power structure of the enterprise. 
(b) The extent to which employees were involved in illegal activ- 
ities. 
(c) The seamy dealings with influential figures in the hierarchy and 
the way in which these individuals were 'paid-off'. 
(d) The social and physical aspects of the informal organization. 
5.1 Three Types of Informal Structure 
The four stores discussed in this chapter have different organiza- 
tional structures - legal as well as illegal (see Figures 1 and 2). 1 
will concentrate this section on managerial positions. 
(a) Appointment 
The vi 11 age store manager was appoi nted by hi s superi ors in the re- 
gional headquarters. Incidentally, this was a village general store. 
On the surface there seems to be nothing unusual about the selection 
process. But in reality things were different. Not only was he well- 
suited because of his formal qualifications (Diploma in Trade) and his 
experience as assistant manager, but he also satisfied the informal 
criteria on several bases. Firstly, it was thought he would be grate- 
ful to his superiors for advancing his career faster than usual, his 
gratitude expecting to yield extra returns. Secondly, and linked to 
that, his personal support network was mediocre. It was expected 
therefore, that he would have only a limited ability to develop local 
autonomy-12 In addition, he hailed from the village and knew the 
local community intimately - he was therefore considered 'their man'13 
- very important in a local village setting where a profitable busi- 
ness is dependent upon local support. Needless to say, it was most 
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In a similar case to this village store manager, a person with a 
particularly weak network core was appointed to the powerful position 
of head of an import warehouse. This unofficial 'qualification' was 
considered paramount as in this way his superiors kept a tight grip on 
the reins and the potential power-base was not abused, at least not 
without them controlling the informal spin-offs. 
Both cases are further examples of symbiotic-interactive bonds between 
the first and second economies in Soviet Georgia. 
(b) Ownership 
Three of the stores were in some respects, part-owned. This was most 
clearly marked with the market stallholder. There were three reasons: 
firstly, he moved into the trade from a different (though not unre- 
lated) occupation - tailoring, while his counterparts had spent most 
(Town Store I) or all (Town Store II) of their professional lives in 
the trade and therefore gradually progressed to managerial positions 
which carried a share in the profits. Secondly, he had a particularly 
weak network core and as such was unable to obtain a nomination by 
virtue of social standing or 'friends of friends'. Thirdly, the 
illegal network of the town's market stores had succeeded in estab- 
lishing its own 'law and customs', one of the customs being that 
stores could be bought and sold on a goodwill basis (see further 
details on this subject in Section 5.5). It was for these reasons 
then that this man acquired a stall by, simply, paying for it. 
In 1965 he decided to move from the relatively secure services sector 
to the ri sky arena of trade (see Chapter 8, Secti on 2f or a detai 1 ed 
discussion). He was later to regret this move as his personal support 
network was not strong enough to sustain him in this endeavour; and if 
it had not been for his fellow market traders he would have been 
implicated in a major crisis (see Chapter 8, Account II). 
The cost of the small store was 8,000 Rubles of which 6,000 went to 
the seller and 2,000 went to the local official in charge of the 
market and responsible, amongst other things, for shop allocations. 
Both the seller and the market official had the power to impose fees. 
The former had powers vested in him by the market's informal 'law and 
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customs' committee - after all it was in the interests of all stores 
in the markýt to assure an 'actual' sale as this reflected on the 
value of their own properties. The latter had official power and gave 
authorization to new occupiers for which he received 'licensing fees'. 
(c) Partnership 
Two of the four stores could be described as partnerships. Town Store 
II was a totally equal partnership in that it operated with equal 
shares of investments and profits. The four partners were closely 
connected: three were related and the fourth was a close friend 
considered to be one of the family. 
Town Store I was also a partnership, but this applied only to two of 
the four members operating it. Their partnership was particularly 
interesting as they had established a clear division of labour between 
them. One was the buyer - he spent most of his time away from the 
store, chasing goods, li. aising with factories, paying out bribes. The 
other was responsi bl ef or runni ng the busi ness i e. sel 11 ng the mer- 
chandise. I knew the two personally and I felt they complemented 
each other extremely well. One was outgoing, determined, rather 
arrogant and always in a hurry. While the other was well-known in the 
community as a 'white chicken': 14 an introvert by nature - he showed 
great discretion, pondered a lot and appeared rather indecisive. Both 
felt they had a very good partnership. 
5.2 The Employees' Place in the Informal Structure 
Unlike production line workers, shop assistants are directly involved 
in the second economy. Even the most junior assistant had to help 
sell the goods and therefore had to be familiar with prices, grades of 
quality, and first and foremost; customers. They were thus closely 
implicated from recruitment and promotion to remuneration. 
(a) Recruitment Selection of Employees 
The village store manager 'inherited' most of his employees (they were 
already employed by the store when he was appointed). When, with 
time, the store grew larger and new people had to be recruited, he 
aimed to "select workers with a good background" as he put it. When I 
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requested that he enlarge upon this he said: "Somebody with a large 
and strong family, preferably who could be influential in times of 
need - to the worker as well as the store. " 
The same requirements applied to Town Store II. This was a newly 
created store run by two partners. They gradually expanded and em- 
ployed another two staff. In choosing the right people for the Job 
they looked not only for a solid familial background but also an 
injection of new blood - they specifically wanted a gentile. They 
hoped this would rejuvenate the store's outlook and open up new hori- 
zons as well as attract a wider circle of clientele (that is 'friends 
of friends' of the new employee). They decided to employ a girl who 
was appointed to the ladies department. 
They similarly took advantage of the sex and age group structure of 
Georgian society when employing a fourth assistant. He was a cousin 
of one of the partners and a teenager (17 years ol d) when he j oi ned. 
By attracting his peers-he helped to expand the store still further. 
(b) Involvement in the Second Economy 
In both town stores the channel through which goods reached the stores 
was dominated by one person. Even in the village general store, all 
the intake of goods for its ten departments, was controlled by the 
manager. He would personally handle rare and expensive merchandise 
irrespective of which department it belonged to. Normally, however, 
he would sub-contract profitable goods to various departments (as 
shown in Figure 2 not all departments were given this privilege simply 
because not all of them handled consumer goods worth dealing in (see 
Section 6 of this chapter). 
Things were different in the smaller stores. Members of staff were 
expected to serve all clients and therefore had to be entrusted with 
the lucrative commodities. This does not mean that employees were let 
in on all the secrets of the trade. For instance, the gentile girl 
working for Town Store I was not aware of any illegal activities with 
manufacturers. "Was it because she was female and not Jewish? " I 
enquired. My informant giggled, recalling how she couldn't understand 
why certain goods were not overpriced when they were in such high 
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demand. "But why don't you take more money when you can? " she asked. 
'You won't believe me but I'm essentially an honest man' I used to 
reply. 'Of course she wasn't aware that I had already made a prof it 
by getting the stuff cheaper from the factory. And there was no point 
in taking too high a risk. " 
The village store had an employee that to all intents and purposes did 
not exi st (of fi ci al ly) 1 He was engaged as a remover of 1 abel sf rom 
merchandise - an important stage in the procedure of overcharging 
customers or falsifying the quality of goods or indeed both (the label 
indentifies amongst other things the grading of quality and price). 
According to my information, this person (a villager in his sixties) 
had regular work for at least one full working day per week. Thus he 
was a regular part-time employee of the informal store. 
5.3 Regular and Irregular Expenses Incurred in Operating the Informal 
Store 
Table 1 summarizes the regular 'salaries' paid out by the four stores. 
It would be usual practice to pay out two types of officials: one's 
organizational superiors and the local police. Compared with produc- 
ers, the number of payees was smaller, their formal rankings were 
lower and so were their remunerations. 
The Regional organization 
In rural Georgia in the sixties and early seventies two large organi- 
zations incorporated most of retail stores: Savachroba (literally 
trade in Georgian) and Tsentrussayooz Rykavshiri (a combination of 
Georgian and Russian meaning: regional section of the central union). 
The former was a Georgian-based organization with headquarters in 
Tbilisi which operated mainly in the towns and townlets. The two town 
stores in my sample were branches of Savachroba. The latter was an 
entirely Soviet organization with headquarters in Moscow, operating 
largely in villages - the village store was one of their subsidiaries. 
The market store was governed by the regional council. 
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The local representatives of these organizations had considerable 
autonomy in running their affairs: ie. recruiting and promoting per- 
sonnel, expanding, merging or moving of stores, allocation of re- 
sources, setting-up and supervising the Plan, and specifying trade 
responsibilities (for instance, exemption from sales of foodstuffs). 
Due to these powers the regional senior officials (who usually super- 
vised local stores) netted a large proportion of the stores' regular 
'pay-outs'. 
This was particularly the case in the village store where the manager 
owed his promotion to his superior. (But it is also a reflection of 
the size of the store and its anticipated illicit earnings). A char- 
acteristic of the stores' regular pay outs is that there would be an 
agreed sum to be paid monthly and it would tend to fluctuate according 
to trade. In most cases, it reflected how much the direct boss knew 
about what was going on. In the market, for instance, the official in 
charge of the market would spend several hours a day scrutinizing 
activities. Consequently he was able to tell from first hand experi- 
ence how a store was doing - he even charged extra fees for giving his 
consent to take leave on High Holidays and Sabbath. In the other 
stores, however the director was largely dependent on the cooperation 
(or fear) of his store managers. "I would actually determine the 
illegal earnings of my boss" said one informant "in a sense, I was my 
boss's boss. " 
One of the town stores also used to bribe the regional book-keeper 
with small gifts: "Just in case. One might always mess up his books. " 
But this seems to me to be a unique variant reflecting a particularly 
powerful personality or lack of skill in double book-keeping. 
The market stall had an additional levy, namely paying the gatekeeper 
who was also the night-watchman. Although formally a marginal posi- 
tion it carried with it a good deal of knowhow and inside information 
which deserved appropriate remuneration. Since he was able to charge 
individual retailers (some with a weak social support network) his 
illicit intake was considerably higher compared with his counterparts 
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(b) The Local Police 
The striking fact about regular payments to the local police is that 
our market tradesman did not pay them: the only case I know of where 
the police were not directly involved in second economy production and 
trade. This could be either because of the weakness of the enterprise 
resulting in the retailer being unable to sustain regular payments (he 
would have to limit his payments to essentials hence, payments to the 
direct supervisor and to the gatekeeper/watchman) or, because the 
business was so small it would be demeaning for a senior policeman to 
accept bribes (see the next section for further details), while keep- 
ing only the lower ranking officers on the pay list would be point- 
less. Without the backing of the local seniors, a store could not be 
guaranteed protection. 
Yet another possibility is that the market with its huge potential for 
illicit profits was dominated by powerful enough individuals to ex- 
clude the police from direct involvement. This does not mean to say 
that police officials were unable to obtain some illicit gains, but 
these would have to be channelled through a key figure among the 
market traders or more likely as part of the pay outs of local repre- 
sentatives to their superiors. My informants estimate the illicit 
annual income of the official running the market was in excess of 
40,000 Rubles and that is from 'salaries' alone. Though my informants 
had no evidence, they believed it most unlikely that such a large sum 
would go into one pocket only. Among the main beneficiaries had to be 
the highest echelons of the police. 
With the other three stores one finds, as would be expected, regular 
pay-offs distributed up the hierarchical ladder with the head of the 
local police sitting on the top rung - his 'salaries' were far in 
excess of any of his subordinates. The reason being that "the big 
boss is a big man. The bigger he is - his word counts more. Besides, 
it's important that the 'small ones' know I am a friend of the boss. 
But though the 'small ones' wouldn't have much power, I wanted them to 
be good to me - so they were paid as well. " 
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Town Store I in particular gave pay-offs to all the minions - the 
reason being that the store was situated close to a tourist resort and 
therefore catered for a passing trade. Consequently it was a more 
vulnerable target than usual for customer complaints. By paying off 
every policeman it hoped to 'tie all loose ends' and diffuse any such 
complaints at as early a stage as possible. 
The village store on the other hand had only limited expenses as the 
local police force consisted of only two policemen. It is interesting 
to note that while the store manager was willing to pay a regular 
'salary' to the Junior policeman as well, the senior police officer 
objected. Apparently he wanted exclusive rights on the local store 
(as a way of asserting his seniority). So my informant used to give 
the junior occasional presents, to ensure his good will without up- 
setting the local balance of power. 
(c) 'Ad Hoc' Payments 
Although most expenses incurred running the illicit store were in the 
form of 'ad hoc payment', not 'salaries', my informants did not con- 
sider them to be bribes or dishonest in any sense. In fact these 
payments were expected when trading in illicit merchandise, reflecting 
the "the real value of goods" as it was put to me. 
The largest portion of pay-off went to the broker at the allocation 
centre who would usually charge about 10% of an item's price. To this 
one had to add additional levies imposed by road patrols (see Chapter 
6) and the customary few Rubles to the driver who transported the 
goods. 
5.4 The Organization and Sale of Goods in the Second Economy 
Unlike factories, stores work on an 'open door' principle - anyone is 
free to wander in and browse. This calls for strict control ýto ensure 
that illicit activities are not exposed to the wrong people. 
In this section I will examine how goods are displayed and stored and 
how the sale of black market merchandise works. 
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(a) The Lay-Out of the Informal Store 
In the Soviet Georgian store two different (but not separate) enter- 
prises operate under the same roof, at the same time, at the same 
counters simultaneously: one is legal, the other is illegal. 
One informant explained the relation between the two as follows: 
"Anything in demand would go under the counter - everything without 
demand would be displayed on the shelves. " So this is a reverse 
situation between the rarity of a product and its displayability - 
really the opposite from the West and a sharp manifestation of the 
main differences between the two markets: one is a buyer's market, 
the other -a seller's. one is an open market (money will buy any- 
thing) the other is a market within a market with only limited access. 
A retailer who had a new store built told me the following revealing 
anecdote about a conflict between a law-abiding ('straight') designer 
- "he came from Moscow" stated my informant, as if this explained it - 
and the informally inclined locals. 
The new purpose-built store consisted of two floors. The interior 
designer suggested that maximum display space was desirable. He had 
all the merchandise stored on shelves and he installed a self-service 
system. Each floor had only one desk where shop assistants would help 
with enquirires and packaging of goods, whilst the customer paid his 
bill at the cash desk. In fact it had a similar layout to Western 
stores. The manager, on the other hand, wanted a more orthodox or- 
ganization of display counters whereby merchandise would be exhibited 
in a display cabinet and be handed over by the assistant at the 
customer's request -a far more personal service. Having this kind of 
arrangement meant ample storage space for hiding 'under the counter' 
merchandise and ensured that quality goods were under the auspices of 
staff and were sold only at the right price to the right people. 
An essential requirement for illegal sale of goods is personal contact 
between customer and retailer. The manager thus wanted a decentralized 
system whereby each department had its own cash register. Separate 
cash registers had the added advantage of complicating audits - when 
officials made a swoop they had to check six sets of accounts as 
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opposed to only one in the proposed system. However the manager's 
proposals contravened the ethos of central command. 
The way the disagreement was resolved is particularly significant. On 
his boss's advice my informant stopped arguing with the interior 
designer and allowed him to do as he pleased. When he had finished 
and authority was back in local hands my informant altered the prem- 
ises to his own requirements (this was sanctioned by his superiors) 
claiming that the original setting out was not practical for the 
store's purposes. The local powers did not question this. 
Yet another common hurdle is where to hide illicit merchandise, espe- 
cially since supply is erratic and retailers cannot plan their store's 
intake. This is a major concern for town stores who tend to obtain 
specially manufactured goods, not only imitations of legal merchan- 
dise. One of my informants solved the problem by acquiring a local 
residential property. The owner agreed to rent out a room to him 
which was turned into a 'warehouse' for 'hot' merchandise. He paid 
the owner a monthly rent (10 Rubles) and more importantly offered him 
the opportunity of access to sought-after goods at somewhat reduced 
prices. My informant felt the landlord was well pleased with this 
arrangement. 
(b) The Strategy of Illicit Sales 
To sell or not to sell: that is the question. This is the Achilles 
Heel of illicit sales and if careless (see Chapter 8, Crisis Events, 
Accounts I, II and V) one might be in great trouble. However, there 
are some general safeguards (see Section 6 on the Rules of Informal 
Trade). 
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The main risk lies in overcharging. 15 With small quantities there is 
usually no problem. They can be sold to trusted associates. Diffi- 
culties occur when off-loading large quantities, especially in town 
stores which lack the rapport that exists between locals and their 
village storekeeper. An informant explains: 
"Say I got 300 pairs of fine shoes. It's a real opportunity to 
make some money - but I handle it cautiously. First, I wait a 
couple of days to see who else has the same stock and how much 
they are sol df or. If I'm 1 ucky and the only one in the area, I 
will start selling 20-30 pairs for a day or two at the official 
price so that the rumour will spread that my store can get qual- 
ity shoes cheaply. 
"It normally doesn't take longer than a day to have people 
queuing for the goods. And then I can select. Either I sell 
(for more than the official price) or I say: "Sorry we've sold 
out. " And if a 'big shot' comes in I may tell him: "Sorry I'm 
sold out - but leave me your shoe number and I'll try my best to 
find a pair for you. And then I gain twice. Firstly, I do him a 
special favour and he owes me now. Second, I can always call him 
as witness (if a control is made) that he just got the last 
pair. " 
Another common problem with customers who present themselves as 
'friends of friends' (Chapter 5 on Networks) is that one's network can 
prol if erate to hundreds of peopl e. Obvi ously it depends on ci rcum- 
stances at the time. But one of my informants claimed he never took 
chances "I would say I haven't got the goods right now: come tomorrow 
and we'l 1 see. In the meantime I check his references. " 
5.5 The Retailers Unofficial Organization 
It is because of their vulnerability, more than anything else, that 
storekeepers are forced to band together. In the market this tendency 
was markedly clear to the extent that salesmen had established their 
own code of 'Law and Customs'. The clearest example of this form of 
autonomy is found in Chapter 8 (Account II). Their solidarity united 
members in mutual friendship and loyalty. 
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To some extent this unofficial association of retailers had a say in 
the running of stores. Any new store had to have the silent approval 
of fellow market traders especially if the new business aimed to vie 
in a competitive trade area. On one particular occasion a forum of 
all interested parties gathered to discuss a claim put forward by one 
member, who argued that an adjacent store had taken on a new line of 
products similar to those he was dealing in. The assembly decided 
against the complainant and the dispute was settled. 
The traders strong association stemmed from familiarity, through hav- 
ing to work in close proximity and also (at least for some of them) 
from having very weak social support networks. By Joining forces they 
overcame weaknesses: they thus formed a coalition of the weak. 
With the other stores, close associations were marked through payment 
of bribes, because unlike factories, 'salaries' were not paid out 
directly by individual stores but collectively and through a repre- 
sentative, who acted as a 'linking pin' (to employ a concept by 
Likert, 1961) between officials and stores. An informant explained: 
". .. the reason being the Head of Police, for instance doesn't want 
to get too dirty; he doesn't want to be everyone's pal - so he does 
not take from everyone. Only from the biggest (traders). " 
This phenomenon also applied to manufacturers. The small producers 
had a similar problem and they solved it in a similar way. It was 
considered dishonourable to take from them since in exchange for this 
money they were owed a favour - it was unthinkable to be indebted to 
such nonentities. Consequently the town stores formed groups of 10 to 
15 stores16 who passed their 'contributions' via a representative who 
was considered respectable enough to deal with the authorities. The 
fee was not a fixed sum but varied according to the size and location 
of each store. Although the official would not receive bribes from 
individuals he would be informed who had paid and how much. 
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Another function of an unofficial group of retailers was the communi- 
cation of reliable information. In other words, business contacts 
were essential - one had to be well-informed about the whereabouts of 
scarce commodities and mingle with people who posses such information 
in order to ". .. devel op antennas what goes where" as one i nf ormant 
put it. It is in this context that one's social standing in the 
community has such far reaching implications. To be excluded from 
information not only implies 'social death' (as outlined in Chapter 4 
on Core Values) but also - in a business environment - financial ruin. 
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6. RULES OF INFORMAL TRADE 
I now come to the last section in this chapter. Bearing in mind the 
principles and practices governing the operation of unofficial stores 
in Georgia, the question one may ask is how do these principles and 
practices determine the retailers choice of merchandise? It is the 
aim of this section to discuss this question. I would like to do so 
by giving the five rules of thumb which were proffered by my inform- 
ants. 
6.1 First Rule: Pricing 
'TRADE WITH MEDIUM PRICED PRODUCTS. DON'T DEAL WITH EITHER VERY CHEAP 
OR VERY DEAR GOODS' 
There is no point dealing in products with a very low market price, 
since even excessive overcharging will not yield a worthwhile profit. 
On the other hand it is not advisable to handle very dear products as 
there is a big initial outlay and the possibilities for a potential 
market are limited. Consequently the target would be a medium sized 
product in reasonable demand from which one could make a fair profit. 
An example of the first negation concerns perfumery. Every brand 
available was Soviet-produced and very cheap. It was in reasonably 
high demand and the stores would supply it accordingly. However, no 
attempt was made to decrease i ts avai I abi Ii ty and in so doi ng rai se 
the market price because it was too insignificant and profit margins 
would have been negligible. 
A reason for not dealing in too rare and expensive items is this 
incident which took place in the early sixties: 
"One day I was approached by an old acquaintance who wanted to 
sell an antique piece, which had been in his family's possession 
for some years. It was a nicely shaped jewellery box (or perhaps 
it was originally made for tobacco or even fire-powder) made of 
fi ne wood, artistically silver-plated and inlaid with precious 
stones. The seller asked a fortune for it - about 5,000 Rubles - 
and it was probably worth it. But I couldn't find a buyer. It 
seemed crazy to put so much money into the purchase of one small 
box. " 
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6.2 Supply and Demand 
'TRADE WITH GOODS WHICH ARE NEITHER RARE NOR COMMON, BUT WHICH ARE IN 
REASONABLE DEMAND' 
It is not a good idea to deal in products which are in high demand and 
very scarce because it is difficult and dangerous to overcharge. On 
the other hand, handling very rare items might leave one open to 
pressure and blackmail by prospective customers eager to acquire these 
products as precious status symbols. Consequently, the trader should 
therefore aim at products which are neither rare or easily accessible. 
An example of the complications pertaining to such scarce commodities 
is that of the ZIL refrigerator. 17 This Russian-made appliance was 
considered the best of its kind. It was of good quality, had a 
powerful motor, a strong freezer and was nicely designed. Needless to 
say, it was in extremely high demand. My informant explained why he 
didn't like to speculate with them: 
"We only got two every three months which was our official allo- 
cati on. It was supplied directly from Moscow. No intermediate 
agencies - therefore it was very difficult to establish connec- 
tions and arrange for more items. But say I got the connections 
and pay extra money and arrange to get some more: where would I 
put them? they're too big to hide - so I'll have to display them 
in the open display space, which would make it more difficult to 
sell for an excessive price. But that's not the main problem. 
If people in the area would hear that one can get a ZIL refrig- 
erator at my place I would expose myself to extreme pressures to 
supply - both from informal and formal channels. So that the 
best was the simplest: to get what I am formally authorized to, 
to sell it at the formal price and only to those who are supposed 
to get it. Which means to the 'big ones. My boss would tell 
beforehand - since he knew when an allocation was due - to whom 
to designate the fridges and sometimes I wouldn't even bother to 
pass them through my store, but rather advise the clients to get 
them from the area central warehouse. " 
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Products which are in plentiful supply and therefore easy to obtain 
are not worth discussing - they would not be sold 'under the counter' 
because they could be purchased at the store over the road for the 
official price. 
6.3 The Size 
'STOCK THE SMALLER ITEMS - THEY ARE SAFER' 
The thinking behind this rule is that large items can draw unwanted 
attention and land one in trouble. 
Large items require special transportation arrangements and the like- 
lihood of detection by a road patrol or any other interested parties 
increases. The village store manager used to inform his superiors of 
any large illegal transactions he made - for instance furniture - 
which meant they had to get a share too. "Even a large profit wasn't 
worth the effort" he concluded. 
6.4 Durability of Goods 
'TRADE WITH CONSUMER GOODS THAT HAVE A GOOD TURNOVER' 
This rule refers to the way in which goods are purchased and sold. 
Indeed it is an intrinsic principle of networking. To establish a 
network for limited, if infrequent use, would be very expensive and 
impractical. A network needs constant nourishment in social and 
monetary inputs (as clarified in Chapter 5 on The Network and The 
Feast). Only a regular ongoing process would therefore be beneficial. 
This applies to both the process of acquiring the goods and selling 
them - both require a network. An informant explains: 
"There were a lot of goods in high demand, in which one could 
specialize. But that was only worthwhile if working on a very 
large scale: at least regionally and certainly not confined to a 
townlet or a number of villages. 
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"For instance, a piano is a must for any Georgian who respects 
hi msel f. The sought-after makes were Russian: Beilerus or 
Krasneya Octyab. But how many can you distribute among your 
friends or among customers you trust? Sooner or later one has to 
expose himself to a larger market and eventually your supply 
sources dwindle. After all, how many pianos does a man buy in 
his lifetime? 
"The same was true even for smaller items. Thus, Czechoslovakian 
china and crystal were renowned. But once again, once you sold 
someone a dinner set, it satisfied his needs. You can't sell him 
another set the following year! " 
Networks then can be 'saturated' by expensive immovable goods. 
6.5 Fifth Rule: Selecting One's Custaners 
'DEAL WITH REGULAR CUSTOMERS. THEY WILL HAVE A VESTED INTEREST IN 
KEEPING YOU GOING' 
There was an immense difference between the way the village store and 
the town stores selected their customers and it has been explained how 
this influenced the kind of illicit dealings a store could operate eg. 
overcharging (country) versus obtaining cheaper supplies from manu- 
facturers (town). I have shown the impact this has had on the infor- 
mal meta-structure: the number of policemen on the regular 'pay roll' 
was the largest in the tourist resort centre. 
The village setting is ideal for covering-up illicit activities (eg. 
Chapter 8, Account I). Firstly, strangers can easily be detected and 
secondly, the store manager is considered by the locals as 'one of 
us'. My informant said that to the customer's way of thinking "he's 
also got to make a profit. But we trust him. " And indeed the manager 
confirmed that he would not exploit them: "I would never squeeze 
them. We have establ i shed a way of Ii vi ng wi th mutual trust as i ts 
foundation. " 
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The vested interest of customers in having 'their store' is self- 
explanatory. Firstly, they know they will be overcharged - but not 
too severely and not very often. Secondly, they have somewhere to go 
for 'special requests. For instance, one of the town stores special- 
ized (as an additional source of income) in introducing engaged 
couples' families to their suppliers in order that they could obtain 
supplies of food and clothes for the wedding ceremony. 
6.6 Clothes - The Ideal Commodity 
Summing up the aforementioned recommendations one concludes that the 
best policy is to - 
TRADE WITH MEDIUM-PRICED PRODUCTS, WHICH ARE NEITHER RARE NOR EASILY 
ACCESSIBLE, BUT WHICH ARE SCARCE AND CONSUMABLE, PREFERABLY SMALL. 
FINALLY, SELL ONLY TO REGULAR CUSTOMERS. 
All things taken into consideration, one can clearly see that certain 
merchandise fits very Well into the desired paradigm: clothes for 
instance. 
Clothes go out of fashion and wear out and are constantly having to be 
replaced. This is a good reason for developing a supply network, for 
regular cl i ents over aI ong period of time. Secondly, they are easy 
to transport and to conceal: they are basically small, flexible and 
light items. 
Thirdly, they are at the right profit level - not too dear to require 
a large investment and not too cheap to make profit levels negligible. 
Fourthly, they are not too rare to become status-linked commodities 
and thus cause risks and not too common (because of their diversity) 
to be of no trading value. 
In addition clothes are a natural focus for conspicuous display -a 
cultural must in the Georgian style of living. This explains why 




Both Hanson (1968) and Greer (1973) have noted how the Soviet 
pricing policy may hinder innovations. 
2. See Chapter 1, Section 2.3 'The Economy'. 
3.1 used the term Kowbinatsia, a common expression referring to 
Second Economy Activity. 
4. There is no point in excessively and regularly overfulfilling the 
Plan, as this would indicate some basic error in planning, and 
consequently the targets will be re-adjusted upwards. Unless of 
course this is exactly what the shopkeeper wants to achieve - 
that is expanding the store. One of my informants extended three 
times in this way, by simply showing that he supplied growing 
needs. 
Each sort bears a di ff erent col our I abel. Sort 11s red, sort 2 
is blue and sort 3 is green. The other specifications given in 
the label clearly Indicate the type of product and the price. 
6. These terms were explained in Chapter 6, sub-section 'The Rules 
of Bribery'. 
7. Unless their products do not compete with the state goods, in 
which case they may get whatever the market forces dictate. 
8. Although in emergencies one could rely on fellow traders to give 
a hand. The business was always kept open even if the store- 
keeper was absent due to illness. 
9. Figures are correct to the beginning of the 1970's. 
10. Wagon (Russian), Wagoni (Georgian) meaning railway carriage. 
11. Information by Intourist correct as at Spring 1983. 
12. Compare this example with the Textile Factory's general manager 
of whom it was said that he "held the town in his fist and was 
afraid of nobody" (Chapter 6, paragraph 5.3). 
13. Local patriotism is deeply rooted in Georgian consciousness. 
Consider for instance a letter published by a Georgian ex-patriot 
(Chapter 3, paragraph 1.1). 
14. Suggesting cowardice, feebleness. 
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15. It can be assumed that by falsifying the quality, the other 
common method of defrauding the customer, it is likely that the 
client will remain in ignorance. 
16. This number is the largest possible to function effectively as a 
intimate social group. 
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The Flea and The Ant: (A Fable) 
A Flea and an Ant swore to become brothers. 1 
They walked off and reached a small stream. 
The flea said to the ant: 
, f. r, zl jump but what will happen with you? " 
"And I can't jump? " answered the ant. 
The flea jumped and the ant jumped but fell into the water. 
Fleaded the ant to the flea: 
"My brother, help me - don't let me drown! " 
And the ftea jumped and jumped and reached the pig and 
asked: 
"Pig, give me your hair and I will have a strong rope done 
and will get my siater-ant out of the stream. " 
Said the pig: 
"But first bring me Rkoo, 2 and the flea jumped and jumped and 
got to the tree and asked: 
"Tree, give me Rko -I will bring it to the pig, who will 
give me his hair, to make a rope I can throw into the stream 
and get out my aister-ant. " 
Told, him the tree: 
"But you have first to draw the hawk away from my branches. " 
And the ftea went to the hawk and asked him to Leave in 
peace the tree, so that the tree wiLl give him ... etc. 
Said the hawk: 
"But fir8t get me a chick. " So the flea went to the chicken 
and aaked her: 
"Please give me a chick, so I can give it the hawk, who will 
Leave in peace the tree ... etc. " 
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Said to him the chicken: 
"But first bring me petvee.,, 3 
Went the flea to the cellar, where Petvee is kept and 
asked: 
Said to him the cetlar: 
"But first far off the rat from here. " 
Went the fLea to the rat and asked: ... 
Said to him the rat: 
"But first get the cat away from me. " 
Went the flea to the cat and asked . 
Said the cat: 
"But first bring me mi Lk. " 
Went the flea to the cow and aakad: 
Said the cow: 
"But first bring me some grass. " 
Went the flea to the field and cut some graza he brought to 
the cow who gave him milk which he brought the cat who kept 
away from the Pat that left the cellar which gave him Petvee 
he brought the chicken who gave him a chick which he brought 
the hawk that Left the tree. The tree gave him food for the 
pig and the pig gave him some hair, from which he made a 
strong rope. He threw the rope in the stream and rescued 
the ant. 
And then they continued their way as brothers would do. 
(Samshoblo, 16 (555), August 1982) 
This fable appeared in Samshoblo, the Georgian compatriot monthly, 
which is distributed free of charge outside Georgia. The fable was 
published in response to a request, from a migrant residing in New 
York, to cater for the young children of Georgians living abroad. One 
can only assume that its choice rates this piece as quite a popular 
one. A view confirmed by both Israeli and English informants origina- 
ti ng f rom Georgi a. 
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1. SIX CRISIS ACCOUNTS 
1.1 Introduction 
The aim of this chapter is to look into some of the crises that 
involved my tnformants when they were carrying on second economy 
activity in Georgia. By crises I mean those occasions, when second 
economy activity became officially known to the authorities or when 
such knowledge was imminent and when it appeared likely that official 
action could not be deflected. Crises are of primary importance for 
the following reasons: 
- the risks of being detected are an inherent component of any illegal 
activity. It thus heavily influences the structure of that activity 
as suggested in earlier chapters. It means, for instance, and at its 
simplest, that extra safeguards have to be incorporated at all stages 
of illegal production, distribution or service provision. Crises 
allow us to look into the structure of informal economic operations in 
ways not normally available when their routine workings are being 
discussed. In short: crises throw structures into high relief. 
- Crises had very real presence in the life of my informants. Among 
the 35 persons who were interviewed for the Life History question- 
naire, only 7 had no case of imprisonment or danger of imprisonment in 
the hi story of thei r extended f ami 11 es. 4,5 One i nf ormant put itin 
these words: "One does not realize the danger there, because life 
takes its course and Leviing6 is part of it. Only now, in the dis- 
tance of time and place, can I see that practically every single day 
of my life my neck was in the rope and at any minute the ground could 
have been cut from under my feet. " It is in this context that people 
speak of a constant presence of FEAR. They often use the word with 
the prefix 'the' as if it had a special connotation in their life, as 
if they were speaking of some real, existing entity. 7 
By looking in detail into crisis events, I follow a1 ong-establ i shed 
tradition in social anthropology. Gluckman studied crises as an 
aspect of conflict and as an important source of data as long ago as 
1940 (Gluckman, 1958), but one can trace it back to Evans-Pritchard 
(1937) and indeed further to Malinowski. Of particular importance is 
the development by Hoebel and Llewellyn of the 'trouble case method' 
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in studying "primitive law" (1941). Not only because they were the 
first to outline this methodology and emphasize its importance, but 
also because their study related to events which happened in the past, 
much like the present study - though their past was more distant than 
in my case. Others, who have made particular use of similar concepts 
are Barton (1949), Colson (1953), Turner (1957), Bohannan (1957), 
Gulliver (1963) and this is by no means an exhaustive list. 
1.2 Account I: An Attempt at Blackmail 
The following account is told by a village storekeeper. It occurred 
at the beginning of the seventies: 
"I'll never forget it. It was a Sunday and snowing and we were 
selling flannel cloth and a long queue of customers accumulated. 
The flannel cost 1.02 Rubles and we were selling it for 1.27 
Rubles -a0.25 Kopek difference which made very nice profit 
since people would be taking some 5m each. 
"Suddenly I noticed two people approaching me. They asked me how 
much is the price - which was strange, so I didn't reply. And 
also because they were strangers. They asked me again and again 
I ignored them. Finally I became angry and said I wouldn't 
discuss anything until their turn comes. So they entered the 
queue. When their turn came one of them chose three colours and 
asked for the price. I ignored his question, computed the 
figures, and gave them the final sum. Which was the correct 
official price. 
"Somehow I felt something fishy about them: they were strangers 
and asked too many questions. They did not seem happy with that, 
but gave me a paper note and I gave back the change. Which was 
the exact sum. So they counted the coins, standing near the 
counter and apparently became irritated. One threw the coins 
into my face and shouted: 'You made an error. You should have 
charged us the same price you charged the others. ' 
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"My reaction was a burst of laughter because I was smarter than 
them. I knew that I could easily prove that I didn't overcharge 
them and actually refused to take from them more money. The two 
left and I didn't bother myself any further with the whole 
affair. 
"Next Sunday one of the two appeared accompanied by a policeman I 
didn't know. They went straight to me and asked: 'who is in 
charge here? ' I identified myself and the policeman said: 'I'd 
like to have a word with you. ' 
"We entered i nto the warehouse and he cl ai med that a compl ai nt 
had been issued against me. I asked him: 'who are you? ' and he 
answered: 'What do you careV 
"I knew he is not from the area, since I knew all policmen in the 
area. So I insisted and asked him again and finally the police- 
man said he belongs-to a certain station. 
"So I told them: 'Please wait here' and rushed out in order to 
get hold of 'my policeman'. When he entered with me into the 
store they both became pale. 'My policeman' asked them what they 
wanted and the other policeman said he came to investigate a 
complaint about price overcharging. 'My policeman' became very 
stern and said that any such complaint should be dealt with by 
the local police only. To start with, that complaint should have 
been regi stered I ocal ly and he is goi ng to see to it that both 
persons are to be questi oned about the whol e af f ai r. Heari ng 
that the two strangers became very nervous and quite apologetic 
and asked me and 'my policeman' not to take this matter any 
further. And it turned out that the stranger persuaded the 
policeman whom he knew that here is a chance to blackmail some 
rich Jews and there was no intention at all to issue genuinely a 
compl ai nt. 
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"After we have done some enquiries, it turned out that there was 
no intention whatsoever to complain but rather to blackmail. The 
stranger got somehow the idea that this store 'belongs' to some 
'rich Jews' and persuaded that policeman to cooperate with him in 
blackmail. " 
1.3 Account II: Rescue from Incrimination 
The following case is told by an informant who at the time was seven- 
teen years old. The subject of the story is his father who was a 
small businesman running a small shop (or a large stall) in a typical 
Georgian small town market holding some forty shops and a few stalls. 
The events happened at the beginning of the seventies. 
"On Monday the traders in the market got warning of a possible 
raid sometime during the coming week. The warning arrived from a 
person who was not a trader but had much invested interest in the 
market. He was a 'silent partner' to some of the shops there. 
Thi s person had a 11 nk to somebody in Tbi 11 si who woul d be ex- 
pected to know of such things. A check with the local officials 
failed to verify the warning. They did not know anything, but 
people in the market nonetheless took the warning seriously. 
After all it came from a highly regarded person. Few closed 
their shops for the whole week - most of them were the more 
established shopkeepers. The rest, including my father, could 
not afford to close entirely. So they tried their luck. 
"A f ew stayed open al I the week - others cl osed only on certai n 
days. My dad closed on Tuesday and Wednesday and opened on the 
Thursday. Thursday, being market day, involved obviously a 
hi gher ri sk - but al so a hi gh chance f or earni ng, especi al ly as 
some shops did not operate because of the scare. The special 
control committee arrived on Thursday. It was a central commit- 
tee on an irregular check mission8 - and that is why the local 
officials were not told. 
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"This was an ad hoc committee of eight persons working in two 
sub-groups, comprised of persons from the commerce departments in 
some local governments and representatives from the regional 
office of the OBKhSS. 9 
"A local boy of fourteen was given some money to buy a few things 
at my dad's shop. The boy was probably a Komsomol. 10 Three men, 
disguised as customers, watched him. He purchased a pair of 
trousers and was charged 4.40 Rubles instead of 3.60 Rubles; a 
pair of socks for 2.30 Rubles instead of 1.20 Rubles and a rubber 
band for underwearof which he got 7m instead of 9m as charged. 
The control man identified themselves, charged my dad with specu- 
lation (which is a criminal offence) and ordered him to close his 
shop, which was thereafter sealed until a formal inquiry was set 
up. He was taken immediately to the town's police station. 
"The rumour spread immediately at the market place and details 
quickly reached our home - though we lived some two hours away by 
train from the market. At once all our relations and neighbours 
came in to share with us the tragedy. My father's brothers and 
my mother's cousin - who happened to visit the town at that time 
- started to pl an how to get hi m out of the mess. Fi rst of al 1, 
all the goods we had at home were dispersed quickly to face a 
possible police raid in our home. They were put, for the time 
being, at my father's brother's place. 
"My uncles and my mother's cousin made a contact with the head of 
the police station where my father was arrested. It seemed 
possible to do something but for a considerable amount of money. 
My mother's cousin proved to be of crucial importance. He was 
much richer than our family - he ran a factory in Tbilisi and had 
many contacts with officials there and knew in person the man who 
had issued the warning to the market traders. 
"He asked this person to come urgently from Tbilisi and both went 
to see the head of the police. Of course they took a lot of 
risk, since they demanded the release on bail of my father as 
well as easing the charges against him. This was arranged for 
the huge sum of 50,000 Rubles to be handed in cash. ' 
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'How was the sum raised in a short timeV 
"20,000 Rubles were given by my family. Part of it we held at 
home as a matter of regularity for emergencies. The rest was 
given as a loan by my relatives. 30.000 Rubles were raised by 
the traders in the market - both Jews and Gentiles. 
11 
"On his release, father went together with a few others (in- 
cluding me) to empty his shop of the illegal goods he held there. 
Instead of 34 items he was licensed to deal with he stocked some 
240. If caught and convicted of this offence he would have been 
sentenced for 'sabotaging the state's economy' on which the 
minimal sentence is 15 years imprisonment. 
"Luckily, dad was clever enough to leave a window unlocked - 
through which we managed to go in with the help of the night 
patrol who was given 100 Rubles. We dispersed the goods among 
the other shops in the market - the traders had authorized the 
guard to open their shops to do it. But a considerable amount 
was loaded on a van we brought with us. On leaving, we phoned to 
our house from the guard's post saying: 'the bi rds are on thei r 
way' which was an agreed code meaning: 'the goods are on the way 
- be ready to disperse them. ' 
"My mother's cousin was driving. He was a man in his thirties 
and very tough. Since it was early morning, we were soon detect- 
ed by the police patrols and were ordered to stop. 
"Of course we dared not stop and a chase developed. We knew the 
roads very well and managed to get away. On arrival we unloaded 
at my mother's cousin's relation, since our home could already 
have been under surveillance. Small traders were waiting with 
cash to buy the goods off us at purchase price. 12 Within 90 
minutes all was gone. " 
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1.4 Account III: Revenge 
The following is told by a young storekeeper. The events took place 
at the end of the sixties. 
"In one of my regular visits to Tsentral Baza13 I was approaced 
by one of the Tovarovedi14 who asked if I would be interested in 
some 'spare' fabrics he got. I replied: 'I'll think about it. ' 
Really, I was not interested in particular. Firstly, because I 
already had a regular supply from a local factory, and secondly, 
because I was aware of the distance I have to travel and the fact 
that I got to pass through three police regions, and in only one 
of them I personally knew the senior officers. 15 
"But he seemed to press me to buy up the stock and I didn't want 
to refuse him as this could affect future relations between us. 
16 
While unloading I was careful to put the illicit stuff deep 
inside the van. As usual, I asked for the driver I have always 
been taking with me. He used to get some 10 Rubles tip, as 
sometimes we had to stop at unsolicited places, unload and upload 
or extend the Journey. He was very reliable; he kept his mouth 
always shut. (My informant draws his lips together). 
"Off we went and after some time I heard a horning behind me. I 
didn't pay any attention to that until the driver looked at the 
mirror and said: 'Gosh, these are 009S. 17 What the hell do they 
wantV 
"We stopped of course. The policeman who approached us seemed to 
be annoyed: 'Why don'tyou stop? ' 'I'm horning and horning for 
five minutes' he shouted to the driver. 
"Then he turned to me and said: 'And who are you? ' The driver 
presented me and the policeman asked to see the Faktura. 18 1 
handed them over - there were some ten and he carefully observed 
them. Then he tol d me to open the van and itI ooked as if he 
intended to go through any single item I bought. Both of us were 
in the rear, unloading and comparing the list and, after going 
through half the van (the unrecorded stock was at the very rear), 
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he suddenly said: Vyou know what, between us, I can assure you 
that I know you got here unsolicited goods' and he quoted to me 
the exact specifications: quantities, sorts and prices. I was 
stunned. But I denied it. 
"So he said: 'OK let's seal the car and turn back and have an 
official check at the police station. ' 'All right, let's cut 
things short' I told him. 'What do you actually wantV 
"And he replied: 'Look, don't be stubborn. It's a pity on you: 
you are sti IIa young lad. ' 
"So I said: 'Dlyou know what - you're right. I got with me 
goods that I should not have. Now, how does it help me that I 
tol d you thatV 'You are 1 ucky' he repI i ed 'You are 1 ucky that 
I am a friendly person and that I like to discuss things. ' 
"So we got off the -van and started negotiating. He asked me my 
name and I told him, and then he called me by my private name, as 
if our relations have suddenly become more intimate. 'Believe 
me, ' he said 'I know where you come from and where you go to and 
I tell you that I cam make a fortune out of this case. From the 
man who gave you these goods I can demand aI ot of money. ' 
"'You are wrong' I said 'Nobody gave me anything. I broke into 
the warehouse. '19 He laughed and said: 'Really, don't tell me 
fairytales. I want 5,000 Rubles. ' So I said: 'All the stuff we 
are speaking about is worth 1,900 Rubles. Out of this I hoped to 
make maybe 200 Rubles' - which was true - 'How can I give you 
that much? ' 'If I take this matter further and arrest you and 
then contact the man who sold you these goods and tell him you 
are under arrest - you wi Il see how much he would be ready to 
spend in order to get you out. What is5,000? 1f I'l 1 11 ke it- 
V1 1 take 50,000 - I'l I have a mi 111 on! ' 
"At that time I really started to worry. He knew too many de- 
tails about this transaction and I could not make out from where. 
It was clear someone was trying to have me. But who? And why? 
In any case, the sum he asked for was ridiculous for the circum- 
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stances and I still had time to bargain. So I said: 'All right, 
I'll give you 500 Rubles., 20 He refused, so I said to him: 
I ook, that's al II can af f ord. If you don't want - al 1 ri ght: 
book me. I'll be finished. You will have finished a man and his 
family. And what will you have gained? Money you won't get and 
you certainly won't receive a medal. ' 
"Finally we agreed on 600 Rubles. But I had nothing like that 
sum wi th me. So I sai d to hi m: 'I gi ve you my word of honour - 
yet this evening (it was already late afternoon) I bring you the 
money. ' But he refused and said in contempt 'Who knows - you are 
a kid., 21 
"So I started naming all the persons in the district whom he 
mi ght know, mostly storekeepers Ii ke mysel f, and who woul d be 
ready to stand a surety for me. And while I am doing that, I 
noticed one of the people I mentioned, passing by in his car. It 
was really a miracle. I waved to him and he stopped and came to 
the two of us and asked what was going on. The policeman who 
knew hi m asked: 'Do you know thi s man? ' poi nti ng to me and the 
I atter conf i rmed. 'Can he be trusted f or 600 Rubl es? ' I nstead 
of an answer, the man - without a word - handed out 600 Rubles to 
the policeman. I was very thankful to him at this moment. 
"The pol i ceman I ef t and the agony seemed to be over. I tol d my 
colleague, who had a shop in the district and we were belonging 
to the same organization, the whole story and asked him if he 
would be kind enough to do me another favour and that is to 
report the incident to the chap who gave me the goods. Because 
he might be in danger as well and I wanted to rush with my stuff 
home and anyhow I had to release the van with the driver. 
"'of course' he agreed. And I thought that as far as I am 
concerned the ordeal is finished. But this was not the end of 
the story. 
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"At 10.00 p. m. the Tovaroved knocked on my door. He was angry 
and worried and wanted to know exact details. In particular he 
was interested in the policeman who stopped me. But I described 
him and I knew to which district he belonged, and most important, 
I noticed the car registration number he came with. The follow- 
ing day - this information I gathered later - the Tovaroved 
located the said policeman. He pressed him very hard to reveal 
the person who gave me in. Of course, the man was very reluctant 
to give away the name. But, af ter a1 engthy debate in whi ch it 
was made clear to him that he would be 'looked for'22 and in 
exchange of 20,000 Rubles and a few bott les of wine, to ease his 
conscience, 23 he got the name out of him. 
"The traitor was a storekeeper and a Jew, and we all knew him 
well. His motivation, as turned out later, was to take revenge 
on the chap who sold me the goods and I was only a vehicle to get 
through to him. Then I recalled that indeed he was present when 
I loaded the van with the unsolicited merchandise and he could 
have had all the evidence required to incriminate me - but who 
would believe it? I never even considered this as a possibility. 
The Tovaroved told me that when he came to see me again. And 
af ter he shared me hi sfi ndi ngs, he sai d: 'I sti II need you f or 
one thing - and then it will be all over for you. Please come 
and attend a meeting I'm gathering tomorrow. You must make an 
effort and come. ' 
"So I did and the following happened: there were some 10-12 
people present in the room. All storekeepers, all regular cus- 
tomers of the Tsentral Basa, including the man who gave me in, 
who apparently didn't suspect anything. The Tovaroved opened the 
meeting and said that he asked the people who were present to 
come because of a grim matter that happened and to which he 
wanted to have their opinions. He then turned to this man and 
said: 'You gave away this young person. Why did you do that? 
Do you know hi in at al I? What wrong has he done to you? Do you 
realize what might have happened if this matter was not stopped 
in time - if it came to an official inquiry? Even if he would 
not talk, even if he would not reveal anything - they were obli- 
ged to come here and seal the whole place and start investigat- 
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ing. Because it was clear that this is the source of the goods. 
And what would have happened then? All of us (he circled the 
participants) would be damaged, it might even be that all of us 
would be arrested. And all because of your slander. Why did you 
do thatV 
"The man, very emotional, replied by accusing the Tovaroved of 
discrimination. He claimed that he would refuse to give him any 
good stuff. Not only under the counter but even his rightful 
allocations he would deny him. 
"'Certainly I did so' replied the Tovaroved 'because I knew your 
kind and I knew you cannot be trusted. ' 
"And then of course a big fuss developed. Finally the Tovaroved 
said to this man: 'I do not pity you, butyour family. Because 
you left me no choice but to chase you from your position. Take 
my advice and leave tomorrow your post and start looking for an 
ordinary Job because you have no chance whatsoever to stay in 
business. I will haunt you in whatever position you will enter, 
in any trade you will take on, because what you did is inexcus- 
able. ' 
"And so it was. The man did not leave his Job voluntarily, but 
was dismissed after a while. " 
1.5 Account IV: A Conflict over Profits 
"Getting the labels for the illegal biscuit packs proved always 
to be a delicate matter. We would get tickets according to the 
official quantities of The Plan but the rest24 had to be supplied 
from elsewhere" explained the biscuit factory manager. 
nThe printing house of the official labels was out of the ques- 
tion. The supply came from outside Georgia and we had no access 
there. So we had to find a local alternative and we never had a 
regular place. Once or twice a year we had to look around for 
some printing house that would be willing to do the job. On this 
particular event we located a workshop some 50 km from the town. 
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We were introduced to the manager and he agreed to do the job but 
we had to supply the paper. This was a major problem. I knew 
personally the manager of a paper warehouse and he fixed us a 250 
kg delivery to the printing workshop. 
"And then I got a phone cal I to my 'house in the I ate afternoon, 
after working hours. It turned out that a quarrel broke out 
betwen the workshop manager and one of his assistants - all 
around our labels. Apparently the manager ordered the man to do 
the printing without offering him any extras for this work. When 
he asked for some money he was refused and then there was a clash 
which ended with the worker walking out of the workplace shout- 
ing: 'I shal I not be cal 1 ed a man if not al 1 of you end at the 
police station. I know precisely what's going on here. ' 
"We were therefore urged to come and collect the papers, because 
it was not known what damage has already been done or what might 
happen next. 
nThis was a supreme emergency and I immediately called my part- 
ners. We were Ii vi ng not f ar f rom each other and af ter a short 
while we got together. It was decided we had to act immediately 
and quickly to find out what happened and diffuse the dangers. 
The first task was to find out where the workshop manager lived. 
We wanted to hear what exactly happened and make it clear to him 
that he is accountable for whatever might follow as a result of 
his stupidity. 
nAfter some effort we got his address, which was in a rather 
remote corner of the province. All of us - that is the three 
partners, got into a vehicle and we asked one of our foremen to 
join us. He was an amateur boxer and looked particularly tough 
and vi ci ous. I had a gun in my pocket and we al 11 ooked as if we 
'meant business'. 
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"When we arrived at his place it was already 10.00 p. m. We 
dragged him out of his bed. It was made clear to him that any 
adverse consequences to us will cost him his life. We forced him 
to get dressed and come with us to his worker's residence, which 
was another hour's drive. 
"We then forced the two men to make peace with each other, which 
they did though not very willingly. Still, we had to take the 
250 kg paper with us and disperse it. 
"So, late at night, it was already after midnight, a van was 
arranged and the workshop unlocked. All the stuff was loaded and 
we made al 1 the way back. We sti 11 had the probl em of getti ng 
rid of the incriminating paper. We did not trust the worker and 
feared that he might have already given us away. So first thing 
in the morni ng I cal I ed on a nei ghbour who coul d hardly be con- 
nected with the factory if it came to the worst. I asked him to 
accommodate with him the paper for a couple of days until we see 
what to do next. He agreed, after some hesitation, but not for 
long. 
"After only two days he came to me and begged us to take away the 
stuff. He said he can't sleep at night from fear. So I had no 
choice. I took the stuff and dispersed it among a few close 
friends and some was left with me - which obviously was rather 
dangerous. And gradually we started burning the paper. We 
coul dn't do it all at once, we were scared this might be noticed. 
But, after a week or so, al I was over. " 
1.6 Account V: A Customer Complains 
The informant was managing a rural town store. 
"one day we got, quite unexpectedly, a small shipment of Japanese 
ladies watches. There were only ten items and we were quite 
puzzled what to do with them. I suggested that we keep the lot 
for ourselves and distribute them only in the close family cir- 
cle, but my partners felt differently and it was decided to sell 
them on a selective basis and naturally for a higher price than 
officially registered. 
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"We sold a watch for 50 Rubles on average, instead of about 25 
Rubles, the formal price, which was not an excessive price for 
this quality and rare a product, and they all went very quickly. 
"Certainly we were very careful about choosing the right clients, 
but we were not careful enough. Because once the watches were 
purchased they immediately appeared on the people's wrists, so 
that everyone will be able to observe the-new purchase. And then 
they would be asked where they got these watches and it was not 
long before we had requests from clients, which we were of course 
not able to fulfil. And the next thing I knew was somebody 
rushing into the shop and handing me a copy of the local paper in 
which a letter of complaint was printed with particular reference 
to me. It said: 25 'There is a store in this town which is 
managed by a person by the name of .... who runs it very wel I, 
and though he is not in charge of every transaction made - his 
impact is to be found in almost anything done, in particular what 
concerns imported goods. ' 
"'I would like, then, to take this opportunity to ask him who 
benefits from the Japanese watches he gets and why is their price 
double the official one; and how come a lady's dress costs 38 
Rubles instead of 18 Rubles and not to mention imported shoes .. 
"'But probably there is no point in asking because he knows 
precisely how these items should be sold and for how much. But 
he really does not care what we, ordinary citizens, think about 
his affairs. He does it his way as if the store were his private 
property and not a common wealth. ' 
"The letter was unnamed but this did not make things easier for 
me. It was bad luck indeed, since had I known it only a few 
hours earlier, even at the stage of the process of printing, I 
could have done something to avoid publication: manipulating my 
people, using threats, offering money - but it was all too late 
for that sort of action. Now we had to see what to do next - the 
damage had already been inflicted upon me. 
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"After careful consideration, we - my partners and myself - 
decided that the best would be for me to quit my post. This 
seemed to be the most reasonable solution for the inquest that we 
were expecting and also the cheapest one. In that respect, we 
were lucky to reside amidst a gentile population. Had it been a 
more 'Jewish' area, the officials would have been so corrupt with 
bribes that to clean up that mess would have cost us perhaps a 
million. We managed to get through considerably cheaper and the 
fact that I had to leave my work helped to smooth things over. " 
1.7 Account VI: A Betrayal 
The following account is told by the son of this case subject. It 
happened in the mid-fifties. 26 
"Father was a tailor. He had a partner and both were working 
partly for the black market. They worked together for several 
years and it really was father who introduced him to the job. 
Father was the senior partner. 
"One day father went to shop for cloths for the extra produce and 
on his return he was arrested with the stuff he bought and sub- 
sequently spent three years in Jail. Later it turned out that 
his partner betrayed him. He approached the police and reported 
my father and instructed them how and when to catch him. He did 
it because he wanted to take over the business and while father 
was in jail his brother joined him as an accomplice. 
If you are right - and there was a betrayal, how come he did not 
fear retaliation? 
"Father was not a rich man. He was really rather poor. He had 
three brothers, younger than him, with whom he had bad relations 
and it is very likely that that person knew all about it. And 
this fact is of supreme importance, because a Georgian will 
always first think of how the relatives will respond if he does 
such a thing and he probably envisaged that there will be no 
reaction. " 
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Were there any other relatives who would consider themselves 
harmed by such a betrayal? 
"Well, father had three sisters and all were already married at 
the time but brothers-in-law would not necessarily count in a 
case like that. The traitor would not fear retaliation from the 
sisters' husbands. " 
Q: And what about your mother's family? 
"Mother had three brothers, all photographers and they were 
helpful indeed. But they were not particularly well-off and they 
lived in different areas, so they did not make a very efficient 
deterrent either. " 
And personal friends? 
"Father had no close friends - that is, no Dsemobilebi27 and no 
Negobarebi. 28 When father was arrested mother and my sisters and 
myself moved to Ii ve with the second brother of mother and her 
parents, who Ii ved nearby and hel ped us wi th f ood and cl othi ng. 
We had no savings nor income to live on. Father's family did 
practically nothing to help. They opposed his marriage with 
mother and ever since they hardly were in contact. When this 
af f ai r happened they of f ered no hel p at al 1. Sure, they gave a 
proper show publicwise: they attended the trial and seemed very 
concerned, but they didn't even offer a penny to help and, after 
the trial was over, they hardly asked about his well-being. When 
father finished his sentence he completely broke off his links 
with his family: with all his brothers and sisters. 
"From the very first day of arrest mother's brothers did their 
best to help father. Firstly they located where he was held: 
that was not clear since no one was present when they arrested 
him. And by the time they found him it was too late to get him 
out without a sentence because though the local police were 
involved, the regional police had already been informed. So they 
tried to find out who the Prokurator29 would be in his case and 
how to find a link with him. 
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"Most of the dealing at that stage was carried out by the eldest 
brother who had brains, was better educated and knew how to talk 
in a nice manner. He approached the middleman who made contact 
with the Prokurator and this was perhaps the most important and 
delicate task in the whole affair. " 
Who was the middleman? 
"The mi ddl eman was the person f ound to be most sui tabl e- that 
is, to the best of my uncle's knowledge - to approach the 
Prokurator. It was known that he was socializing with him and he 
had a proven record of previous successes. He claimed that he 
was not getting any money for his services, not a penny. That he 
is doing it for a just cause, because he knows my father and the 
family and that we are honourable people and blah-blah-blah ... 
But the money passed through him and only he had contact with the 
Prokurator, so really he can take - and probably he does take - 
whatever he finds appropriate. The givers cannot know and pos- 
siblY the receiver does not know either the exact sums ex- 
changed. " 
Was the middleman Jewish or gentile? 
"He was a genti I e. " 
Q: From your experi ence and f rom your knowl edge of the mi ddl eman 
institution, can you describe some of the characteristics of 
these men? 
"This person, firstly, would be someone reliable. Someone you 
can trust, and that applies to both sides: to the giving and 
receiving ends. His source of power is the very fact that he has 
a reliable contact with a person in an important position. That 
is a potential powee that can become active in times of need. 
"The sources of this contact could vary. Maybe he once helped a 
relative in crisis and hence established relations and then 
became known in the community as someone who can 'fix' such 
things. Maybe he has already a communication channel with this 
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important person on other grounds. Say, he is supplying him some 
professional services or goods - and that can be even the tailor 
or the grocer, but probably someone of a better social standing - 
and now he uses the same channel for other purposes. So the 
crucial characteristic is that he has already a communication 
link. And sometimes it could well be that the initiative will 
stem from the Prokurator himself and he finds a suitable person 
to function as middleman. 
"Fi rst we got a demand f or 20,000 Rubl es30 in exchange f or a 
lenient sentence. That is, for 20,000 father would get three 
years. Without any payment he might have got up to 15 years, 
depending on the charges against him. This was a lot of money 
and there was no chance to raise such a sum. Probably it had to 
do with the fact we were Jewish. Because the image the Jews had 
was that they are wealthy and therefore can afford to pay, and 
that they are cowards and therefore can be easily threatened and 
that they would do anything not to sit in jail. 
"In no way were we able to raise the sum required, so we started 
to negotiate with the middleman. My uncle said: 'We are a poor 
f ami ly - you can ask and fi nd out. We are desperate, we hardly 
have a living, etc. ' So the price dropped gradually, but it 
would still be too high. At a stage we had to stop negotiations 
to demonstrate that we had given up. Finally, the price settled 
on 7,000 Rubles. " 
Q: Does this mean that the sentence was linked to the price? 
"No, no. For the 20,000 he still would get three years, not 
less. The only difference was later, during imprisonment, that 
we could not afford to supply him money for better food, better 
clothing, or to better the type of labour he was designated to. " 
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How was the money raised? 
"Father got some and mother's brothers gave some. Each brother 
gave about 25% and we had altogether about 90% of the sum. The 
10% missing we got from Mother's nephew (her brother's son). 
After father's release he gave them gradually back the money. " 
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2. CRISIS PRONENESS IN DIFFERENT ECONOMIC SECTORS 
Four of the si x cases rel ate to events havi ng to do wi th stores and 
this is no coincidence. My impression is that crises in distribution 
are far more common than in manufacturing or in personal service 
occupations. Thus, for instance, the biscuit factory, over a period 
of ten years, was involved in only two crises, while the village 
general store was involved in three major crises within two and a half 
years. In the town store there were two or three crises annually. 
2.1 Stores 
If one looks at the way stores operate, four reasons emerge as para- 
mount in explaining why these crises should be so frequent. 
The primary reason why stores are so liable to instability is that 
illicit merchandise often tends to be purchased via ad hoc trans- 
acti on s: a storekeeper must grasp at a good deal whenever he gets the 
chance - hence the source of his goods is not always clear, the agents 
that have dealt with the purchase at different points along its route 
are not necessarily known and the quality, if it is sold by sample, 
may not be homogenous. These uncertainties involve danger and finally 
there is always the possibility that goods are 'hot' and that offi- 
cials are in close pursuit or that agrieved members of the public 
might complain directly to the authorities about quality or over- 
charging. 
The following is an example of typical ad hoc buying. The informant 
is the son of a small-scale merchant, who was a student at the time: 
"I went to Riga for what was a social event to meet some friends 
from the university and naturally I kept my eyes open to see if I 
could get anything for my father. On my way I passed through the 
town's big department store and I noticed a girl from the faculty 
working in the shoe department. She was earning some money 
during the vacation. I asked her if there was anything interest- 
ing to buy and she replied that yes, as a matter of fact they had 
just got a shipment of Hungarian leather shoes. She asked if I 
woul dIi ke a pai r and I sai d 'why not make it hal fa dozen? ' I 
knew that in Georgia these would fetch a good price. The girl 
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said she could probably fix me the half dozen and she did and I 
collected them later. I passed her a few Rubles for her help. 
"Next I wandered around the local market just to browse around 
and see what I would do next. There I noticed a Georgian who 
looked to me to be buying and selling: you can always identify a 
Georgian by his appearance and the manner of his speech. And on 
foreign ground one Georgian is as a brother to another. So I 
approached him and asked if he would be interested in the shoes. 
We agreed on a deal. He gave me 5 Rubles extra on each pair and 
so I made a modest profit of 30 Rubles. 31 It's not a lot, but it 
was OK for the circumstances and it gave me some pocket money for 
my vacation. I suppose that in many ways this was a risky thing 
to do. I di dn't real ly know the gi rl or the man in the market 
and carrying out a parcel of six pairs of shoes was suspicious in 
itself. " 
A second built-in weakness for store managements is that a good deal 
of their illegal activity is carried out on an ad hoc basis. Though 
most stores possess a regular clientele, many of their customers are 
unknown. Nonetheless, when selling illegal goods an attempt is in- 
variably made to verify their credibility. A storekeeper told me: 
"As a rule, you would sell a product which is in much demand only 
to someone you know. " And what if the demand comes from a stran- 
ger? "Then I would probaly not deny I got the goods but I would 
say I haven't got them right now: 'come tomorrow and we'll see. ' 
In the meantime I check the references. " 
But one cannot total ly avoi d sel Ii ng to strangers or persons whose 
credibility has not been thoroughly checked. And sometimes it is a 
refusal which causes trouble for the storekeeper: 
"A wife of a highly ranked official entered a shop in Kutaisi 
which was operated by a friend of mine. She w anted to buy a TV 
set of a certain make and type that was in great demand. She was 
refused because no one knew her and in any case how was it that a 
woman should be buying an item like that? This refusal, however, 
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was a bad mistake. Had her husband come, then of course this 
mistake would have been avoided. 
"She was upset because she'd seen the set she wanted on the 
di spl ay - but she was tol dit had al ready been sol d. She was 
annoyed and after an argument she went off. Then of course she 
complained to her husband. The first thing next morning the 
Chief of Police was in the store: an official inquiry was on its 
way to look into the whole question of the supplies and purchases 
of Ms. " 
A further source of instability derives from the consumer-conscious 
customer against whom there can never be good enough preventive 
counter-measures. This type of person, whom Lampert (1982) calls 'a 
whistle-blower' is to be found everywhere and Soviet Georgia is no 
exception. The following is recounted by a village store manager: 
"One day a man bought a sweater from me and then he went straight 
to the village police and issued a complaint because he believed 
I'd charged him above the set price. The policeman was regularly 
receiving money from me, so he told him: 'leave the purchase 
with me and I'll call the store manager and ask for his explana- 
tion. ' But the customer meant to be difficult - he didn't want 
to leave the sweater because he real i zed that the sweater, to- 
gether with its labelling, was the basis of his evidence and he 
didn't trust the policeman. So he took his sweater away with 
him. A few days later he came back again to inquire about the 
complaint. He insisted on carrying it through. It was only by 
doi ng aI ot of work to fi nd out if we knew anyone who coul d exert 
a lever against him that we managed to stop him. Luckily the 
pol i ceman had af ri end of af ri end who was owed a bi gf avour by 
this troublemaker, and he stopped it going further. " 
On another occasion the same village storekeeper was approached by his 
old school master with what he called a friendly warning: "you were 
my pupi 1 and that is why I am warni ng you: when I buy a box of Pri Na 
cigarettes I expect to get one Kopek change from a coin of 15. " 
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The pri ce of the box was 14 Kopeks and itis consi dered an i nsul tin 
Georgian values, to give back a mere 1 Kopek piece as change. It is 
unheard of to ask for such a small coin. Mars, in his trip to 
Georgia, in 1982, observed that one would never give the exact 5 
Kopeks to stand on a street weighing machine "they always gave extra - 
often as much as three times the official price and they never expect- 
ed to receive change" (personal communication). And yet, by law, 
change should always be given, which again increases the vulnerability 
of shop keepers who are the fulcrum point of colluded-in and connived- 
at behaviour which is nonetheless officially illegal. In addition to 
the major vulnerabilities described it should again be emphasized that 
storekeepers frequently have to act as the delivery agents for their 
own illegal goods. They therefore operate at the most vulnerable 
stage of the movement of goods. 
It has already been noted in previous Chapters (5,6 and 7) that when 
compared with factory executives, storekeepers have a smaller and 
weaker network involved in their illicit affairs. Which is also an 
indication of their relative lack of prestige. And both factors 
together limit their ability to sustain crises when they arise - at 
least in comparison with their counterparts in production. 
From the information I gathered it is interesting to note the unanim- 
ity expressed about storekeeping, especially smallscale storekeeping - 
and its risks. It seems, as in the West, to attract people who wish 
to aspire and 'improve their lot' but who appear to lack the extensive 
skills and the necessary contacts which yield the really large 
'prizes' that can arise in distribution and certainly arise in produc- 
ti on. This is perhaps why several of my informants had tried store- 
keeping at different times but had then changed to the less risky 
personal service occupations. As one told me: 
"The first job I had was as a minor partner in a small country store. 
One day - luckily I was away in Tbilisi - there was a raid and the 
other two were arrested for overcharging on oil. We weren't making 
enough to head off the raid before it happened or to pay off the 
pol i ce af terwards, so they both went to j ai 1.1 t was then I deci ded 
that the whole thing was too dangerous for me and that was when I 
decided to be a barber. " 
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2.2 Factories 
It is the nature of factory production that, it requires continuous 
uninterrupted and coordinated throughput of material and effort. That 
is why in production we do not find so much of ad hoc crises as is 
seen in distribution. I have already reviewed what production re- 
quires in terms of 'licensing fees' and 'hush money' which also take 
on the flavour of consistency and which result in regular bribes paid 
as 'salaries'. It is because of these necessities which are expressed 
in the multiplicity of interest by so many functionaries who neces- 
sarily have to act in coordination, that factories benefit from a 
relatively low threat of direct exposure. As the biscuit factory 
manager told his local Komsomol chief who had stumbled on his illicit 
production: "Do you realize how many people's (essentially illegal) 
livings are dependent on this factory? ... (and) you really thought 
you could stop it!? " 
At the end of the productive process - the sale of fi nal products - 
factories again differ widely from stores. Since the Soviet economy 
is notorious for its lack of consumer goods, manufacturers operate in 
a sellers market. They are therefore pursued by retailers and are in 
a position to dictate their conditions of sale. And again, unlike 
stores, they are in a better position to be able to choose their 
customers. In the biscuit factory these were carefully chosen and 
comprised of no more than four stores who regularly received their 
products. In this way the relationship of the factory to its outlets 
was able to be based on long-range commitments. 32 For the store- 
keepers, however, biscuits were only one item on their shelves. 
Whereas the biscuit factory could limit its risks to servicing only 
four regular outlets, the typical store was involved with several 
(non-fixed) suppliers. 
Crises, however, do occur with factories as with stores, not only 
because of a malfunctioning of 'safeguards' (see later) but because no 
matter how far a factory management is able to safeguard its own 
procedures, it is still nonetheless vulnerable to breakdowns in con- 
trol that occur outside its boundaries. Such was the case with the 
labels printing workshop (Account IV) that serviced the biscuit fac- 
tory and which came under threat of official intervention. These are 
B-26 
always likely to spill over and contaminate other concerns with which 
they have dealings as in the case of a factory which manufactured 
furniture: 
"Our troubles started when one of our managers, who was also a 
partner to the illegal enterprise, committed suicide. The ci r- 
cumstances were rather mysterious and they are still unclear 
today. 
"The tragedy happened in another di stri ct of Georgi a and at the 
beginning there were even suspicions of murder. When the police 
investigators came from the other district to tell the bad news 
to the widow, they interrogated her about potential suspects. 
She started to talk about everything she knew - all about his - 
and our - business. She must have been in a state of shock 
otherwise she would have had more sense but she told them a mass 
of very delicate information - far more than she ought to have 
known in the first-place. 
"Since the investigators came from a different district, they had 
a $monopoly' over the crime because it had happened in thei r 
area. And worse - they had documented evidence, which was very 
incriminating so there was not much we could do except pay. And 
because they weren't local, our contacts weren't able to reach 
them. This meant we had to go up very high on our side to reach 
a high level on their side, to get them off our necks. " 
Q: Did you succeed? 
"Oh yes, we succeeded all right. " 
Q: How much did it cost? 
"A lot of money! " 
Q: Alot of money means thousands of Rubles? 
"In such circumstances thousands of Rubles are not sufficent to 
silence the case. " 
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He refused to answer further questions. I have, however, heard of 
instances where the authorities who have stumbled on cases of illegal 
production have - as the price of their silence - insisted on becoming 
partners in the business. 33 This appears from accounts to apply to 
different levels of officialdom from road patrolmen to the most senior 
officials. 
There are therefore two basic differences in the economic conditions 
that face stores and factories, and which affect both legitimate and 
illicit activity. Firstly, as in the West, the pressure on factories 
is to ensure that they generate throughput as consistently as they 
can, whereas stores experience a much greater proneness to ad hoc 
responses. But linked to this factor is the specificity of the Soviet 
economic system with its scarcity of consumer goods which gives such 
disproportionate power to the producer at the expense of the retailer. 
It is for these reasons then that we can understand why the Georgain 
storekeeper spends a good deal of his time away from his store. As 
one storekeeper put it: 
"I had to spend more than four days a week chasing goods - you 
have to go to this factory and to that factory, to see this man 
and that man - you have really to put yourself out to survive. " 
it is a position in marked contrast to that of the Western storekeeper 
who, operating in an economy of surplus spends all his time behind his 
counter and is visited by supplicant representatives of the manufac- 
turers. If, as Nove has observed (1977) "In an economy of scarcity, 
the producer is King" - then we can also better understand the con- 
verse - that in an economy of surplus it is the retailer who is King. 
But it is in understanding what lies behind these differences that we 
can come to appreciate the profound implications they offer to our 
understanding of the working of Soviet Georgia's second economy. This 
point will be further explored in the last chapter. 
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2.3 Personal Services 
Illegal activities in the personal service occupations - that is 
barbers, tailors, shoe repairers, hatters, samll cafe-bar owners and 
waiters - are very limited and are, of course, differently organized 
than is the case in either stores or factories. By and large these 
are one-person organizations, even if people work in cooperatives and 
share a common space. Since the work is individual and transactions, 
in particular unofficial ones, are strictly person-to-person, they are 
predominantly carried on with regular clients - which limits the risk. 
As a result, personal service crises are practically non-existent 
(except on the rare occasions when a delivery of unsolicited raw 
materials is detected, as in Case IV). A barber explains: 
"We got always a generous tip from our customers, which of course 
we were not supposed to get, and in any case we would not record 
it, and some of the clients - the regular ones - we would not 
record at all. This was the way to fiddle. But there was no 
'fear'. Because, after all, what is the offence? It's pennies 
we are talking about. Suppose, in the very unlikely event that 
you are caught on the spot, who is going to see you? Who wi Il 
report you? But say that somebody sees that you take money and 
don't regi ster it and then reports you. So what wi II they do? 
The worst could be that you might be reprimanded by the coopera- 
tive headquarters and that would be the worst. " 
Personal services therefore are relatively secure. In addition, how- 
ever, personal service relationships are highly valued in a personal- 
ized face-to-face, macho-dominated culture such as the Georgian. In 
this context the bond between a customer and his personal servant is 
constant and stronger than in a more faceless, bureaucratic culture 
where each transaction is seen as 'one-off' rather than as part of a 
flow. This element also makes for greater security. 
It is for these reasons of personal security then that, though total 
rewards (Mars, 1982) from personal service can be high, they do not 
tend to attract people with strong personal support networks. People 
with high network scores are able to take jobs that involve greater 
risks and which in this culture attract greater prestige (a point 
discussed more fully in Chapter 4). 
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3. THE WORKINGS OF TROUBLESHOOTERS 
3.1 'Routine' and 'Irregular' Crises 
There are countless reasons f or crises. Thi sis true in any system 
and the Soviet second economy, as a system, is no exception. The 
variety is well expressed in the presented accounts: 
(i) attempted blackmail, 
(i i) excessive risk-taking, 
(iii) revenge from an insider, 
(iv) collapse of a support system, 
(v) an unusual customer complaint, 
(vi) betrayal by a partner. 
These and others can be classified into 'routine' and 'irregular' 
crises. 
I would define 'routine crises' as those one might reasonably antici- 
pate, taking into account the normal vulnerabilities of a particular 
'business, 34 as discussed in the previous section. These crises are 
typically countered by routine safeguards. It is the task of these 
safeguarders to whom money is paid as either 'licensing fees, 
35 or as 
'hush money, 35 to protect the enterprise. Thus Account I, the Black- 
mail Attempt, is a typical routine customer complaint case albeit with 
a peculiar edge. Most shops get several such complaints a year. The 
storekeeper expected 'his policeman' as he termed it, to deal with the 
af f ai r: this was clearly his responsibility for which he had been 
regularly pai(L 
This role of the paid official as the expected diffuser of routine 
crises emerged even more clearly in the case already discussed of the 
customer who was persistent with his complaint. The village store- 
keeper explains: 
"After the customer kept calling at the police station about his 
complaint, 'my policeman' came to see me: 'The situation is 
getting serious. He won't drop it. I suggest you have a word 
with him: apologize or explain yourself and ask him to cancel 
it., 
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"I didn't like his advice. Firstly, I knew this character - he 
wasn't the type to be persuaded by soft words and secondly, I had 
my pride. I was quite angry and I said to him: 'You get paid - 
you find a way out. ' And so it was. The policeman found out 
that one of his relatives -a cousin - was a pal of that stubborn 
customer. The cousin then had a word with his pal and said that 
I had once done him a big favour (which was not true) and he 
therefore owes me a favour in return. Obviously he couldn't have 
refused a request coming from a close friend. " 
'Irregular' crises are much more serious for the illegal entrepreneur. 
Account V is typical of this type of case. While it might appear to 
be basically a common customer complaint, what makes it irregular is 
that the complaint is not lodged with the local police - where it 
coul d be routi ni zed but wi th the 1 ocal paper - whose treatment was 
essentially unpredictable. 'Routine' crises, on the other hand, would 
often not be accounted crises at all, simply because they could be 
resolved before evolving into a problem. Routine checks would never 
be considered a threat - only if they are instigated by higher author- 
ities outside of the region (Account II). Personal networks are 
usually too localized to be effective in dealing with outsiders. 
Three of the accounts tell of the collapse of (or a serious threat to) 
the illicit enterprise (Account III, IV and VI). This, naturally, is 
a real catastrophe, almost a force majeure. Since it is a fundamental 
characteristic of Georgian culture to consider friendship as a sacred 
axiom (as outlined in Chapter 4 on Core Values), there is always a 
close association between business relations and social life: they 
are practically fused (see Chapter 5 on Networks and The Feast). Any 
undermining of this basic assumption is therefore extremely threaten- 
ing, so much so that people find it difficult to accept such treach- 
ery. The storekeeper in Account III put itin these words "... I 
recalled that indeed he (the traitor) ... had the evidence required 
to incriminate me - but who would ever believe anyone would have acted 
like that? I never even considered it as a possibility. " 
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3.2 The Workings of the Network 
It is in the 'irregular' crises that the operation of networks are 
made manifest. It is in these circumstances that all resources are 
mobilized to minimize the perils of exposure. It is in this sense 
that the network becomes a 'safety net' which softens the fall. 
(a) Mobilization 
To respond effectively to an irregular crisis, one often needs a 
massive activation of people and material resources. Account II tells 
the story of the successful resolution of an irregular crisis which 
involved in its different stages several scores of people. My inform- 
ant estimated that some sixty to seventy people had finally to be 
mobilized before it was possible to overcome the last crucial phase of 
the crisis - that is to achieve the subject's release. All this had 
to take place in a total time span of less than 24 hours and in three 
different and distant geographical regions. Of course, not all who 
were involved were directly related to the subject. Some did not know 
him - or had even heard of him - before their assistance was required, 
whi 1e others were not even tol d of hi s name: it was not relevant. 
They were asked to help by someone to whom they had a commitment and 
that was sufficient (see Chapter 5 on the nature of transactions in 
this respect). These partisans were literally 'friends of friends' 
(Boissevain, 1978) activated by the 'first order' and 'second order' 
zones of a network - that is - by an ego's core family and his close 
friends, respectively. 
Such a complex degree of mobilization is usually required for three 
purposes: 
Monitoring - to closely follow developments in order to identify 
and locate the right people - those who are influential and 
could help out by approaching authorities or who can point out 
whom to approach and how (Accounts II and VI in particular). 
Sometimes other skills are needed: muscles (Account IV), for 
instance. 
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(ii) Prevention - by disposing of any incriminating traces: mobi 11 z- 
ing unsolicited goods (Account II) or in hiding a large amount 
of paper (Account IV). 
(iii) Fund-Raising - especially when a large sum of money has to be 
raised in a short time. Thus money was demanded on the spot 
(Account III) - because the person involved was not respectable 
enough to be trusted (he was too young) or money was needed 
urgently (Account II) to allow an early release, which again was 
crucial to prevent further negative results - (in this particu- 
lar case the detection of unsolicited goods). 
(b) Staffing 
Monitoring, prevention and fund-raising - the three main requirements 
at a time of crisis may need different skills for their successful 
accomplishment. The primary task, therefore, is to find the right 
people for each job in the given circumstances. This means the use of 
these cl ose contacts at the core of the network36 as a pool of talent 
and as links, which by careful screening of total resources, can 
locate the most suitable. 37 It is of particular importance to deter- 
mine who will take on the role of principal negotiator. This is a key 
position which naturally effects the future and personal safety of the 
person concerned and necessarily also the well-being of his closest 
family. The negotiator will be responsible for negotiating the sum of 
money involved and the terms of its exchange. This nomination re- 
flects upon a person's standing amongst his family and his friends. 
It is not surprising for the most senior member of the family to take 
up the mission (in Account VI this is the eldest brother) but more 
important are relevant personal links and know how (therefore in 
Account II this is the subject's wife's cousin; in the case of the 
village store customer complaint mentioned earlier, the village 
policeman's cousin proved the best choice. 
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(c) The Time Dimension 
Immediacy is the first general rule in resolving a crisis. Here we 
find an implicit use of the 'need to know' principle. The less people 
who know - the greater the possibility of containing and limiting a 
crisis' impact. This is why the store manager (Account V) gave up 
once he knew a customer's complaint had become public knowledge 
through publication in the local paper. 
A second significance of time acknowledges that here it literally 
means money. The more time a case takes, the greater the number of 
officials become involved thus incurring more claims for stakes in 
solving the problem. And time usually means that the case will go 
higher - the further it proceeds through the hierarchy the dearer the 
eventual settlement becomes. This is why the policeman and the store- 
keeper (Account III) reached a compromise and agreed to settle 'on the 
spot'. Both knew that each woul d stand to benef it more by 11 mi ti ng 
the case than by ref erri ng it upwards. As the I atter argued 
(if you) book me ... what wi II you have gained? Money you won't get 
and you certainly won't receive a medal. " This too was one of the 
reasons for speeding up the release of the storekeeper (Account II) 
apparently at the expense of further bargaining. Both parties to such 
transactions have an interest in reaching a mutual settlement. And 
for both, time is of the essence. 
Thirdly, the more official the inquiry - the higher the likelihood of 
unforseeable implications and again time is a crucial factor. This is 
because the longer a case is sub judice the more incriminating are the 
facts that might eventually emerge (Account II), and the possibility 
of an ever-widening circle of people who might be incriminated 
(Accounts III and IV). Once bureaucratic procedures start, it becomes 
progressively more difficult to stop them. "By the time they found 
him (my father) it was too late to get him out without a sentence 
because though the local police were involved, the regional police had 
already been informedn (Account VI). 
The aim then is always to stop procedures as soon as possible. It 
would appear to be in none of the actors interests to do otherwise. 
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A Final Note 
By studying the way people operate under stess, we are allowed to 
observe the workings of the social matrix in action. We can thus 
observe relations which might normally be latent or inactive or 
perhaps too marginal to become manifest at normal times. In the 
Georgian context an understanding of how people react to crises proves 
invaluable for understanding the workings and the efficiency of a 
social network. Crises activate networks by putting them to a real 
test: a network is only as good as its performance in a crisis. 
Whereas the feasting, fraternal union role of the network reflects its 
normal everyday manifestation, its true worth can be revealed only 
under stress. As such, the analysis of crises can provide a unique 
insight into the workings of a second economy -a constant source of 




1 Dzenobili in Georgian: the highest level of friendship, literal- 
ly meaning 'like brother' (see Chapter 4). 
2. Rko - acorn, pig food which grows on trees. 
3. Petvee - kind of dough, kept in cellars. 
4. The extended families in the survey included Ego's brethren and 
their spouses, his wife's family: parents, brethren and spouses; 
their children and spouses; and both Ego and his wife's uncles 
and aunts - that is, each father's and mother's brethren. Elam 
(1974) also mentions this phenomenon: "In our visits we often 
hear that relatives of the family questioned delayed their migra- 
tion because one of them was in Jail for economic crime and they 
waited until his sentence was finishedn (p. 7). And Lahav (1976) 
notes: *1 spoke to scores of Georgians in Tel-Aviv and Lod, in 
Ramla and Ashdod, in Kiryat-Malakhi and Kiron. I almost did not 
meet a family that did not have a 'representative' in Jail. That 
person was himself in prison, another has a brother who is still 
in; a certain Mr. X delayed his Aliyah because he was a prisoner 
when his family emigrated and a particular Mr. Y was waiting for 
a cousin, who had only recently been released. "The Jail is part 
of the rules of the game" they say (24.9.76). 
5. This raises once again the question of how representative is the 
Jewish sample to the general population of Soviet Georgia. This 
is discussed in Chapter 3 on Jews in Georgia, in particular the 
section on their place in the second economy. 
6. He uses the Russian slang for illegal economic activity: Levi, 
which literally means 'left' as against the 'right', which refers 
to the official economy. 
7. Elam, who had no particular interest in the second economy nor in 
Iifein Georgi a, menti ons thi s phenomenon of FEAR several ti me 
(1973,1974,1980) and always as an abstract noun, always putting 
it in inverted commas, as if wishing to emphasize a special 
meani ng. 
8. Thi sisa rather common method of by-passi ng the 1 ocal author- 
ities. 
9. The Economic Police. 
10. A member of the Communist Youth. 
11. The loans were given under no guarantee without any condition or 
specified time for returning. It is done under the understanding 
that a person's honour commits him and his family to see to it 
that the loans are returned as soon as possible. In this par- 
ticular case it took 18 months to return the lot. (On the infor- 
mal organization of traders in the market see Chapter 7). 
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12. Thus, not taking advantage of the person's plight. 
13. Allocation Centre. 
14. In charge of Allocations. 
15. The informant refers to the region where he lived and worked. 
16. The Allocation Centre officials are most powerful and can dictate 
the movement of not only illicit but also official goods. For a 
detailed discussion see Chapter 7 on The Store. 
17. Dogs are a common nickname for policemen in Georgia among opera- 
tors in the second economy. When I enquired about the doggish 
qualities of this attribute, I was told that it referred to the 
fact that once they get hold of somebody, they do not easily let 
go. 
18. Bill of Lading. 
19. It is expected on such occasions to take the blame wholly on 
oneself, so as not to implicate more. It is also better for 
juridical reasons (see discussions later). 
20. This equals roughly two months salary of a police officer. 
21. Meaning: You are not yet a man - you don't have honour and hence 
you cannot have a word of honour. 
22. In Hebrew, this expression means that one should expect troubles 
in the future. 
23. This is important, since to give somebody away is very unmanly 
behaviour. But if one is drunk he is probably less accountable 
for his words. Which is not less important for his self-esteem 
than for public opinion. 
24. The biscuit factory produced one biscuit illegally to every four 
produced legally. 
25.1 cannot, of course, quote the letter word for word, but I tried 
to be as accurate as the undetectibility of my sources would 
allow. 
26. Though this account dates back farther than all other accounts, 
it seems to have stayed a very vivid memory, because of the 
event's rather traumatic impact. Unlike other occasions I was 
able here to ask questions which reveal some of the underlying 
dynamics of crises. 
27. Dsemobili - like brother. 
28. Negobari -a very close friend. 
29. Prokurator - Public Prosecutor. 
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30. Though the events happened in the fifties, before the devaluation 
of the Ruble, the figures are given in current, new Rubles. 
31. Equals roughly one week's average formal income (plus bonus) for 
the said period. (The event took place in 1968 and the average 
monthly income for that year was 135 Rubles: Gruzinskaya SSR v 
Tsifrakh 1975 (1976)). 
32. This was true also where illegal production output was much 
higher than in the biscuit factory and even where goods passed 
through mediating agencies before reaching the stores. 
33. Though mainly in the sense of staying on the monthly payroll. 
34. The common name for any illicit profit-making activity in Georgia 
(but this is also common official Soviet Jargon: Lexicon of the 
Soviet Language, 1980). 
35. The terms are discussed in Chapter 6 on The Factory. 
36. First and second order zones or personal and intimate zones - to 
use established concepts (Boissevain, 1978). 
37. The closest event in which I participated and observed this kind 
of behaviour (Phase 1 of the research) was a crisis, with a 
similar urgency and much importance but of a different kind. 
Less than 24 hours bef ore it was schedul ed, I heard that in the 
neighbouring town of Ashdod, Israeli TV (which only has one 
channel and therefore a major impact) were presenting a live 
documentary on the local Georgian community. I immediately con- 
tacted my closest informants, who again contacted their closest 
friends and we held an emergency meeting with the aim of sending 
an Ashkelonian representative along to express our opinion in the 
film. The series of actions taken was similar to those discussed 
here. Participants screened the available resources, located 
key-figures and used them to get. through to relevant function- 
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1. THE SECOND ECONOMY: VALUES AND STRUCTURES 
1.1 The Second Economy as a Societal Phenomenon 
The interdependencies between a people's social needs, expressed in 
their culture's core values; their political needs expressed in their 
anti-Russian attitudes and a unique social organization epitomized in 
their nepotistic networks, have all helped to sustain Georgia's vi- 
brant second economy. This second economy caters to, and is a product 
of, the competitive urge for demonstrative honour grading that is 
readily expressed in an insatiable demand for scarce consumer goods. 
The same competitive - and therefore essentially fragmentary - pres- 
sures allow expressions of political dissidence to find fulfilment in 
'screwing the system' and thus it provides an alternative to political 
opposition. Georgians rate low (next only to the Russians themselves) 
in the number of political prisoners held per thousand of population 
(LubeLrsky, 1979 in Wiles, 1980). And traditional social institutions 
such as the networks - have come to take on new roles in confronting, 
negating and by-passing the rigours of centrally planned controls. 
The more that attempts are made to impose central controls the more it 
appears that networks adapt to mobilize and assert opposition. Thi s 
can be seen, for instance, in the negation of attempts by the central 
authorities to channel the distribution of particularly scarce con- 
sumer goods - such as cars - which are allocated through places of 
work. Networks have come to focus their attention on the workplace 
and to utilize its delegated control over such allocations for the 
benefit of personal network memberships. In this way network influ- 
ence can extend well beyond the boundary of a workplace. 
It is as if a closed circle has been drawn around the territory of 
Soviet Georgia, within which its people are compelled to adhere to 
different rules than those the Moscow authorities expect, or at least 
plan for. These difficulties that face the central Soviet author- 
ities, derive in part from their ideological commitment to seeing the 
production and distribution of goods as somehow separated from their 
cultural bases. From Moscow's standpoint cultural differences are 
peripheral, essentially transitory and subordinate to the concerns of 
the planning centre. Seen from Georgia the reverse applies. 
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In its attempts to achieve control the Soviet centre has developed a 
complex system of independent check-points which should, in principle, 
be able to combat corruption. It is what Rose-Ackerman (1978) and 
Montias and Rose-Ackerman (1980) have called a fragmented type of 
hierarchy, one where separate controls operate independently from each 
other. But these controls, though locally oriented, are still set 
within an overall bureaucratic frame. In Soviet Georgia I found that 
the personal support network has readily adapted itself to combat such 
hierarchic fragmentation, Just as it has in effecting the realloction 
of goods through the workplace. It does both - as I have shown - by 
extending its contacts to overcome independent control points. And in 
doing this it not only negates their power but it also captures their 
personnel and hence the power awarded to them as well. 
1.2 Soviet and Georgian Values 
The fact that a bureaucratic homogeneity can be planned to operate 
with minimal reference to cultural variations should not, however, 
mean that our understanding of reality is well served by ignoring the 
variability of cultural bases within the Soviet Union. When we find a 
particularly divergent cultural base such as that offered us from 
Georgia, then the distinction between the Soviet orthodoxy of what 
should be, and the 'on the ground' reality of what is, appears at its 
most pronounced. If we look at the official Soviet view of work - 
that is, of how a Soviet bureaucracy should run (eg: Mahoney, 1982; 
Nachmias and Rosenbloom, 1978; Weber, 1947) - and the values effec- 
tively associated with work, we can further appreciate the gulf of 
this distinction between a Soviet centre and the periphery that is 
Georgia. 
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Table 1: Work and Work Values: Formal Soviet Work Values vs. the 
Georgian Value System 
Principle Formal Soviet Values Georgian Values 
Separation and insulation There is a fusion of work 
of private life from work life and private life. 
life. 
1 (a) Since private and work 
lives are conceptually 
separate they are not 
rated vis-a-vis each 
other nor seen as 








Recruitment on impartial 
universalistic merit. 
Hierarchical organization: 
directives go down; 
information flows up. 
Officials are responsible 
to the official above them 
and for the work of sub- 
ordinates. 
Work roles and relation- 
ships are unambiguously 
defined. 
Decisions are based on 
rules and analogies. 
Every role is replaceable. 
Since private and work lives 
are fused within one concep- 
tual system the resources 
from one can be used in the 
service of the other. Since 
private concerns are domi- 
nant, work roles and re- 
sources are therefore sub- 
ordinate to private concerns. 
Nepotism as a moral duty. 
Patron-client networks: 
directives come from where 
the real power is invested; 
information flows along net- 
work lines. 
Officials are primarily 
responsible to the claims of 
obligation and reciprocity 
imposed by network relation- 
ships. 
Work roles and relationships 
are part of a total role set 
(work is not set apart from 
the rest of life). 
Decisions are submitted to 
honour commitments. 
Every role holder is network- 
bounded. 
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From the official Soviet standpoint office holders are essentially 
replaceable units set within one overall bureaucracy where decisions 
are subject to hierarchical control, where rewards are allocated from 
above and where expectations are clearly defined. In this world, 
officials are recruited on impartial, universalistic criteria, a per- 
songs overall rewards from work are distributed according to office 
and private and work concerns are conceptually separate. 
The Georgian way however is worlds apart. Work is an integral part of 
one's life and a person is expected to use his powers in the service 
of his 'significant others'. The workplace is essentially conceived 
as a resource available to the members of one's personal support 
network. Loyalties are partial and dominated by the office holder's 
obligations. Indeed his whole career starting with the choice of 
occupations. through recruitment to promotionis determined along very 
different criteria from what the Moscow authorities would expect. 
The key element is the network and the relationships between the 
strength of an individual's network and the kind of Job he is likely 
to be engaged in (with its associated rewards and inherent risks) is 
presented in Table 2. 
1.3 occupational Stratification, Georgian Style 
Table 2 demonstrates that if we look at representative occupations in 
terms of their related networks and the risks involved in them, we 
find a close association between occupations and personal support 
networks: a small and/or weak network enables an individual to oper- 
ate only in a low risk occupation. A strong and/or extended network 
allows for the taking of bigger risks and allows entry into more 
prestigious occupations. Earnings, as would be expected, are linked 
to risk, and risks and earnings are both linked to honour - all derive 
from the effectiveness of networks. 
1 
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Table 2: Representative Occupations and their Related Network Cores, Risks 
and Income 
OCCUPATIONS NETWORK CORES RISK INVOLVED MONTHLY 
INCOME. 
Occupational Total Low Med High Formal & 
Weight Score Informal 
Incl. 
GROUP I (a) Barber 1+1 2 400-60OR 
(b) Shoemaker/ 1+1+1+2 5 400-60OR 
Personal Repairer 
Services (c) Hatter 1+1+1+1 4 300-50OR 
& Shop- (d) Small 2+1+1+1+ 8 300-40OR 
Floor Snack-bar 1+1+1 
Workers (e) Blue-Collar 1+2+1+1+ 11 25OR 
1+1+1+2+1 
Average 6.0 
GROUP II (f) Shop Assistant 1+2+2+1+ 10 
1/ 300-SOOR 1+2+1 
Middlemen (g) Shoemaker: 2+1+1+1+ 12 600-90OR 
& small Foreman & 2+1+1+2+1 
Business Middleman 
operators (h) Taxi Driver 3+1+1+3+ is 800-100OR 
2+3+1+1 
(i) Small Shop- 2+1+1+1+ 8 500-80OR 
Keeper 1+1+1 
Average 11.25 
GROUP III (j ) Supermarket 3+3+3+3+ 20 2000-250OR 
Manager 3+3+1+1 
Profes- (k) Small Factory 3+1+3+3+ 16 J 1000-200OR 
sional Executive 3+3 
Executives (I ) Medium Factory 2+2+3 7 1000-150OR 
Executive 
(m) Big Factory 3+3+1+3+ 19 2000-1000OR 
Executive 3+3+3 
(n) Import Ware- 3+2+1+1+ 9 3000-500OR 
House 1+1 
Executive 
(0) Physician 1+3+3+3+ 16 Starter 100OR (GP) 3+3 Specialist 
up to 1500OR I Average 1 14 
* Network cores are computed here from males within the nuclear families of 
origin and marriage. We thus include father of Ego, father of wife, brothers, 
sisters' husbands and wife's brothers. Their 'weight' is then calculated on the basis of a rating of their occupation, classified into. personal services/ 
shop floor labour 1 point; middlemen/small businessmen =2 points; profes- 
sional /executives 3 points. Only social active persons are considered. The deceased and young are excluded. 
Though network cores are kinship based their extension depends upon peer group 
contact. 
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Table 2 also demonstrates that those economists who have relied on 
official Soviet statistics are particularly misplaced when drawing 
interpretations about occupational structures, reward systems and the 
importance for instance of bonuses as part of the managerial package 
(eg. Granick, 1972). 1 would argue that for Georgia at least, no 
assumptions in any of these areas can be considered valid if they draw 
upon official figures - and even less when such figures are homog- 
enized as part of discussions about 'the Soviet Manager' or 'the 
Soviet Worker' (eg: Lane and O'Dell, 1978), offered irrespective of 
their cultural settings within the Soviet Union. 
What is required then, is a fresh look at the social bases of occupa- 
tions within the Soviet Union, one which takes account of cultural 
variation. In the Georgian case at least, it would appear that though 
success in recruitment, selection, promotion and career development 
might well have some dependence on necessary universalistic criteria, 
these would not of themselves be sufficient in any of these areas. 
Network criteria appear to be of overriding importance in determining 
the role, place and rewards of an individual in Georgia's occupational 
structure. Maintaining and developing this resource demands the in- 
vestment of social and material resources. The necessary skills of a 
Georgian manager are therefore, differently, ordered than one would 
expect from his counterpart in the West and perhaps from those of 
managers in other Soviet Republics. 
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2. THE SECOND ECONOMY: POINTS OF VIEW 
2.1 Two 'Economies' or One? 
The common approach to the study of the second economy, has been - as 
its name suggests - to differentiate between the formal, 'first' 
economy and its subsidiary, the informal or 'second' economy. 
This approach is useful for economists who can then distinguish be- 
tween official and unofficial data. But it would appear to require 
at least adequate assessments of the quantities of both kinds of data, 
which is surely problematic in the case of the Soviet Union where all 
figures are notoriously suspect. However, the underlying assumptions 
underpinning this approach may well lead to dangerous conclusions - in 
the assumption, for instance of a distinction between two kinds of 
economic behaviours when no such distinction exists. Katsenlinboigen 
(1978,1982) for example writes of the Soviet system's 'pathology' and 
uses metaphors such as 'schizophrenic' when discussing the present 
state of Soviet economic performance. From here it is only a short 
path to suggest that the Soviet system faces the option either to 
'reform2 or to die' as Meney (1982) argues. The danger from this 
approach lies firstly, in the suggestion that there can be 'right' and 
'wrong' in an economy - that the right is functional to the system and 
that the wrong is dysfunctional - and further, that one can - and 
should - right the wrong in order to make the system become 
'healthier' and thereby more efficient. However, economic behaviour 
is economic behaviour which is culture bound and culture rooted. 
People do not differentiate between first and second, formal and 
informal, official and unofficial behaviour, in the same way as econo- 
mists do. The clear message this study bears is the existence of an 
interactive bond between all economic activities, at least as it 
concerns the people who operate in the system. Even the associated 
dangers of imprisonment, for that matter, are perceived as part and 
parcel of one indivisible reality; of risk conceived as an unavoidable 
element of cost. 
It is not, however, only through the eyes of actors 'on the ground' 
that this inadequate dualism cannot be sustained. The Soviet system 
itself does not sustain a distinction between a 'first' and a 'second' 
economy, or a 'normal' and an 'abnormal', one. The fact is that the 
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system works as an integrated whole and has done so for a long time. 
Disruptions and malfunctions, may on the one hand cause serious defor- 
mations to some overall and distant plan but viewed from 'on the 
ground', on the other hand, they may well be evidence of a vigorous 
and vigilant system, which has the energy and capacity to accommodate 
to demand, adapt production and transform supply. So we return to the 
observer's point of view - where he stands determines what it is he 
sees. What he sees - and what we have seen through his eyes - is a 
level of output and a process of distribution that uses 'official' 
labour on official ma chinery in official factories - to produce both 
official and unofficial produce and then to distribute it through 
official outlets. The people who make and distribute this produce 
gain overall incomes that can be divided if we wish, into formal and 
informal components. But they themselves make no such distinctions. 
Whether producers, distributors or consumers they are involved in one 
overall set of activities. 
The point that arises from a discussion of the duality or otherwise of 
economic behaviour is surely that some aspects of economic activity 
are always, as of necessity, more covert than are others and that some 
economies - just as some organizations - have a greater or lesser 
propensity towards concealment. The danger has been that economists 
interested in the Soviet Union have, until recently, tended to ignore 
these activities which has seriously distorted their observations and 
their conclusions. And, having become aware of the informal, the 
danger now lies in their tendency to treat it as a separate and 
distinct type of behaviour. 
2.2 The Size and Possible Scope of the Second Economy 
A limitation any micro-oriented, anthropologically based study faces 
is in its possibility to generalize. The ever intriguing question of 
how applicable findings are, applies to the present study as well. 
Can we estimate the extent of Soviet Georgia's second economy? Well, 
not directly, but there are certainly some indicators which could, at 
least, hint at some plausible answers. 
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To start with, the involvement in the second economy seems to encom- 
pass practically every corner of life: it is unavoidable - that is, 
if you are a Georgian. Schroeder-Greenslade's (1980) statement that 
119 .. regarding Transcaucasia, my strong impression is that illegal 
activities there are primarily redistributive: favoured groups ... 
are pervasively engaged in extracting money and goods from less fa- 
voured groups" (p. 17) does not seem to fit with the impressions gener- 
ated from this research. It is not only that the national cake is 
differently divided, but firstly, the 'real' cake is much bigger than 
the one which appears in the formal figures: and secondly, more 
people have a share in it than might be envisaged by reading the daily 
press or even in walking the streets of Tbilisi. 
Though the people of Georgia would appear to have an insatiable demand 
for consumer goods and though there is some evidence that unofficial 
supply expands to meet it (as evidenced for instance, in the quick and 
steady expansion of road freight as compared to both rail and air), 3 
the possibility of the second economy being for ever able to ef- 
fectively expand must be limited. First and foremost an effective 
expansion in supply depends upon an output that benefits from econo- 
mies of scale. From the case studies presented here (particularly in 
Chapter 6) it appears that increases in supply are necessarily limit- 
ed, however, not because of a lack of effective demand but because 
distribution is reduced to a radius that is bounded by the effective- 
ness of personal networks. It is this distributional limit that 
limits production to safe levels. This perhaps explains why Mars in 
1982, was able to observe a factory in Tbilisi that produced a whole 
range of different consumer items, each of which he considered was 
being produced at well below their optimum output levels (personal 
communication). By producing a multiplicity of small outputs for 
local markets they maximized security but at the cost of operating 
without the benefits of scale. 
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Postscript 
I believe I can now go some way in explaining why the Georgian Second 
Economy should be larger in real terms than the second economies of 
other Soviet type republics. To be sure other Soviet type economies 
display the same kind of second economy practices. They too depend 
for much of their informal economic activity on 'friends of friends'. 
But it is the degree to which networks in Georgia are institutional- 
ized as a means of linking individuals through trust based honour 
commitments that forms the cornerstone of Georgia's second economy. 
The difference may a ppear to be merely one of degree but it is based 
on a fundamental cultural distinction. 
I hope to have demonstrated how restropective reconstruction can work. 
How a concern with the central interest of anthropology - the idea of 
cul ture ' the application of the concept of personal support network 
and the alliance of these to the anthropological method of patient 
participant observation, can produce understanding of an economic 
system that would otherwise be unobtainable. Other Soviet type econo- 
mies based on different cultural core values may well display high 
levels of second economy activity. Ofer and Vinokur (1979), for 
instance, suggest that this is the case in the Central Asian Republics 
- well known to be second only to Georgia in this respect. It is not 
sufficient, however, to consider merely the overall outcome of second 
economy activity. If this phenomenon is to be understood it must be 
examined in the context of its cultural setting. Recourse to the 





Of course, things are somewhat more complicated and correlations 
between network cores and occupations would vary according to 
circumstances. While the general trend is clearly manifested in 
Table 2, there are notable exceptions. In case (e) the blue- 
collar worker was not able to take advantage of his relatively 
strong network, because he broke relations with them. Case (1) - 
our biscuit factory production line manager, was discussed before 
(Chapter 6); and case (n) is perhaps the most striking example 
of all. As an executive of a central warehouse in control of 
imported consumer goods he was placed in this position because he 
only possessed a weak network, thus ensuring his inability to 
abuse the powers entrusted to him. 
2. What Berliner (1983) labelled the 'radical' model. 
3. The flexibilities for illicit distribution by road are consider- 
ably higher than by either rail or air (see Chapter 7). 
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APPENDICES 
QUESTIONNAIRES AND SURVEYS 
1. Life History Questionnaire 
2. Life in Georgia Questionnaire 
Personal Details Questionnaire 
4. Literature Survey 
A-1 
LIFE HISTORY QUESTIONNAIRE 
PURPOSES: 
1) To learn on Ego's familial ties. 
2) To learn on Ego's and Family's occupations and wealth in Georgia. 
3) To learn on Ego's engagements with gentiles. 
4) To learn on some aspects of Ego's life and personality. 
5) To learn on some social/economic aspects of Georgia. 
Question P= Purpose 
PQ 
1 Ego's familial chart: names, dates, places (see under 
separate page). 
32 Was Ego known in his Christian or Hebrew name in Georgia? 
(a) C (b) H 
2: 4 3* Education: Ego studied ........ years 
university/polytechnic in G ........ years 
in IS ........ years. Profession acquired 
5: 2 4* Occupation: What did you live from? In chronological 
order: - 
A (1) Occupation ........ 
(2) From ........ to ........ 
(3) Who referred you to this job (state relation, eg: 
cousin of mother; gentile friend)? ........ 
(4) Why did you want this job? What made you like it? 
.0.0.00.00.0000#0000.. 4.00*000000............... 
00.0.06*000a. a. 0.46.0...... 0.0.0..................... 
(5) How did you get it? Describe the procedure. 
(NOTE: Q3 - Q5 - Double Check) 
es..... ". I" """S""" "......... .. II " "" "S" "S "s" . "I.. lS. s ..... . 
(6) Was it easy/difficult to get/fix? .............. 
(7) If you changed the Job why? 
.......... 0a00*000... *a.. 0000000000.0. **000*00 
If Ego was too young to develop career in Georgia, these items refer 
to parents. 
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B (1) - (7) 
(1) - (7) 
5: 2 5* Wife's education - as in Q. 3 
6* Wife's occupation: Did your wife work? 
(a) Yes (b) No 
If yes - in what ........ from ........ to 
How did she get it? Describe the procedure .............. 
.*00000000**0.09... *0000. *. 0a0a60.00&0**0000.............. 
Was it easy/difficult to obtain/fix? 
1: 2 7 Kinship occupations. Insert occupations in chart. 
Including R/P/S. 
2: 58 Income figure - monthly ........ Rubles (including formal 
and informal). 
59 This figure is (a) average 
W above average 
W below average figure of income in this occupation 
carried out under similar circumstances. (If Ego refers to 
several occupations, repeat Q to each). 
5 10 To the best of your knowledge, in your home village (town), 
how many ........ % were I ike you ini ncome; how many bel ow 
........ % how many above ........ %. 
2 11 Housing of family. Number of rooms ........ and m2 
of garden (land). 
5 12 The dwel Ii ng was 
(a) smaller 
W bigger 
(c) same as standard (normal). 
If Ego was too young to develop career in Georgia, these items refer 
to parents. 
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2: 5 13 Did you: 
A) Own the housing? - 
(1) Inherited from (relation) ........ 
(2) Bought for ........ Rubles 
(3) Built for ........ Rubles 
B) Rent it for ........ Rubles Monthly? 
3 14 Did you live in a particular Jewish neighbourhood; were 
most of your neighbours Jewish rather than gentiles? 
(a) Yes (b) No 
3 15 Ego's close friends (to include blood brotherhood and milk 
brotherhood) 
How many? ........ How many of them gentiles? 
A) Jewish/Non-Jewish B) C) 
occupation 
R/P/S place How often met? 
............ . place IS 
3: 4 16 Circumstances of making blood brotherhood and milk 
brotherhood .............................................. 
17 Engagement with family. Insert in kinship chart according 
to symbols 
1: 4 18 If you had to raise a large sum of money in G whom would 
you approach - in what priorities? Indicate relations. 
A) B) C) 
3: 4 19 How often would you attend synagogue? 
(a) Everyday 
(b) Every Sabbath 
(c) Only on holidays and special occasions 
3 20 How often were you invited to gentile parties, 
celebrations, familial events? 
(a) Once a month or more 
(b) Every few months 
(c) once a year 
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2: 4: 5 21 If not mentioned earlier - have you or your family had any 
troubles with the authorities which resulted in an arrest 
or threatened arrest? 
If yes - who was it? (relation) .......................... 
When (approx. date) ........ 
Reasons and cicumstances ................................. 
Who is to blame and motives .............................. 
........................... 0.000.0. *. 0.. 0000900*00*a0. aa. s 
CIRCUMSTANCES OF INTERVIEW 
(a) Date, time and duration 
(b) Mediator to interviewee 
(C) Translator (1) No (2) Yes (who: relation) 
(d) Location: refreshments? Who else was present 
(e) Interviewee's acceptance of interview: 
(1) Willing to assist; enthusiastic 
(2) Willing but restricted; passive 
(3) Suspicious; not cooperative 
(4) Indifferent 
M Reports on interviewee's credibility 
(1) 1 knew him for ........ 
(2) 1 have had previous contacts with him ........ 







Place of Residence, G: 




Place of Residence, G: 
Place of Residence, IS: 
Age: 
Married: 
Place of Residence, G: 
Place of Residence, IS: 
Occupation: 











Wife's Uncles & Aunts 
c? 2, ý4 
Trader, Trader 











Ego's Bretheren Wife's Bretheren 
d' 44, (f 38, ý 36 ý 28, (f 33 
1958,1965,1962 1970, - 
Kutaisi (All) Oni, Tbilisi 
Ashdod, Ashkelon, Lod Ashdod, Jerusalem 
Tailor, Tailor, N/A N/A, Academic 
Chi 1 dren 
Children's Espouse Family: 
Place of Residence, G: 
Place of Residence, IS: 
1. Itzhak (f20 
2. Hanna 16 






Weal th symbol s: 
R- richer than Ego; P- poorer than Ego; S- same as Ego. 
Engagement Symbols in: 
Georgia (Israel) 
1 (A) Would meet a person once a week or less. 
2 (B) would once a month or less. 
3 (C) Would once every few months. 
0 (0) Would once a year or less. 
Gender Symbols: d Male, ý Female. 
Kinship Symbols: F- Father, M- Mother. 
Location Symbols: G- Georgia, IS - Israel. 
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LIFE IN GEORGIA QUESTIONNAIRE 
A Prize Winning Competition for 13-14 Year Olds 
Life in Georgia and in Israel: compare relations between Jews 
and gentiles 
(a) i) Living amongst gentiles 
ii) Living amongst Jews (in Israel) 
(b) Economic (status) position in Georgia and in Israel 
(c) Customes in Georgia and Israel (eg: High Holidays) 
2. What do I remember from Georgia? 
(a) Landscape (climate) 
(b) People 
(c) A certain event which I particularly recall 
Life in Georgia: good and bad 
(a) Something good that happened to me 
(b) Something bad that happened to me 
or: 
(c) What do I miss most? 
(d) What disturbed me most? 
Choose 2 out of 3 subjects. * Relate either to your personal experi- 
ences or question someone who came from Georgia (in which case enclose 
details of the interviewee). 
* Most pupils examined all three subjects 
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PERSONAL DETAILS QUESTIONNAIRE 
A Questionnaire to the Pupil 
Date ........ Class ........ 
School ................ 
I was born in ................ 
(Name of place in Georgia) 
I came to Israel in ........ 
(Year) 
Father is ........ years old. 
He grew up in ................ 
(Place in Georgia) 
Father has ........ brothers. 
Father has ........ sisters. 
He studied ........ years. 
Mother is ........ years old. 
She grew up in ................ 
(Place in Georgia) 
Mother has ........ brothers. 
Mother has ........ sisters. 
She studied ........ years. 
Married in 19 ..... (Year) 
Father Did Not Work in Georgia 
(Encircle if Applicable) 




He now works in ................ 
Father Has Not Worked in Israel 
(Encircle if Applicable) 




Mother Did Not Work in Georgia 
(Encircle if Applicable) 




She now works in ................ 
Mother Has Not Worked in Israel 
(Encircle if Applicable) 




Brothers and Sisters: 
Name .................. Age ....... Studies/Works at ................ 
Name .................. Age ....... Studies/Works at ................ 
Name .................. Age ....... Studies/Works at ................ 
Remarks: ........................................................... 
0.. 00*0000000..................... 00**.. #00.. 
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LITERATURE SURVEY 
List the twenty literary pieces you studied at school (Grades 6- 
10: age 11-15), which you rate as most important and which you 
like most. Do not consult others: it is important to obtain 
your opinion. Name the piece and the author. 
The literary pieces named by all six repsondents were: 
1. Shota Rustaveli: The Knight in the Tiger's Skin. 
2. Ilya Chavchavadze: Is He A Man? 
3. Alexander Azbegi: Khevis-beri Gocha. 
4. Akaki Tsereteli: The Guardian. 
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